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ABSTRACT 
 
Knowing Others, or Not: Performing, Caring, Foreboding, and Acknowledging  
in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction 
 
By  
Meechal Hoffman 
 
Advisor: Talia Schaffer  
 
Knowing Others, Or Not makes two overarching claims about the nineteenth-
century novel’s depictions of relations. First, they are overwhelmingly concerned with 
epistemological questions about knowing others, and second, more often than not, the 
problem of other minds is portrayed as productive of both pleasure and valuable negative 
affects. While much scholarship on the relational nineteenth century focuses on either 
sympathy or social responsibility within the framework of liberal individualism, I show 
instead that the authors in this study—Jane Austen, Charlotte Brontë, Wilkie Collins, and 
George Eliot—repeatedly register doubt about the usefulness or possibility of 
authenticity, and posit the pleasure that bad feelings can bring to characters and readers. 
As my subtitle indicates, I focus on four sites of epistemological inquiry: performances of 
authenticity, care relations that distinguish between care as an action and care as a 
feeling, foreboding as a feeling unlike anxiety that stems from accurate knowledge, and 
acknowledgment of others in the place of sympathy or knowledge. Throughout, this 
dissertation asks questions about performance, affect, and knowledge—What emotions 
are structurally expected in what contexts? What social performances are demanded and 
by whom? What options are there for acting out? How can we allow for radical 
difference while acknowledging shared values?—and attends to the centrality of, and 
indeed encouragement of, bad behavior and feelings in the nineteenth-century novel.  
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 1 
KNOWING OTHERS, OR NOT: AN INTRODUCTION 
DAPHNE. My dear Mrs. Humbug how d’ye 
do? Oh! Fanny, t’is all over.  
FANNY: Is it indeed!  
MRS HUM. I’m very sorry to hear it.  
FANNY. Then t’was to no purpose that I… 
DAPHNE. None upon Earth.  
MRS HUM. And what is to become of?... 
DAPHNE. Oh! That’s all settled, (whispers 
MRS HUMBUG)  
FANNY. And how is it determined?  
DAPHNE. I’ll tell you. (whispers FANNY)  
MRS. HUM. And is he to?... 
DAPHNE. I’ll tell you all I know of the 
matter. (whispers MRS HUMBUG & 
FANNY)  
FANNY. Well! Now I know everything 
about it, I’ll go [and dress] away.  
MRS HUM. And so will I.  
DAPHNE. And so will I.  
[Exeunt.]  
– Jane Austen, “The Mystery: An 
Unfinished Comedy”   
 
“What does knowledge do?” 
–Eve Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading and  
Reparative Reading, Or, You’re So 
Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay is 
About You”  
  
On the brink of marriage to Dorothea Brooke, Mr. Casaubon “did not find his 
spirits rising.” Instead, “Here was a weary experience in which he was utterly condemned 
to loneliness as in the despair which sometimes threatened him while toiling in the 
morass of authorship without seeming nearer to the goal. And his was that worst 
loneliness which would shrink from sympathy” (85-6). Even in the moments when we 
approach, finally, at long last, the relations we’ve sought, we are thrown, like “Poor 
Casaubon,” back into isolated despair, or anxious jealousy, or guarded secrecy, feelings 
more grievous for their very nearness to the desired object. Throughout George Eliot’s 
Middlemarch, we are left with the gnawing feeling that if only they could tell one another 
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everything, it would all be okay: if only Casaubon could have told Dorothea of his self-
doubt, if only Lydgate could be frank with Rosamond about their financial situation, if 
only Bulstrode and Featherstone could have gotten their news out in time, and so on. My 
dissertation spends time at this site of overlap between relations and epistemological 
uncertainty. What happens to relations when we accept the problem of other minds, 
conceding that we can’t know or get adequately close to others, and yet live in constant, 
unavoidable proximity and reliance on them?  
In the novels I consider, the answer is surprisingly exploratory, playful, and even, 
at times, perverse. Indeed, the spirit of the teenage Jane Austen, author of the epigraph 
above—a piece of juvenilia quoted in full—hovers over what follows: the mystery 
underpinning all our relations is a cause for whispering, sarcastic hilarity as much as for 
isolating self-doubt. As Austen wrote in dedicating this bit of mischief to her father, the 
“following Comedy, which tho’ an unfinished one, is I flatter myself as complete a 
Mystery as any of its kind” (56, emphasis in the original). Austen’s linguistic playfulness 
provides minimal cover for her layered paradox: her mystery is complete in having been 
whispered in full (albeit inaudibly to audiences or readers), it’s complete because it is not 
truly a fragment but a finished piece of family fun (where the left-off and ambiguous 
style is part of the design), it’s complete in the sense of being still a complete mystery 
(where not only the whisperings are unknowable, but the very nature of the mystery 
remains a mystery), and it’s completely both a mystery and a comedy. Further, the 
enigma is delivered as a performance. In the novels by Jane Austen, Charlotte Brontë, 
Wilkie Collins, and George Eliot that make up this study, knowledge of the other is 
presented as a complicated matter: a question with both the highest of stakes and an 
 3 
enormous potential for experimentation and pleasure. And in these novels that interrogate 
the authenticity, veracity, and knowability of others, much attention is paid to the 
performances of self that are enacted as a matter of course in daily life. These 
performances differ greatly, as we will see, and correspond to historically shifting 
expectations for behavior and affect, and the ways those expectations are contravened. 
Throughout, the problem of other minds is a source of play and pleasure, even when it is 
also a source of anxiety or loss.  
Rife with marriage plots, care relations, webs of coincidence, and intertwined or 
double plots, my dissertation shows the inescapable relationality of the novel form, but 
demonstrates that nineteenth-century novelists were invested foremost in their difficulty, 
performativity, and in the negative affects and behaviors they produce. While the novel 
insists formally on the inescapably social nature of human relations, nineteenth-century 
novels don’t often depict happy, collaborative characters engaged in seamless or even 
functional interaction and communication. I argue that the novelists in this study, and 
often in the period more broadly, are invested and interested in this discomfort and 
nastiness. Meanwhile, however, scholarship on nineteenth-century British literature 
remains deeply invested in ideas of liberalism, individualism, and self-improvement, 
forms of political and philosophical theory designed to protect and solve against the 
volatility of epistemological doubt. As David Kurnick points out in Empty Houses: 
Theatrical Failure and the Novel (2012), it is still almost axiomatic to declare that the 
novel, and especially the novels of the nineteenth century whose innovations—such as 
free indirect discourse and stream of consciousness—led to what we might call the 
modern novel, is committed to individualism:  
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The novel of interiority seems to offer irrefutable support for Ian Watt’s 
canonical description of the novel as “less concerned with the public and 
more with the private side of life than any previous” literary form, as well 
as for Sylvie Thorel-Cailleteau’s recent claim that “the history of the genre 
is related to that of contracting space.” In a series of influential critiques, 
each of the writers treated here [Thackeray, Eliot, James, and Baldwin] has 
been faulted for a betrayal of the collective imagination […] Although 
these novelists have received the harshest assessments from Marxist 
analysts, the terms of those critiques chime with descriptions of the novel 
of interiority articulated from a host of perspectives—from post-
structuralist feminist Nancy Armstrong’s claim that the novel’s “phobic 
representations of the human aggregate” indicate that “the novel of course 
was not made to think beyond the individual” to sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu’s assertion that “the psychological novel…maximize[s] denial of 
the social world” (2-3).   
Elaine Hadley, in Living Liberalism: Practical Citizenship in Mid-Victorian Britain 
(2010), writes that “mid-Victorian liberalism offers the promise of abstracted 
individuality, which emancipates the subject from these diverse formulations of 
bodiliness and their constitutive social spaces through its twin practices of privatization 
and abstraction” (64). Hadley shows that liberalism consists of having opinions and being 
unique and individuated, but at the same time, not eccentric or threatening. This makes 
“living liberalism” a contradiction, or, at best, nearly impossible. David Wayne Thomas, 
in Cultivating Victorians: Liberal Culture and the Aesthetic (2003), argues that liberal 
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culture and aesthetics in the Victorian period are joined in a project of self-improvement 
and social amelioration. Hadley and Thomas both show that liberalism is central to the 
Victorian ethos, especially in the generation of moral self-improvement. Andrew Miller, 
writing about moral self-improvement in The Burdens of Perfection: On Ethics and 
Reading in Nineteenth-Century British Literature (2008), helps us see, though, the ways 
that this individualism is always relationally figured in the Victorian period. While on the 
one hand, Miller writes that “This desire [for moral self-improvement] has come to seem 
not merely an essential expression of individualism, though it has often been that, but a 
defining aspect of modernity,” he also writes that “this self needs discovering; we are not 
readily apparent to ourselves or to others but must be called forth and given support” (8, 
emphasis in the original). We come to know and improve ourselves through dialogue and 
reaction. “The individual who emerges in response to such an injunction is not the 
solitary subject of classical liberalism, cast against such imposing abstractions as the state 
of public opinion […] Instead, moral perfectionism provides a complex, relational 
understanding of self-hood” (15). In contrast to, and sometimes in parallel to, scholarship 
on nineteenth-century individualism, much contemporary scholarship on the Victorian 
novel, its relational ethos, and its cultural context is highly invested in moral self-
improvement as a relationally construed project in conversation with liberalism.  
In addition to, and often in conjunction with, moral self-improvement, sympathy, 
or more broadly, the ways we think about others in light of our insuperable distance, is 
another highly trafficked site for relational nineteenth-century scholarship. Rachel 
Ablow, Rae Greiner, Audrey Jaffe, Andrew Miller, Adela Pinch, and others have 
contributed enormously to the field by historicizing and theorizing the way sympathy 
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functioned in the Victorian period, the way it harkened back to the moral sentimentalist 
discourse, especially of Hume and Smith, about sympathy, and the way it was used to 
formally structure the novel. Both thematically and formally, they show the ways that 
writers of the period opened up the novel’s range and capacity to explore the nature of 
human relations and trouble the problem of other minds. Andrew Miller has shown how 
J. S. Mill “ephasiz[ed] the sustaining powers of ‘ideal sympathy’” (8), and examines 
sympathy, whether readerly sympathy or that between characters, in a range of fiction 
from the period. Cara Weber writes that “Victorian writers often focus questions of ethics 
through scenes of sympathetic encounters that have been conceptualized, both by 
Victorian thinkers and by their recent critics, as a theater of identification in which an 
onlooking spectator identifies with the sufferer” (494). Audrey Jaffe, also interested in 
the role of spectatorship in sympathy, writes in Scenes of Sympathy: Identification and 
Representation in Victorian Fiction (2000), that “In Victorian fiction and the work of its 
critics, the term ‘sympathy’ has commonly been used to describe an individualistic, 
affective solution to the problem of class alienation: the attempt to ameliorate social 
differences with assurances of mutual feeling and universal humanity” (15). Jaffe argues 
that in Victorian fiction, “The scene of sympathy in effect effaces both its participants, 
substituting them for images, or fantasies, of social and cultural identity” (4). Rachel 
Ablow argues, in The Marriage of Minds: Reading Sympathy in the Victorian Marriage 
(2007), that the Victorian marriage plot figures the wife as the novel: both teach the 
urban, capital-driven, hardened person to be ethical, to have emotions, and to sympathize. 
A good wife and a novel can both “influence” people and help them “resist the depraved 
values of the marketplace” (1) but “the novel has additional resources and strategies no 
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woman could ever possess” (7) like the ability to see into people’s consciousness. Rae 
Greiner, in Sympathetic Realism in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction (2012), focuses on 
the importance of distance to sympathy, arguing that similarity or identification are 
destructive of sympathy. She argues that formal attention to the novel, in particular to 
free indirect discourse, metonymy, and characterization, helps us see “a social 
understanding of reality” (9) in which sympathy thrives on imaginative recreation of the 
other. Writing about eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philosophical, poetic, and 
fictional texts, Nancy Yousef, in Romantic Intimacy (2015), looks to “intimacy” instead 
of sympathy “in order to investigate, without reduplicating, symptomatic conflicts around 
the term ‘sympathy’ and to hold in abeyance, as far as possible, the ethical and epistemic 
goal of mutual recognition that is always at stake in the imagination of intimacy as a form 
of sympathetic insight or achievement” (2). In other words, Yousef mobilizes intimacy to 
think about uneven relations that don’t require knowledge of the other. “Unlike 
sympathy, intimacy need not, and rarely does, entail a symmetrical relationship between 
one and another; need not, and rarely does, involve the discovery of similitude between 
one and another. Yet insofar as intimacy, like sympathy, designates feeling for and with 
another, it also admits and discloses affective expectations and disappointments—from 
aversion to self-abasing admiration, from gratitude and resentments, from frustration to 
fascination—that involve neither mutuality nor reciprocity but that certainly must be 
counted among the many ‘fine-spun and intricate’ threads of the web (to borrow from 
Lessing’s metaphor) that bind one to others” (2-3). 
 Building on all of these approaches to sympathy and its relation to the nineteenth-
century novel, I focus less on the moral dimensions of and impediments to sympathy, and 
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more on the negative feelings that stem from the fundamental problem of other minds 
that sympathy is meant to solve. When I do treat sympathy directly, in my final chapter, it 
is found to be lacking, and productive of more bad feelings than epistemological 
solutions. This dissertation thus works against the resilient picture of a repressed, prudish, 
moralistic nineteenth century by looking at epistemological questions apart from 
sympathy, and by underscoring the pleasurable and productive outcomes of not feeling as 
one should in light of the skeptical impasse.    
Peter K. Andersson writes in The Journal of Victorian Culture (2015) that “the 
established picture of the Victorian period [its supposed prudishness and repression] 
lingers…not only in popular media, but also in academic research” (439). In Nancy 
Armstrong’s influential How Novels Think: The Limits of Individualism from 1719-1900 
(2006), she argues that while the eighteenth-century novel is populated by misfits, the 
nineteenth-century novel is dominated by attempts to fit in socially: this tension is often 
located within the female misfit who is cast out for her deviance. With a heavy reliance 
on Foucault, Armstrong’s argument draws a repressive and conservative picture of the 
period. As Bruce Robbins notes in his review in Victorian Studies (2007), Armstrong 
mythologizes and loves the Althussarian “bad subject” she finds in the first part of 
Robinson Crusoe, and feels its loss to be great in the Victorian period, where the 
individual’s needs are subordinated to the social good. In this dissertation, I argue that 
these persistent tropes of, in Andersson’s words, “visitations and hat-tippings” (440), in 
which “fiction began to think of itself as a means of discipline” (Armstrong, 49), are 
belied throughout the Victorian period, that they represent a fantasy of Victorian 
affluence and leisure and a discounting of lived experience, including among working 
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classes. Instead, this dissertation will look beyond the veneer of what seems alien to us—
the visitations, the hat tippings—to find an actually very recognizable current of rage, 
boredom, anxiety, and other bad feelings that accompany the compromised reality of a 
social existence defined by an inability to know others.  Largely, then, this dissertation 
will draw a picture of nineteenth-century relationality not reflecting moral self-
improvement and not describing sympathetic relations. More often than not, I’ll show, we 
find failed marriages,1 bad care, and untrustworthy people in positions of great authority. 
Courtship and marriage, care relations, and scenes of employment or cross-class 
interaction are thus crucial axes for this dissertation, as they are heightened scenes of 
problematic relations.  
Theories of marriage have underpinned many studies of the relational nineteenth-
century, from Rachel Ablow’s Marriage of Minds to Talia Schaffer’s Romance’s Rivals: 
Familiar Marriage in Victorian Fiction (2016). While this dissertation doesn’t treat the 
history of marriage explicitly in its chapters, the subject of this scholarship not only 
impacts all the texts considered—from Austen’s marriage plots to the radical form of 
coverture imagined in The Woman in White—it also serves as a model for the kind of 
epistemological questions and affective responses I study. Marriage, in the nineteenth 
century, is at once profoundly alienating and, structurally speaking, increasingly designed 
to unite two people into one flesh. Thus, a look at the impressive surge of scholarship 
historicizing the relationship between changing kinship networks in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries and the novels of the period will help me describe the 
epistemological questions this novel treats alongside the structural and historical nature 
                                                
1 See Kelly Hager’s Dickens and the Rise of Divorce for an account of the period’s 
preoccupation with the divorce, rather than the marriage, plot.  
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of affective expectations. 2 The scholars who have done this work have, importantly, 
argued for attention to the ways that marriage relates to the unknowability of others, and 
the affective expectations in response to a changing institution. Ruth Perry’s Novel 
Relations: The Transformation of Kinship in English Literature and Culture, 1748-1818 
(2006), for example, argues that the shift from arranged to consensual marriage created 
new anxieties for women, anxieties that the novel registered and responded to. Helena 
Michie, in Victorian Honeymoons: Journeys to the Conjugal (2007), describes marriage 
(and she is putting it mildly) as “very difficult cultural work,” in that it brings together 
“two people with limited experience of the opposite sex, who often deeply identified with 
their families of origin and with communities of same-sex friends, into a conjugal unit 
that was to become their primary source of social and emotional identification” (2). To 
cope with these profoundly unsettling changes, Perry argues, women were forced to 
develop a new emotional framework within which to understand their roles in married 
life. Thus, shifting structures of family life lead to shifting affective expectations, 
responses, and performances of self.   
There are four changes in particular that are central to the concerns of nineteenth-
century fiction and that are reflected in many of the novels this dissertation treats. I’ll 
describe them in relation to George Eliot’s The Mill on the Floss which, as will be shown 
later in this dissertation, interrogates affective responses to “the great fundamental fact of 
blood” (129.) First, there’s a radical shift in this period from sprawling kinship networks 
                                                
2 For the two most comprehensive histories of marriage and family, see Ruth Perry’s 
Novel Relations: The Transformation of Kinship in English Literature and Culture, 1748-
1818, especially the Introduction, and Talia Schaffer’s Romance’s Rival: Familiar 
Marriage in Victorian Fiction, especially the second chapter.  
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to tight nuclear families.3 When Mr. Tulliver tells his wife that he is going to send their 
son to a new school, she responds: “Well, Mr. Tulliver, you know best: I’ve no objections. 
But hadn’t I better kill a couple o’ fowl and have th’ aunts and uncles to dinner next 
week, so as you may hear what sister Glegg and sister Pullet have got to say about it?” 
(9-10, emphasis in the original). Mr. Tulliver “defiantly” refuses to “ask neither aunt nor 
uncle what I’m to do wi’ my own lad.” He sees himself as a part of a nuclear family, of 
which he is the head. Mrs. Tulliver, on the other hand, sees herself as a Dodson first, and 
a Tulliver second. This reflects a widespread shift, described by Ruth Perry, Lawrence 
Stone, Stephanie Coontz, Talia Schaffer, and others, as occurring at some point in the late 
eighteenth century, in which marriage overwhelmingly came to demand a departure from 
one’s family of origin, and the beginning of a new life in which one was defined 
exclusively in terms of the duties of wife and mother. Mr. and Mrs. Tulliver’s views on 
family clash here. Mrs. Tulliver feels a part of an older form of family, in which her ties 
to her kinship network are strong and persist beyond marriage. Mr. Tulliver, on the other 
hand, feels himself to have created a nuclear family when he married, and doesn’t see 
why her family of origin should impact their decisions about their children. His view on 
this particular issue reflects his period, although on other issues, like water rights and 
biblical forms of revenge, he is decidedly old-fashioned.   
                                                
3 See Suzanne Graver’s George Eliot and Community: A Study in Social Theory and 
Fictional Form for a parallel historical change: the shift from what German social 
theorist Ferdinand Tönnies called Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. Gemeinschaft refers to 
“local, organic, agricultural communities that are modeled on the family and rooted in the 
traditional and sacred; and Gesellschaft denotes urban, heterogeneous, industrial societies 
that are culturally sophisticated and shaped by the rational pursuit of self-interest in a 
capitalistic and secular environment” (Graver, 14).  
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Next, according to many historians of marriage and family, the shift from open 
kinship networks to closed nuclear families brought about a shift from a culture that did 
not put a premium on privacy to one that did. This change went hand-in-hand with the 
previous one, bolstering the privacy and isolation from the larger kinship network that the 
nuclear family was newly expected to maintain, and, according to Perry, isolating women 
from their support networks. The need for private time, and space to spend it in, was a 
new development. Historian of marriage Lawrence Stone argues that even the 
architectural layout of homes reflected this shift, with houses newly arranged to have 
rooms like closets and studies.4 Maggie exists at both stages of this development. From 
the ritual she performs with her Fetish doll in the privacy of “her attic” (36), to her 
clandestine relationships with Philip Waken and Stephen Guest, Maggie is a character 
who chafes under the old standard of openness that the Dodsons expect and the voice of 
“public opinion” which “always knew what to think” about the actions, however private, 
of other people (490). 
Third, marriage came to be seen as a binding together of two people who had 
chosen one another, and, what’s more, were in love. This is a view expounded on at 
length by Stone, who argues that affective relationships between husband and wife as 
well as between parent and child are a relatively new phenomenon. While Stone’s claim 
that relationships based on love were rare and incidental before 1700 is obviously faulty 
                                                
4Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England, 1500-1800, pp. 253-4. 
Stone’s findings have been questioned and discredited by many. His sources are largely 
diaries and letters, thus favoring evidence from the upper and middle classes, and 
particularly, allows men to speak for the women they represent in their literature. Further, 
much of his material is drawn from France, and Stone regularly uses sources from 
multiple centuries while describing a single historical shift. However, many of his larger 
arguments and narrower claims, including this piece about domestic architecture, have 
formed the basis of later, more scrupulous studies and continue to be useful.  
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(Romeo and Juliet, for example, suggests the centrality of romantic love to its culture), it 
is true that the doctrine of coverture, with its legal and affective expectations of two 
bodies becoming one flesh, represented a new ideal. Of course, this new ideal very often 
remained just that—an ideal—but it was now no longer possible to view marriage as the 
coldly functional institution it had been for many centuries.  We see this in Maggie’s 
difficulty in choosing between the safe, brotherly, disabled Philip and the romantic, 
perfumed Stephen. What is love in this period? Is it closeness? Is it comfort? Is it like 
siblinghood or cousinship? Does it require tingling sensations and sleepless nights? Is it 
being helped into a boat by a tall, rich man and borne away? Perry writes, in Novel 
Relations, that the shift to “privatized family” resulted in a net loss for women. The 
pressure to find someone you love and live with them in an isolated nuclear family was 
often impossible to enact, and marriage was thus more often than not the binding together 
more tightly than ever of two incompatible people, with one of them giving up all her 
rights. As Rachel Ablow puts it, “For most married couples […] husband and wife were 
legally ‘one person,’ and, as one popular saying put it, ‘that one [was] the husband’” 
(One Flesh, par 1).  Perry argues that in consanguineal families—families organized 
around many generations—women had clearly defined roles and were respected for their 
contribution to the family’s work and life. In conjugal families women were 
commodified, isolated, and legally vulnerable. Essentially agreeing with Stone, Perry 
argues that this period saw the invention of love as we know it. In order to cope with their 
new status in a new marriage arrangement, women developed an affective bond with their 
husbands, or at least strove for one. Talia Schaffer has written about this new potential 
for danger in marriage, arguing that relationships with cousins, disabled men, or close 
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neighbors or brotherly types was a way of ensuring safety in marriage. In her reading, 
forsaking love in order to remain a part of a larger consanguineal family was a regular 
and acceptable choice for women in the nineteenth century.5 Regardless of whether the 
match was one made for love or for relative safety, love was in the air in a way it never 
had been before. 
Fourth, and finally, childrearing came to be seen within the context of breeding, 
eugenics, and the production of strong offspring. Scientific and sociological discoveries, 
from Darwin and Spencer to McLennan, Engels, and Maine, changed the way people 
viewed their own children, and the way they viewed marriage. Rather than consider the 
interests of the family and the relative compatibility of the couple, fitness for producing 
offspring came to be central to the function of marriage and the work of women. Witness 
the Dodson sisters’ confusion at the way in which “the Tulliver blood did not mix well 
with the Dodson blood” (60) or the narrator’s description of the doomed Maggie as “a 
small mistake of nature” (13). Contemporary readers were struck by how Darwinistic the 
novel seemed in its depiction of the animal magnetism, the natural (erotic) pull between 
Maggie and Stephen.6 This evolutionary approach to marriage, in the context of 
coverture, pressure to love, and new forms of nuclear privacy, throws into relief the 
disparity between the institution of marriage as construed in the nineteenth century and 
the epistemological and affective underpinnings of marriage as a project.    
As the institution of marriage underwent a significant shift in the period under 
consideration, and serves here to underscore the challenging relationship between 
epistemological uncertainty and affective expectation, so too did relationships organized 
                                                
5See Talia Schaffer’s Romance’s Rivals. 
6See Rohan Maitzen’s “Queen of the Gypsies.”   
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around the provision of care—another central site of relations in the nineteenth century. 
Just as with marriage, epistemological questions are at the heart of care relations, and the 
affective expectations in these relational contexts are more often than not defied in 
strange, unexpected ways. To better understand these relations, I turn not to historicist 
scholarship but instead to ethics of care, an ethical theory that privileges relatedness over 
independence and helps me think about what is at stake in care relations, especially as 
they became at once more isolated, and also more professionalized. Born in the late-
nineteen seventies out of a feminist interest in elevating and theorizing care, the ethics of 
care argues that we are all born relational beings, completely dependent on others for 
survival, and that the care we give or receive to or from dependents is the central feature 
of our moral worlds and should be the basis for an ethical system. Ethics of care suggests 
that, by acknowledging our universal state of interdependence, we privilege actual care-
giving over the abstractions of justice, and that we view scenes of care, maternal care, for 
example, as scenes of moral thinking. Virginia Held writes: “The ethics of care rejects the 
view of the dominant moral theories that the more abstract the reasoning about a moral 
problem the better because the more likely to avoid bias and arbitrariness, the more likely 
to achieve impartiality. The ethics of care respects rather than removes itself from the 
claims of particular others with whom we share actual relationships” (11). The ethics of 
care goes against our contemporary understanding of and practice of liberal 
individualism. Taking the emphasis off independence, ethics of care argues that as much 
as we might enact a semblance of independence, we are actually always interdependent, 
and that as a society we should acknowledge that fact—that we once were or will be 
again dependent on others—and build a moral system around care rather than on an 
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ethical system that promotes and supports an imaginary independence.7 Virginia Held 
sees the liberal emphasis on “autonomy, independence, noninterference, self-
determination, fairness, and rights” as deluding and dangerous, as individuals don’t exist 
without the care and cooperation of others. “…From the perspective of an ethics of care, 
to construct morality as if we were Robinson Crusoe, or, to use Hobbes’s image, 
mushrooms sprung from nowhere, is misleading […] The ethics of care is, instead, 
hospitable to the relatedness of persons […] It often calls on us to take responsibility, 
while liberal individualist morality focuses on how we should leave each other alone” 
(14-15, emphasis in original). As Nancy Yousef writes in Isolated Cases: The Anxieties 
of Autonomy in Enlightenment Philosophy and Romantic Literature (2004), “Hobbes’s 
notorious invitation to ‘consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth like 
mushrooms, come to full maturity without all kind of engagement to each other’ 
flamboyantly veers away from the familiar, the recognizable, and the obvious facts of 
how human beings come into the world” (19, italics in the original).  
Ethics of care has been deeply connected to feminist and gender studies from its 
inception. Carol Gilligan for example, argues in In A Difference Voice: Psychological 
                                                
7 In our contemporary context, these arguments are being made most visibly, though still 
on the margins of our cultural and political discourse, about taxation, social safety nets, 
and other forms of public care for the welfare of others. Think of Elizabeth’s Warren’s 
2011 speech in Andover Massachusetts: “There is nobody in this country who got rich on 
his own — nobody. You built a factory out there? Good for you. But I want to be clear. 
You moved your goods to market on the roads the rest of us paid for. You hired workers 
the rest of us paid to educate. You were safe in your factory because of police-forces and 
fire-forces that the rest of us paid for. You didn't have to worry that marauding bands 
would come and seize everything at your factory — and hire someone to protect against 
this — because of the work the rest of us did. Now look, you built a factory and it turned 
into something terrific, or a great idea. God bless — keep a big hunk of it. But part of the 
underlying social contract is, you take a hunk of that and pay forward for the next kid 
who comes along.”    
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Theory and Women’s Development (1993) against the findings of Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
morality test, which were used to show that the development of moral reasoning was less 
realized in girls than in boys. Gilligan argues that female respondents answered the 
prompts by turning to their own experience of moral choices in personal relationships, 
whereas the male respondents abstracted from moral principles. Because our political and 
moral system privileges abstractions, ethics rooted in particular circumstance weren’t 
seen as reflecting advanced moral development. Sara Ruddick, in Maternal Thinking: 
Toward a Politics of Peace (1995), makes the connection between caring and mothering 
explicit in her influential writing on the ethical work that takes place in the interpersonal 
relationship between parent and child. She argues that moral judgment comes into play in 
particular circumstances with particular others and challenges the idea that ethics only 
takes effect or has valence in the public sphere, where it serves as an abstract system of 
protection against the machinations of individuals.  
 Like the nineteenth-century novel, ethics of care asks us to take seriously the 
feelings and responsibilities we have about particular others, and to place primary ethical 
weight on those interpersonal relationships rather than on abstract principles about justice 
and autonomy.8 By taking abstract ideas about love or friendship or abuse or 
disappointment, and making them particular and specific, fixed in particular characters 
and plots, the novel is in many ways a vehicle for the ethics of care. The nineteenth 
century novel, in particular, is rooted in ethics of care, peopled as it is by characters 
                                                
8 Indeed, thinking about ethics of care in relation to the novel form allows me to flip the 
argument that the novel is the form that best reflects individualism (see Ian Watt, The 
Rise of the Novel for the founding document of this line of thinking) because of its 
attention to particular people in particular circumstances. Because the novel attends to 
particular people in particular circumstances, it gives voice to the kind of moral thinking 
(or, as we shall see, immoral or irreverent thinking) that exists in the particular.  
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whose principle role is as care-giver—women, and in some cases, invalids (male and 
female) whose invalidism bestows on them the responsibility to variously receive and 
give care.9 The novel as a genre, and the nineteenth-century novel in particular, shows 
that the most interpersonal, domestic, and emotional interactions we have rely on ethical 
thinking. Think of Elizabeth Bennet’s agonizing, moral labor over the process of falling 
in love, or Ralph Touchett and Isabel Archer’s process of coming to understand the self 
and the other through a morally invested form of care and interdependence. Privileging 
this ethics that happens between people in observation of our interdependence, rather 
than relegating that kind of ethics to something that happens between women, for 
example, or among domestic care givers, aid-workers, nurses—in other words, the 
poorest and most disenfranchised—is the focus of relational ethics and of the nineteenth-
century novel.10   
 However, ethics of care raises serious questions. For example, detractors have 
argued that privileging care has the effect of reinforcing the stereotype of the caring 
female. Elevating maternal care, for example, into a site of ethical action has the potential 
to re-instantiate essentialized gender roles. Virginia Held has argued that actually, the 
ethics of care provides a moral framework through which care is something done by 
everyone, not just women, and that its promotion to ethical work is meant not only to 
                                                
9 Interestingly, disabled characters in Victorian novels are expert care-givers as well as 
recipients of care. Think, for example, of Ralph Touchett in The Portrait of a Lady, or 
Ermine Williams in The Clever Woman of the Family.  See Talia Schaffer’s Romance’s 
Rivals.  
10 In our introduction to a special issue of Nineteenth-Century Gender Studies, Fuller, 
Woods, and I argued that the care work of contemporary higher education—the work of 
teaching, organizing conferences, performing departmental service—is most often 
performed by women, and problematically under-recognized in the marketplace of tenure 
and promotion that privileges productivity metrics.  
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enfranchise the disenfranchised who typically do the care work in a society but also to 
attract the historically enfranchised, including men, to care work.  
Another complication in care theory is that care relationships are necessarily 
uneven: one person is charged to give care to another. The caregiver is providing for 
someone necessarily unable to reciprocate, and the likelihood that care will be returned in 
equal measure is limited, especially given that structurally, care-givers give care for a 
reason, and won’t likely be structurally empowered to receive it in turn. Nel Noddings 
writes about this inequity by arguing that recognition of the care-giver’s efforts is a form 
of returning care. She calls this “care completed in the other” (4). However, recognition 
often isn’t given; when it is, it is more often than not affectively complicated, tinged with 
feelings of resentment, anger, and disdain, just as the delivery of care was likely tinged 
with feelings outside the boundaries of feeling caring.   
The responses these challenges have elicited from care theorists have been 
unsatisfying, and it is in part because I am so invested in the recuperation of care work as 
a site of serious ethical work that I take on these challenges in this dissertation.11 And 
indeed, nineteenth-century novels usefully complicate the power dynamics inherent in 
care work, challenge the affective expectations of both the cared-for and the care-giver, 
and struggle with the impossibility of knowing others in spite of the very interdependence 
insisted on by care theory. This dissertation troubles the structural inequity that is 
                                                
11 As I write, feminists are still arguing about the relative value (ethical, monetary) of 
maternal and paternal care and in some cases, promoting legislation that would not only 
secure a national requirement of 12 weeks of paid maternity leave, but a de-
stigmatization of the labor of care, social security credits for parents who opt out of the 
workforce in favor of the work of care, and other, even more utopian reorganizations of 
our society’s perception of care work.  See Judith Shulevitz, “How to fix feminism,” New 
York Times, June 10, 2016.  
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fundamental to care, the gulf between care work and care feelings, and the differences 
between free care (maternal care, for example, or care for the Aged P) and care as 
economic labor (as governess, teacher, or nurse). This dissertation argues that in fact, bad 
care, uneven care, or even care that degradingly reproduces hierarchically dominating 
relations can be both productive of pleasure and effective forms of care. This dissertation 
therefore extends the rubric of ethics of care to include care given with uncaring feelings.  
Undergirding all of these discourses are feminist questions about the relation 
between affect and care; authenticity and the performances of social life; acting out and 
powers of control. Thinking about ethics of care in the context of the nineteenth-century 
novel helps me to understand the kinds of relationships available for women, the 
expectations surrounding and inscribed within these relations, and their inherent 
challenges. Again and again in the novels I consider, these challenges are narrated in 
terms of authenticity: the degree to which relations, and care relations in particular, are 
performed, and whether performance is figured negatively or even framed ethically. 
Thus, in looking at the feelings appropriate to interrelations and care, and discovering 
instead feelings distinctly inappropriate, many of which are either covered and hidden 
through performance, or are exhibited and flagrantly performed, this dissertation attends 
to affect theory: to structures of feelings, to the political and productive function of 
feelings, and to the dangers of interiorized, private affect that can serve to isolate and 
domesticate what might otherwise be the most politically powerful feelings of anger, 
frustration, and fed up-ness.  
Ann Cvetkovich begins Mixed Feelings: Feminism, Mass Culture, and Victorian 
Sensationalism (1992) with the admission that “This book is the product of my own 
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mixed feelings about a feminist politics of affect” (1). Indeed, the claiming of feelings 
and personal stories in feminist writing, and the claim that the personal is political, is 
freighted. Affect has the power to be transgressive or transformative, but it also has the 
power to be made safe, interiorized, or contained, repressed, and privatized. In other 
words, Cvetkovich and many others writing about affect consider it an axis of power: it 
either grants, gives way to, responds to, or rejects forms of power, dominance, and 
control. I will never forget first reading Eve Sedgwick’s “Paranoid Reading and 
Reparative Reading, Or, You’re So Paranoid You Probably Think This Essay is About 
You” (1997), and seeing in affect a way out of political defeatism. In Sedgwick and 
Cvetkovich’s writing, there is a throbbing current of anger, shock, and sadness about 
contemporary life: in both cases, largely in relation to the AIDS crisis in America. Both 
are concerned about the power of affect in the face of outrage, and the responsibilities 
that power affords. This rootedness in contemporary forms of and uses for feeling 
circulates through the whole field,12 and as we have been freshly, rudely, unfortunately 
reminded by the election of Donald Trump to the presidency, feelings are an important 
tool for coalition building, empowerment, and change, but can just as easily produce 
inertia, or excuse corruption and violence. Sianne Ngai, in Ugly Feelings (2005), is 
interested in just this possibility. She investigates “canonically minor” (11) twentieth 
century representations of what she calls “minor and generously unprestigious feelings” 
(6) that reflect “what T.W. Adorno calls the fully ‘administered world’ of late modernity” 
(1). Her focus is on negative affects that suspend agency rather than produce outcomes, 
                                                
12 See, for example, Naomi Greyser, “Beyond the ‘Feeling Woman’: Feminist 
Implications of Affect Studies.” 
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and that therefore counterintuitively do a lot: they reproduce the capitalist conditions that 
are responsible in the first place for distancing, disaffecting, ugly feelings.   
While my dissertation, too, focuses on negative feelings, my period is different 
than Ngai’s. Rachel Ablow, in her introduction to a special issue of Victorian Studies on 
Victorian Emotion (2008), writes that “Victorians commentators […] were fascinated by 
the historical status of emotions. To what extent are emotions innate and to what extent 
are they social? Can we control or train them? Does the experience of the emotions 
change over time? These are questions to which the Victorians retuned repeatedly, 
questions that contemporary scientists, historians, and literary scholars continue to puzzle 
over” (376). Affect theory assumes that emotions are relational and have histories. For 
Sara Ahmed, in The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2014), for example, this means a 
rejection of the psychological approach in which we have feelings inside of us, “within,” 
and independently. It means, instead, that emotions circulate, and accrete meaning by 
repetition and “stickiness.” Ahmed’s affect theory, in seeing feelings as in circulation 
rather than originating from one’s interior, makes a move similar to the one I make in this 
dissertation: instead of seeing the interiority of the nineteenth-century novel as a mark of 
privacy and independence, it is reflective of the circulation of feelings between 
interdependent bodies.  This is a view of emotions that, as Adela Pinch shows in Strange 
Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen (1996), had currency in the 
eighteenth- and early nineteenth-centuries. As Pinch writes, “The books I study here […] 
reveal the period’s […] tendency to characterize feelings as transpersonal, as autonomous 
entities that do not always belong to individuals but rather wander extravagantly from 
one person to another” (3). What happens in that circulation, and what is done with the 
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feelings in circulation—what happens to and from those feelings—varies, but what 
remains constant, deep into the nineteenth century, is that feelings don’t do what they’re 
supposed to do, and they don’t do what social norms and codes of conduct would want 
them to do. The response to epistemological uncertainty is not, often, sympathy; the 
outcome of care relations is not, often, caring feelings; the effect of marriage is not flesh 
made one, except in the substantial legal sense of coverture. Thus, this dissertation looks 
at performances of authenticity, care dispensed with a range of uncaring feelings, cases 
like foreboding where knowledge is to some degree possible, and forms of knowing that 
don’t require knowledge, such as acknowledgment.  
   
One difficulty of writing this dissertation has been choosing what texts and 
authors to consider. While the claims wouldn’t reflect fiction from the whole period 
under consideration nor all genres—Charlotte Yonge’s novels, for example, or the 
socialist utopian News from Nowhere would not have found a comfortable home in these 
pages—the greater problem was that too many things seemed to want to find a place. 
Choosing to leave Charles Dickens and Thomas Hardy out, for example, was ultimately a 
matter of necessity, rather than choice. Beginning with Austen, however, allowed me to 
establish some central ideas in relation to authenticity; Brontë enabled a study of the 
pleasure of perversion; Collins provided a much-needed detour into sensation fiction, 
which is so centrally concerned with questions of authenticity, bad behavior, and 
feelings; and any dissertation that demands attention to nineteenth-century novels and 
epistemology must, ultimately, return to Eliot’s theories of sympathy. Those needs 
guided my selections, but one pleasure of the writing has been the imaginative project of 
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applying these arguments to Hardy’s depressive characters, or Dickens’s seemingly 
happy ones.  
My first chapter argues that Jane Austen’s novels, far from punishing or 
reforming her heroines and urging authenticity and right behavior, actually show that 
selfhood is fundamentally inauthentic and performative. In Mansfield Park, I argue that 
Austen’s narrator aligns herself not with Fanny Price but, surprisingly, with the amoral 
Henry Crawford. Both are interested in inhabiting characters: Henry Crawford through 
performance and Austen’s narrator through free indirect discourse. Further, though the 
inhabitation of others is similar to the work of sympathy, Austen shows that this kind of 
imaginative exercise can be divorced from ethical ends and mobilized purely for aesthetic 
ones. Emma, I argue, continues this exploration of the badly behaving character by 
challenging the very idea of authenticity that the “good” Mr. Knightley embodies. 
Austen, it turns out, is concerned with the relation between morals and aesthetics, but her 
work is not nearly as ideologically driven as Marilyn Butler or Claudia Johnson have 
argued. In this chapter, I set the stage for questions that persist through the period about 
whether there is such a thing as an authentic self, the degree to which behavior is 
performative, and the value in troublesome and unmoral feelings.  
My second chapter looks to Charlotte Brontë’s Villette, which, I argue, explores 
the question of authenticity from the perspective of affective responses to labor, in 
particular, the paid care work Lucy Snowe performs throughout the novel. Lucy is often 
thought of as a paradigmatic individual, preferring and cultivating obscurity and 
isolation, but I argue that she is instead inextricably bound up in a network of care 
relations, and that her perplexing behavior is a response to the problematics of care. The 
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treachery of power—Madame Beck’s, M. Paul’s, her wards’ and then students’—is so 
great, and the forms of abuse are so pervasive, that Lucy’s bildung is toward the 
development of her ability to derive pleasure from pain, and eventually, to also derive 
pleasure from producing pain in others, such as M. Paul, her students, Ginevra, and her 
reader. In other words, Villette posits sadomasochism as a response to the problematics of 
care and of epistemological uncertainty. In thinking of Lucy as developing the capacity 
for pleasure through abuse—both received and meted out—it is clear that the novel’s 
interest in performance, though most explicit on the fete day and at the Vashti play, goes 
beyond literal performance and extends to performances of power and pleasure. Lucy’s 
ability to perform and manipulate her feelings is distinct from M. Paul, who is so 
authentic he can’t control his performance. Though he teaches Lucy a great deal about 
the pleasure of power-play in his delivery of abuse as a form of love, he is too authentic, 
not a skilled performer like Lucy, and therefore not in control of the measured, attentive, 
calibrated pleasures of sadomasochism.  
Affect, performance, and care are particularly vexed in sensation fiction, centered 
as the genre is on the relationship between bodies and feelings, deceit and truths, and the 
terror of inescapable interrelatedness. In my third chapter I turn to sensation fiction’s ur-
text, Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White, a strange circus performance of a novel in 
which the two competing ringmasters -- the obese light-footed man and the aspirational 
drawing master—control the actions and narratives of the manly woman, the identical 
women, and the man so full of hot air he goes up in flames. By attending to Fosco and 
Hartright’s performances of authenticity on the one hand, and on the other to the 
surprising authenticity of the dangers imagined, I show that this novel encourages fear on 
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the grounds that foreboding is prophetic rather than delusional. In a world where 
inauthenticity is the norm, foreboding makes sense, and produces an uncomfortable, 
pleasurable frisson for reader and character alike. This novel, thus, offers an opportunity 
to deconstruct some of the assumptions inherent in one of our most interesting 
contemporary critical conversations, that of suspicious and just reading practices. By 
showing that a suspicious reading was right all along, the distinction between surface and 
depth is collapsed, suspicious and just readings are the same, and we are no closer to 
being able to differentiate between the authentic and inauthentic. And by attending to 
sensation fiction, which demands verisimilitude like realist fiction but attends more 
urgently to affective, sensational modes of describing reality, I show a broader 
dimensionality to the discourse of performance, authenticity, and feeling in the nineteenth 
century. In particular, I show that even in the face of epistemological uncertainty, there 
are things one can know, and that feelings play a role in making those thinks knowable.  
Public rage, enjoyable perversity, and performative nastiness, I argue, are 
necessary in Victorian fiction because sympathy so often fails—even, and especially, in 
the work of George Eliot, who is often taken to be its greatest proponent. I argue in my 
final chapter that critics take as too static what I see as Eliot’s shifting and increasingly 
skeptical view of sympathy. I show that in The Mill on the Floss, Eliot investigates the 
use of sympathy among kin networks, and compares identificatory sympathy between 
characters to that between text and reader. By the time of her writing of Romola, Eliot 
uses the real, historical case of Savonarola, whose motivations remain unknowable in the 
novel and historical record alike, to investigate the epistemological difficulties inherent in 
knowing others, and posits a form of sympathy that forgoes knowledge of others 
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altogether in favor of something else: acknowledgment. This critique of sympathy is 
extended in her final novel, Daniel Deronda, but to the point that Eliot questions whether 
sympathy is even the best or most useful feeling in the first place, and whether it isn’t, 
actually, damaging and disturbing. Her eponymous character is an expert sympathizer, 
but that leads him to an indolence and apathy that at times flares into deeply problematic 
domination and judgment, as in his relationship with Gwendolen Harleth. Not only does 
Eliot question whether sympathy is an impediment to action, she also shows that 
sympathy can produce disturbing inequality in interpersonal relations when only one 
person has the capacity to imagine the other. By closing this dissertation with George 
Eliot, I show that failures of sympathy, and the anger, resentment, envy, and feelings of 
inauthenticity that relations inspire, inform the period’s novels. Far from encouraging a 
generation of docile readers disciplined into feeling as one ought, the nineteenth-century 
novel investigates, delights in, and encourages bad feelings.    
 
The work of this dissertation is rooted in the nineteenth century, but I also hope 
that the questions it raises are transferable to our contemporary context. Looking at the 
people, mostly men, running our government, questions about authenticity and 
performance abound: What’s he really up to? Is our President as childlike and 
intellectually compromised as he seems, or is he a mastermind with a plan for autocracy?  
If selfhood is necessarily performative and historically determined, how might we 
mobilize to construct new patterns of authenticity, where, for example, being a powerful 
woman or a feminist man doesn’t look like a performance? More than ever in the modern 
history of our country, members of our society are being marginalized, discriminated 
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against, and violated. As we will see in the chapter on Villette, embracing the bad feelings 
inherent in hierarchically uneven relations might be not only acceptable, but useful. To 
care, bad feelings might be both natural and productive. Our current political predicament 
is so unbelievable, and yet so hostile to truth and facts, that we urgently need ways to 
think through what it means when we can know or could have foreseen. My chapter on 
The Woman in White attends to this dynamic by introducing the affective category of 
foreboding, and theorizing the implications of being able to know what is going wrong. 
The chapter asks questions about the role of patterns, historical structures, and facts, and 
troubles the relationship between the inability to know others and the stability of facts. 
While our president and his administration unveil an agenda that depends on a radical 
extension of epistemological doubt, in which no facts are knowable and all facts are 
alternatives, it is incumbent on us to think not just about our inability to know, but also 
our ability to know. Finally, while we recommit to the work of resistance, what kinds of 
sympathy and connection is possible? What does sympathy look like with members of 
one’s own party or protest movement? If we, like Ezra and Mordecai in Daniel Deronda, 
form an ideal Victorian sympathetic marriage of two flesh made one, what comes of the 
very difference we were hoping to celebrate and protect? What does sympathy with 
others across coalitions look like, and what should it look like? My chapter on Eliot 
shows that accommodating and encouraging bad feelings is a way of protecting 
difference against threats to diversity and inclusion. Instead of consensus or knowledge, 
we might instead acknowledge difference, allowing for disappointment, difficulty, and 
disagreement.   
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PERFORMING AUTHENTICITY IN JANE AUSTEN’S  
MANSFIELD PARK AND EMMA 
“When an individual plays a part he 
implicitly requests observers to take 
seriously the impression that is fostered 
before them. They are asked to believe that 
the character they see actually possesses the 
attributes he appears to possess, that the task 
he performs will have the consequences that 
are implicitly claimed for it, and that, in 
general, matters are what they appear to be.”  
—Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self 
in Everyday Life  
 
 “She had not quite done nothing—for she 
had done mischief.”  
—Jane Austen, Emma  
 
 
 Often considered a bridge between the forms she inherited and those she 
inaugurated, Jane Austen is no stranger to studies of the nineteenth-century novel. Indeed, 
Austen’s carefully mannered characters, genteel drawing rooms, and castigated local 
villains have led some to describe her novels, Mansfield Park in particular, as proto-
Victorian.13 As I will show, this reflects a misunderstanding of both Austen and the 
Victorians, neither of which exhibited the strict comfort with moralism and staid behavior 
that are often presumed. Austen’s worlds are comprised of stifling small towns, very 
small numbers of people available for social interaction, and complete interdependence. 
All the while, there is little that can be known about others, there are countless secrets 
being kept, and even those entrusted with authority are often less than stable or reliable. 
From John Willoughby to General Tilney to Henry Crawford and even George Knightley, 
Austen is interested in the everyday problem of the opacity of others, and the 
performances of self, especially in men, that make up relations. As that character-list 
                                                
13 See Barbara Bail Collins’s "Jane Austen's Victorian Novel." 
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suggests, this preoccupation spans her career, but in this chapter I begin with her mid-late 
career Mansfield Park, a novel that contains an actual, though aborted, private theatrical. 
It is in this novel that I see Austen playing with the pleasure of performance, even when, 
especially when, performance is purposefully deceiving. From there, I turn to Emma, 
which, though it doesn’t contain any performances in its plot, upends the very notion of 
authentic selfhood. I argue that by looking at these novels in light of the performances 
they imagine, we can discover an Austen deeply concerned with the relation in everyday 
life between the private and the social, and with the ways we perform our relationality. 
When the stakes are high, as they are in marriage plots, not being able to know the other 
is a troubling problem. But far from proposing that, through the vetting process that is the 
courtship plot, authentic selves can be discovered underneath social performances, 
Austen ultimately describes selves as inauthentic at their core, and even more radically, 
takes pleasure in these performances, and produces them for us.  
There is a paradox in some of the orthodoxies of Austen scholarship: on the one 
hand, she is concerned first and foremost with interiority: indeed, her major innovation—
free indirect discourse—promotes the deepening of her characters’ inner lives. On the 
other hand, she is concerned first and foremost with moral and social codes of behavior: 
her novels enforce right and wrong and participate in punishment and correction. The 
first orthodoxy implies that the novels evidence an intensifying individualism, the second 
a relationality that regulates and prescribes. But in fact these apparently contradictory 
orthodoxies converge with the interiority expressed through, among other formal 
features, free indirect discourse, and the social expressed through an attention to social 
codes of behavior.  Furthermore, these contradictory positions assume a truth to 
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interiority that is belied in her approach to selfhood. As Rachel Brownstein shows in Why 
Jane Austen? (2013), Austen’s confidential tones flatter her readers into thinking that they 
can distinguish between “truth” and “truths universally acknowledged,” but while certain 
facts can be ascertained (for example, as Brownstein explains, they know Darcy “is 
stalking the shrubbery near Rosings in order to meet [Elizabeth], that he is not turning up 
there (as she thinks) by accident” (28)) other truths are much harder to ascertain.  
Crucially, Austen’s depiction of interiority is actually experienced—by the 
character, the reader, and the narrator—more relationally and less individually than many 
have argued, and her depiction of the enforcement of social or moral norms does not 
actually reflect an ominous social order as many have argued. In my view, Austen’s 
vision of interiority, as communicated through free indirect discourse, is actually an 
expression of the tendency we all have, and that authors especially need to have, to try 
others on for size and speak as if through their voices. And what Foucauldians might 
describe as Austen’s sinister enforcement of social order is actually, I will show, an 
interrogation of this putting on of parts—manners, habits, tones—when we live 
relationally, and that even within our own selves, we don’t even come close to knowing 
the full cast of characters we embody. I argue that in Mansfield Park, Austen is interested 
in the way that acting demands the actor to try on parts vastly different from the self and 
in Emma, I argue that this interest matures toward an exploration of whether a self really 
even is a stable entity, or whether, as the novel seems to suggest, the self/character 
dichotomy is actually problematic because it rests on the false supposition that there is an 
authentic self in the first place. Thus, my reading of Austen bridges this paradox in 
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Austen scholarship by noting the way that the self functions in relation to the social: in 
Austen, the self is constantly inhabiting others and playing parts.14   
Further, I argue that in Mansfield Park and Emma, one of Austen’s ethical but 
distinctly unmoralistic investigations is into the role of the novelist herself, whose 
professional charge is not only to make things up, but also to present that fiction as truth: 
in other words, she herself creates artificial authenticities. Indeed, I argue that some of the 
most central ideological concerns that her novels take up within the plot—about 
authenticity and relationality—are also examined in relation to form, the role of the 
author, and the primacy of pleasure. My reading reveals a deeply ethically-invested 
Austen rather than a moralistic one, whose understanding of relationality questions the 
very nature of authenticity.  There is a long critical practice of reading political and moral 
philosophy into Jane Austen’s novels. From Marilyn Butler’s groundbreaking Jane 
Austen and the War of Ideas (1975) to Claudia Johnson’s Jane Austen: Women, Politics 
and the Novel (1988), scholars have read the novels and the precious little external 
evidence (letters, socioeconomic status, marital status, etc.) to hazard claims about her 
ideological commitments. In this chapter, I argue that Austen’s novels interrogate 
ideology but from a unmoralistic position that instead raises and plays with difficult but 
pleasurable ethical questions. 
A few words, before moving on, about some of the loaded terminology in what 
follows. Throughout this chapter I consider two primary dialectical concepts: first, 
authenticity and performance, and second, ethics and moralism. Starting with the first 
                                                
14 See Deidre Shauna Lynch, The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture, and 
the Business of Inner Meaning for more on the construction of an authentic, deep self in a 
changing, commercializing social world. For Lynch, “deep” novel characters served to 
facilitate the development for readers of inwardness, privacy, and authenticity.    
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pair, my aim in thinking about authenticity is to trouble the very notion that Austen’s 
characters range from more or less authentic, culminating in complete authenticity among 
some choice specimens. We all know some people who seem the same across discourse 
communities: a woman who demonstrates the same humor, behavior, and relational 
patterns with her mother, whole family, work colleagues, best friends, and students. On 
the other hand, we all know people whose selves get refracted and seem altered 
depending on the social context. This is one measure of “authenticity.” Is the person who 
retains a sense of self across discourse communities more authentic than the other? Or are 
both performing selves, with the first performing uniformity while the second performs, 
albeit against her will, fracture? These are questions this chapter addresses in discussion 
of authenticity and performance.  
As for the second dialectical pair, the relationship between moralism and ethical 
thinking has been central to discussions, and disagreements, about Austen from the 
earliest reviews of her work. I will go into greater depth on this as this chapter progresses, 
but in short, the distinction is meant to reflect the difference between interest in the 
ethical dimensions of choice, behavior, and selfhood on one hand, and on the other, 
interest in making judgments about choices, behaviors, and authenticity. While Austen is 
without a doubt interested in tensions between representation, language, and moral 
thinking—in other words, an ethical thinker—I challenge the notion that Austen 
moralizes—in other words, resolved the tensions in favor of making moral judgments. As 
Gilbert Ryle established in “Jane Austen and the Moralists” (1966):  
Jane Austen was a moralist in a thick sense, that she wrote what and as she 
wrote partly from a deep interest in some perfectly general, even 
 34 
theoretical questions about human nature and human conduct. To say this 
is not, however, to say that she was a moraliser. There is indeed some 
moralising in Sense and Sensibility and she does descend to covert 
preaching in Mansfield Park. Here I do discern, with regret, the tones of 
voice of the anxious aunt, and even occasionally of the prig. But for the 
most part, I am glad to say, she explores and does not shepherd (5).   
By looking at Mansfield Park and Emma together, we discover a distinctly unmoralizing 
Austen, one who is interested in theater and theatricality both as literal embodiment (the 
private theatricals) and as a metaphor (for human behavior) but who doesn’t judge 
theatricality moralistically. Rather, theater becomes a vehicle for Austen’s thinking about 
the form and function of fiction, the relation between performance and pleasure, and 
experiments in the nature of, and manifold meanings of, character. Looking at the novels 
this way reveals an Austen who is neither Tory nor Whig, moralist nor anarchist, 
individualist nor enforcer of a social order. Rather, in this chapter she is a dialectical 
writer and a thinker interested in the relation between subject and social world, in the 
confusing and complex ways that relationality manifests, and in the performances of self 
that constitute our experiences of life, courtship, and pleasure.   
 
I. “To undertake any character” in Mansfield Park: The Performance of Sympathy  
 
Acting as analog  
Many critics of Mansfield Park have struggled to understand the novel’s apparent 
moralistic strain, especially in relation to its puzzling stance on acting. How can the 
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author who created Elizabeth Bennet have gone on to create Fanny Price? How can the 
author who wrote plays for her family’s consumption have written a novel that seems to 
condemn acting in private theatricals?15 Regardless of the approach critics have taken, 
their arguments have often been framed within the context of Austen’s morals. Implicit in 
these arguments is the belief that the novel espouses a particular moral position as to 
private theatricals and conduct in general. I would instead like to suggest that Austen is 
more interested in thinking through philosophical arguments than in admonishing her 
characters’ behavior, or prescribing behavior for her readers. In particular, she is 
interested in thinking about the relation between sympathy and identification, and further, 
in the idea that identification might end in non-sympathetic frames of mind that might 
work against moral behavior. By exploring different aspects of identification, as she does 
in this novel, Austen complicates and engages with ethical questions, playing the role of 
moral thinker rather than moralist.  
Austen’s own writing in Mansfield Park, and her characters’ acting—that element 
of the novel often seen to be moralistically condemned—might actually, I argue, be 
usefully considered as analogs, in that both arts require their practitioners to imagine the 
inner lives of others and to act on that imaginative projection. Austen explores 
identification and sympathy as activities productive of aesthetic as well as ethical 
pleasures, and considers the relation and the tensions between ethics and aesthetics. 
Mostly, she plays with depicting forms of identification that don’t lead to moral behavior 
or even sympathy, but that produce pleasure and underwrite aesthetic form, language, 
play, and performance.  
                                                
15The two most puzzling features of the novel have been its puzzling stance on acting and 
its depiction of Fanny's disturbing passivity.  
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As the moral sentimentalists knew, and as many critics of moral sentimentalism 
have since noted, sympathy is in many ways theatrical, with the object of sympathy 
conceived of as a spectacle, and the sympathizer a spectator.16 It is not surprising, then, 
that this novel about sympathy hinges on a theatrical event. By looking closely at the 
rehearsals of “Lovers’ Vows” and at Henry Crawford’s reading of Shakespeare, as well as 
at Fanny’s sympathetic nature, we will see that Austen teases apart and plays with two 
aspects of sympathy—the moral motivation to recognize others and the aesthetic 
enjoyment of perception and insight—exploring their complicated and at times disturbing 
interconnection. Austen teases out aspects of this tension by holding open the possibility 
that first, Fanny Price (or Edmund Bertram, for that matter) is not actually the novel’s 
moral spokesperson, and, second, that Henry Crawford, in addition to being a scoundrel, 
is actually also, intriguingly, an authorial surrogate, someone who artfully navigates the 
inner lives of a whole cast of characters.   
While Henry Crawford rightfully has a reputation among critics as one of the 
book’s most morally dubious character (and there’s certainly stiff competition), he is also 
the only truly gifted actor at Mansfield Park, able to act all roles equally well, in large 
part because of his chameleon-like gift for identification. This virtuosic omniscience is, 
of course, precisely what Austen achieves in Mansfield Park at large, the first of her 
novels to employ from its inception free indirect discourse, a style of narration in which 
the narrator shifts, often very subtly, from straight third person to one that seems to have 
                                                
16 See Rae Greiner, Sympathetic Realism in Nineteenth Century British Fiction, and 
Audrey Jaffe, Scenes of Sympathy: Identification and Representation in Victorian  
Fiction.   
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privileged access to a character’s thoughts.17 In this novel, Austen shows us that this form 
of imaginative identification is not just a moral tool, but is also one that can derive 
aesthetic pleasure, not just for the subject of identification, but for the production of 
representative, realistic, mimetic artistic work (such as novels and plays). What’s more, 
she is interested in what happens when the aesthetic function of identification is isolated 
from its moral function, as seems to be the case with Henry Crawford. While I don’t want 
to argue that Austen is unconcerned with ethical conduct and ethical thinking (she is of 
course very interested in her characters as moral beings, and as characters undergoing 
moral development), I do think it is valuable to see the ways that, in this novel, she teases 
out sympathetic identification and applies it not just to Fanny Price, but also to Henry 
Crawford, who, like Austen, imagines himself into others.   
My reading redresses a longstanding imbalance in critical attention to Fanny and 
her moralism as opposed to the novel’s aesthetic investment.18  Austen vests the moral in 
Fanny, but embodies the aesthetic in Henry Crawford, who has been far less attended to.  
That Austen plays in this novel with the aesthetic function of sympathy, and its complex 
relation to its moral uses, may be gleaned from her enjoyment of her readers’ often wildly 
                                                
17Narelle Shaw, in her essay about free indirect discourse in Austen’s 1816 revision of 
Northanger Abbey, writes that Austen uses the method sparsely in her earlier work 
(hardly at all in her juvenilia, only somewhat more pervasively in Sense and Sensibility 
and Pride and Prejudice, and probably, according to her argument, only in the later 
revisions of Northanger Abbey that were done after writing Mansfield Park). It is only, 
she argues, in what are generally agreed to be her “mature novels” (Mansfield Park, 
Emma, and Persuasion) that the narrative device is fully developed and deployed, and in 
which Austen developed her novels with an already fully-conceived idea of what free 
indirect discourse could achieve. See Shaw, 592. 
18 For an overview of criticism on Mansfield Park and Fanny, especially, see “Critical 
Reception” in Marcia McClintock Folsom and John Wiltshire’s Approaches to Teaching 
Austen’s Mansfield Park. The editors of this volume reject criticism that is critical of 
Fanny, as this overview implies, but it usefully draws a history that follows the thread of 
Fanny’s moral values, and their celebration or denigration by readers and critics.   
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off the mark reactions to Mansfield Park. Chapman tells us that Austen transcribed what 
she gleaned “from her correspondence, from hearsay, and from remarks passed on to her 
by members of the family” (Minor Works, 431). On their frequent (and frequently 
negative) comparisons of the new novel to Pride and Prejudice: “We certainly do not 
think it as a whole equal to P. & P.;” “Not so clever as P. & P.;” “My mother—not liked it 
so well as P. & P.;” “Your characters are drawn to Life—so very, very natural & just—but 
as you beg me to be perfectly honest, I must confess I prefer P. & P.” On their (often 
underwhelmed) responses to Fanny: “Edward admired Fanny—George disliked her;” 
“Highly pleased with Fanny Price--& a warm admirer of the Portsmouth scene.—Angry 
with Edmund for not being in love with her, & hating Mrs. Norris for teasing her;” “Mr. 
J. P. made two objections, but only one of them was remembered, the want of some 
character more striking & interesting to the generality of Readers, than Fanny was likely 
to be” (Southam, 48-51). One begins to think, after reading pages of these copied-out 
comments, that she relished them. Perhaps it was amusing to her to think that her readers 
judged her book on the likeability of her characters or on the moral justice of the plot. By 
writing them all out in her own hand she got a chance to laugh at and distance herself 
from her readers, especially the ones who read her novel as they might a book of 
sermons. In the novel, too, she often seems to be laughing quietly, under her breath. That 
Austen depicts Fanny as being capable of falling in love with Henry Crawford as he 
reads, among other parts, that of the power-hungry Wolsey in Shakespeare’s Henry VIII, 
or the womanizing king himself, is a fine comic touch.19 Austen seems to be poking fun 
at those who would look for moral direction, for moralism, in the novel.   
                                                
19This irony was brought to my attention by Michael Dobson at a symposium entitled 
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Instead, Austen plays with the idea that Fanny is not the heroine, exactly, of the 
novel, and that her moral perspective is not the novel’s. The distance between the novel’s 
and Fanny’s moral and aesthetic sense is thrown into relief when Fanny is sent back to 
Portsmouth by Sir Thomas Bertram, who correctly assumes that a trip back to a filthy, 
over-crowded home will change her mind about her place in society. What she most 
objects to, tellingly, is the noise: 
The living in incessant noise was to a frame and temper, delicate and 
nervous like Fanny’s, an evil which no super-added elegance or harmony 
could have entirely atoned for. It was the greatest misery of all. At 
Mansfield, no sounds of contention, no raised voice, no abrupt bursts, no 
tread of violence was ever heard […] Here, every body was noisy, every 
voice was loud. (266-267) 
Fanny’s hatred of noise contrasts sharply with the novel in which she appears. Mansfield 
Park is, in a way, an exaltation of dissonance, a prime example of what Mikhail Bakhtin 
called heteroglossia. The novel is not Fanny’s novel.  
I argue, then, that it serves our understanding of Austen and of this novel if we 
train our attention on the complicated play between identification for aesthetic and moral 
ends, and look at how Austen explores this through her characters’ acting. Rather than 
seeing this as her most moralistic novel, one that condemns acting, I argue that we should 
attend to the ways in which Austen uses the novel, via acting, to suggest that sympathy is 
                                                                                                                                            
“What Signifies a Theatre?” which took place in Jane Austen’s Chawton at which I 
delivered a version of this chapter, and was further developed in conversation with Talia 
Schaffer. 
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an artistic device as well as a moral one, and that identification can have very troubling 
but interesting results.   
 
The moral problems with acting: A critical history 
Before addressing in detail the moral and aesthetic aspects of sympathy that 
Austen was responding to in Mansfield Park, it will be helpful to give a sense of some of 
the ways that critics have addressed her use of theatricals in the novel, since it is through 
theater that Austen explores the aesthetic aspects of sympathy. E. M. Butler, who, in 1933 
was the first critic to discuss the relationship between Elizabeth Inchbald’s loose 
translation of August Friedrich Ferdinand von Kotzebue’s play and the action of the 
novel, argued that Mansfield Park was a rewriting of Lovers’ Vows, but one that 
reasserted the moral values that had been subverted in the original. “The real fact of the 
case I believe to be this: Mansfield Park is nothing more nor less than Lovers’ Vows 
translated into terms of real life with the moral standard subverted by Kotzebue neatly re-
inverted” (326). In other words, in Lovers’ Vows immorality is rewarded, whereas in 
Mansfield Park it is punished. The main example for this, in Butler’s essay, is that in 
Lover’s Vows Agatha gets to marry the Baron in the end and is reinstated to respectability 
despite having had premarital sex with him, whereas in Mansfield Park, Maria, who plays 
Agatha in the play and mirrors her role in the novel, is exiled for her bad behavior. 
William Reitzel, later in 1933, reinforced Butler’s claim that Kotzebue’s play, and even 
Inchbald’s bowdlerized translation of it, was widely considered immoral in England, 
quoting for proof a review in the anti-Jacobin magazine, The Porcupine and Anti-
Gallican Monitor, which portrays the play as dangerous and un-English, an opinion 
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Reitzel says Austen would be aware of even if she hadn’t ever picked up a copy of The 
Porcupine (451-456). Winifred Husbands, writing in 1934 in direct response to Butler, 
and to a lesser degree, to Reitzel, argues that Austen was not writing in protest against the 
immorality of Lovers’ Vows, and that, indeed, Austen wouldn’t have considered the play 
immoral in the least. Lovers’ Vows, according to Husbands, depicts a woman who is 
betrayed, deceived, and left essentially for dead, but whose dignity is finally restored 
when she marries the very man who had taken her virginity. It is not, in other words, her 
sin that is rewarded (as Butler argued) but her perseverance and faith. Furthermore, 
Husbands argues, Maria’s guilt in Mansfield Park is actually greater than Agatha’s in 
Lovers’ Vows—the former has an extramarital affair, the latter only has premarital sex 
after receiving a false promise of marriage—while her punishment is more lenient. 
Better, in Husbands’ reading, to have to go abroad but still be monetarily supported than 
to be on the brink of death after a twenty-year period of deprivation and abandonment. 
Husbands argues that if the situation depicted in Lovers’ Vows is more morally upstanding 
than that in Mansfield Park, then the novel’s (or Austen’s) problem with acting must be 
that Maria’s “situation” (her engagement to be married) makes private theatricals 
inappropriate and morally unsound (Husbands, 176-179), an argument made by Edmund 
within the novel itself (Austen, 89). 
Lionel Trilling, writing in 1955, thought that acting was presented in the novel as 
problematic in the Platonic sense—Austen’s concern, according to Trilling, was that the 
amateur actors would lose their identity and begin to imagine themselves as something 
other than what they are (427-428). In this sense, acting risks hardening you into the 
character you are portraying—a souped up don’t-cross-your-eyes-or-they’ll-get-stuck-
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that-way argument. Many have questioned this position, in particular those who see a 
ready-made correspondence rather than a disjunction between the characters and the parts 
they play (Maria corresponds with Agatha, Mary with Amelia, Edmund with Anhalt, Mr. 
Rushworth with Count Cassel, and so on). Whereas most early critics saw the characters 
in the play as bad influences and argued that it was perilous to expose the Mansfield Park 
crowd to their behavior lest they themselves engage in premarital sex, reverse gender-
roles, or overturn class boundaries, Dvora Zelicovici argues just the opposite: “If 
anything, Lovers’ Vows is a didactic play with an over-insistence on poetic justice and 
moral judgment” (531). The problem isn’t that the amateur actors are playing parts they 
are at risk of becoming themselves, she argues, but that they fail to learn the lessons 
offered to them by the characters in the play: “But—and this is Austen’s keenest irony—
in sharp distinction to the main characters in Lovers’ Vows, who learn the right lessons, 
the actors do not profit from studying and rehearsing the play” (532). In spite of the fact 
that the Mansfield Park characters play roles perfectly suited to their own situations, or 
closely enough related that it should have been easy for them to recognize themselves and 
the pertinent moral lesson in Kotzebue’s play, they remain none the wiser. Had the cast 
done a better job and studied their roles more imaginatively,20 they might have profited 
from acting. All they do, though, is further their own agendas: for Maria, the play allows 
her to flirt with the man she prefers to her fiancé; Edmund and Mary are able to explore 
their affection for one another under the guise of the script; Mr. Rushworth gets the 
opportunity to wear, among other costumes, “a blue dress, and a pink satin coat” (98). 
                                                
20It is not a coincidence, as others have pointed out (notably Joseph Litvak, Caught in the 
Act: Theatricality in the Nineteenth-Century English Novel), that it is the study that gets 
sealed off in order to create a theater. 
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The problem with acting that Zelicovici offers is anti- Platonic: the actors remain 
themselves instead of becoming their characters, and thus lose the opportunity to learn 
from them. This argument, though quite different from the previous arguments, is still 
moralistic at its core: it is about a failure to learn the right lessons.  Indeed, it assumes 
that portraying a character on the stage is somewhat like the work involved in moral 
forms of sympathy: if you imagine your way into another character, you might improve 
morally. Zelicovici is correct that the novel relates acting to sympathy, but, crucially, 
Austen’s interest is not moralistic and is instead about the relation between sympathy and 
acting—or novel writing.  
In “The Infection of Acting: Theatricals and Theatricality in Mansfield Park,”  
Joseph Litvak writes: “The question, in other words, is not so much ‘What motivated 
Austen’s anti-theatricalism?’ as ‘What motivated her to create the impression of 
antitheatricalism?’” (333). Litvak argues that theatricality serves as a cover for more 
subtle forms of theater at Mansfield Park: “the theatricals serve….as a ‘diversion,’ as 
Hazlitt would say, from the subtler and more comprehensive theatricality that persists 
long after Sir Thomas has reclaimed his study” (343), especially and most interestingly, 
in the form of Fanny who “has in fact been playing a role, albeit ‘sincerely’” (348). 
Litvak, in destabilizing our impression of Fanny, goes on to conclude that “Indeed, in 
reading the final chapter of the novel one has the impression that its protagonist is less 
Fanny than Sir Thomas himself, or the ‘governing body’ that he represents” and that “Sir 
Thomas maybe be viewed as the agent of Jane Austen, insofar as both appear to endorse 
the fortification of a conservative social order” (351). But then, he argues, “No sooner has 
Sir Thomas expelled his demonic counterpart [Mrs. Norris]—whose ‘anxiety for 
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everybody’s comfort’ mocks his own need to keep everybody in their place—than she 
returns in the form of the anxious, ‘impatient,’ comfort-oriented author herself” (352). In 
other words, for Litvak, “theatricality is not a single, unitary phenomenon but an already 
self-divided set of practices capable of serving both reactionary and subversive causes” 
(352). This subtle expansion of theatricality to include its subversive and repressive 
forces runs parallel to my thinking on the multiple implications of identification in 
Mansfield Park.     
 
Austen’s ethical interests  
Austen inherited her interest in the relationship between acting and sympathy 
from the moral sentimentalists. Even without access to a reading journal or letters like the 
ones we have for George Eliot, it is safe to say that Austen was a reader and thinker 
intimately familiar with the fundamental concerns of the Enlightenment, including 
sympathy.21 In this novel, you can see that familiarity at work, as she plays with and 
explores, in particular, the theatrical nature of sympathy. Hume and Smith both described 
                                                
21 The question of what Jane Austen read, and how philosophical or otherwise learned 
she was is a matter for debate. See especially Marilyn Butler, Jane Austen and the War of 
Ideas; Claudia L. Johnson, Jane Austen: Women, Politics, and the Novel; Devoney 
Looser, ed. Jane Austen and the Discourses of Feminism; Gilbert Ryle, "Jane Austen and 
the Moralists;" Peter Knox-Shaw, Jane Austen and the Enlightenment. In order to give a 
sense of the range of the debate, I’ll offer two brief claims from the above. Butler argues 
that Austen was an anti-Jacobin conservative whose morality was “preconveived and 
inflexible” (298). Knox-Shaw, on the other hand, argues that “Austen is a writer of 
centrist views who derives in large measure from the Enlightenment, more particularly 
from that skeptical tradition within it that flourished in England and Scotland during the 
second half of the eighteenth century” (5). He shows how “deeply the ideas of writers 
like David Hume and Adam Smith penetrated” (5) the institutions Austen grew up with, 
such as Anglicanism, and he reminds Austen scholars that Enlightenment thinking was 
coursing through her family home, via her brothers and her father.  
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sympathy as being like a theatrical event, an activity that starts with spectatorship, and 
culminates in role-playing. For Hume, sympathy is largely a question of point of view, of 
the position from which one spectates. He is concerned, throughout A Treatise of Human 
Nature, to determine what point of view, or frame of mind—what seat in the theater—one 
sympathizes from. Sympathy is naturally strongest for those we are close to, he says. It 
“gives the preference to ourselves and friends, above strangers” (3.2.2.11) and thus it is 
necessary “to fix on some steady and general points of view” (3.3.1.15) that take into 
account the general good of mankind. Our sympathy is biased, and so we need to learn to 
sympathize with the general good. Hume’s preoccupation, then, is about the position 
from which one spectates, and the effects that has on the sympathetic exchange. Audrey 
Jaffe, in Scenes of Sympathy, writes of Victorian fiction that “the term ‘sympathy’ has 
commonly been used to describe an individualistic, affective solution to the problem of 
class alienation: the attempt to ameliorate social differences with assurances of mutual 
feeling and universal humanity” and that “sympathy thus formulated seeks to efface the 
social and political problems for which it is offered as a resolution” (15). While for Jaffe, 
Victorian sympathy entails a kind of sour rejection of failed others as opposed to Hume’s 
more convivial eighteenth-century version, for both, the spectacle of the other breaks 
down the atomism of social difference and provides access to a “general point of view,” 
in Hume’s terms, or, in Jaffe’s, “a universal humanity.” Thus, in these readings, sympathy 
is a way around the individualism of experience, and a requirement for moral action.   
Adam Smith is even more commonly associated with depicting sympathy as a 
dramatic affair, largely due to the stirring opening image of The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments: “Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, 
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our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry 
us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any 
conception of what are his sensations” (11). The observer is passively watching, 
contemplating his difference in circumstance and experience from the sufferer on the 
rack. But through imaginatively identifying with the sufferer, by getting worked up by the 
scene being played out, we are carried “beyond our own person.” For Rae Greiner, 
Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments is the ur-text for understanding sympathy in the 
nineteenth-century novel, and in particular, she argues that Smith is correct in depicting 
the maintenance of difference and distance as being central to the sympathetic exchange. 
“Against the standard claim that knowing more and seeing further into the hidden hearts 
and minds of characters heightens our sympathy with them, novels of the period are 
dubious of the tie that binds sympathy to knowledge. What’s more, sympathy resists 
identification” (4). The mirror that identification props up, Greiner argues, is 
counterproductive for sympathy or the consideration of a real and individuated other. 
Better to look at the other from a distance, and without assumptions of identification and 
knowledge. She cites James Chandler and Ian Duncan as postulating the major difference 
between Hume and Smith as being “that Smith’s sympathizer abstracts feelings, routing it 
through cognition, while Hume allows for sensation to be transmitted both directly and 
unconsciously from one person to the next” (5). Greiner’s argument is that realist fiction 
is actually more invested in Smith’s form of sympathy than Hume’s—moral sympathy is 
a distant and cognitive process rather than a feeling-driven one. Like Greiner, I’m 
interested in separating identification from sympathy, but what Greiner neglects is that 
identification can lead to aesthetic enjoyment, bypassing all moral outcomes. Instead of 
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looking at our brother suffering on the rack and, through imagining what he feels, 
entering sympathetically into his position, what if this identification is simply 
aesthetically interesting? 
I argue that Mansfield can be read as an oblique commentary on, and a novel 
hugely influenced by, these theories of sympathy. Austen’s characters are famous for their 
ability to imagine the thoughts of others, to think about what another person will need 
before that person has even thought of it, and to respond to others as unique and 
independent subjects. Or she shows that they aren’t. On a formal level, too, she was 
fascinated with the uses of, and problems with, sympathy. Her newly developed narrative 
style, free indirect discourse, seems especially to draw from arguments, like those made 
by Hume and Smith, about the perspectives from which one sympathizes—removed and 
remote, or involved and implicated—and the moral repercussions of those perspectives. 
Mansfield Park, in particular, relates sympathy to acting, stressing the imaginative, 
theatrical nature of sympathy. Hume and Smith postulated that imaginative identification 
with others would lead to some kind of moral behavior. Austen shows that it might or it 
might not. And in many cases, it might just end at identification—and that identification 
might be an aesthetic process rather than anything moral or other-directed.  
 
Fanny and Henry’s different sympathies  
Austen shows that sympathy can be a moral or an aesthetic faculty in part by 
dividing the two functions of sympathy between two of her main characters: Fanny and 
Henry. Fanny Price, in the word of Austen’s mother, is “insipid” (Southam, 49). Kingsley 
Amis put it well when he said that he would not take lightly the decision of whether to 
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accept a dinner invitation from her and Edmund (14). Passive, sickly, and retiring though 
she may be, she is also fascinating for our purposes. Fanny is the only character in the 
novel who enters sympathetically into all her peers’ minds. She imagines what they might 
be thinking or feeling, and thinks and feels for them and with them.22 When the strict and 
forbidding patriarch of Mansfield Park, Sir Thomas Bertram, departs for Antigua, leaving 
the younger generation to their own devices, they do the nineteenth-century equivalent of 
throwing a house party: they begin planning a private theatrical. Fanny, however, refuses 
to participate. “Higher consequence was against it” (93) she tells herself. Regardless, in 
her role as wallflower,23 Fanny masters Lovers’ Vows. Whereas the others fail to learn 
even their own parts, and stage rehearsals mainly in order to flirt, Fanny memorizes the 
whole play simply by observing. Not only is Fanny the only one in the house who 
actually knows the play, she is the only one who sees, as it were, the play taking place 
outside the play, and the erotic motives behind the decision to stage Lovers’ Vows. When 
Henry Crawford slyly chooses Maria to play the part of Agatha, thereby slighting Julia, 
Fanny alone comprehends Julia’s disappointment, and does so despite the fact that Julia 
has always ignored or outright mistreated her. Once the rehearsals are underway and Julia 
is devoting herself to her misery while watching her sister, Maria, flirt with Henry, the 
narrator says: “Fanny saw and pitied much of this in Julia; but there was no outward 
fellowship between them. Julia made no communication, and Fanny took no liberties. 
They were two solitary sufferers, or connected only by Fanny’s consciousness” (114). 
                                                
22Fanny’s frequent insights into the emotional lives of others sometimes leads her to think 
against them, as it were, rather than, or in addition to, for them or with them. This is of 
course most often the case with Mary and Henry Crawford. Fanny, whose passivity is one 
of the most hated aspects of the book, is actually quite remorseless, in her thoughts, 
especially when she has seen into someone and disliked what she found. 
23 See Litvak.  
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Fanny is the only one who sees the relationship between Julia, Maria, and the flirtatious 
Henry Crawford for what it is: a quagmire of jealousy on the female side and a pleased 
puffing of the chest on the male side. Of Maria’s acting, Fanny thinks, “Maria […] acted 
well—too well…” (115). She knows exactly what is going on between Maria and Henry, 
who have chosen to act the mother and son pair largely, it seems, because mother and son 
do a fair amount of touching in the play. Of Edmund’s participation in the play, despite 
his objection to the activity, Fanny sees that he joins in order to be closer to the girl with 
whom he is smitten, and to ensure that nobody else ends up playing the part of her lover. 
Edmund is not fully aware of his own reasons—only Fanny has entered into his mind and 
imagined what he must be feeling. This is Fanny’s mode of sympathetic engagement. 
Henry Crawford, on the other hand, is neither insipid nor high-minded. He is a 
cad.  Nevertheless, he, too, has a highly developed ability to enter sympathetically into 
others—even if it’s only as an actor, not as a person. Before Lovers’ Vows has been 
chosen for the group’s theatricals, Henry says in a moment of exultation: 
I really believe I could be fool enough at this moment to undertake any 
character that ever was written, from Shylock or Richard III down to the 
singing hero of a farce in his scarlet cloak and cocked hat. I feel as if I 
could be any thing or every thing, as if I could rant and storm, or sigh, or 
cut capers in any tragedy or comedy in the English language. (87) 
Henry is as good as his word. He proves this ability in the novel, not just by 
consummately preparing to play Frederick in Lovers’ Vows, but also later, after he decides 
he is in love with Fanny and continues his attempted seduction by reading from 
Shakespeare’s Henry VIII. The narrator says: 
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[…] in Mr. Crawford’s reading there was a variety of excellence beyond 
what she [Fanny] had ever met with. The King, the Queen, Buckingham, 
Wolsey, Cromwell, all were given in turn; for with the happiest knack, the 
happiest power of jumping and guessing, he could always alight at will on 
the best scene, or the best speeches of each; and whether it were dignity, or 
pride, or tenderness, or remorse, or whatever were to be expressed, he 
could do it with equal beauty. It was truly dramatic. His acting had first 
taught Fanny what pleasure a play might give, and his reading brought all 
his acting before her again. (228) 
Henry’s “truly dramatic” performance is so powerful that it compels Fanny, against her 
will, to drop her needle-work and watch him attentively. The remarkable thing about his 
acting is that he does all the parts, and does them all well. He can inhabit any character, 
exhibit any quality or expression.  However, this ability to enter imaginatively into other 
selves evaporates when Henry is not reading Shakespeare or acting in private theatricals. 
Although he can enter into a fictional character’s subjectivity, he shows little interest in 
identifying with actual people. Fanny’s thoughts are a mystery to him—indeed, as his 
sister notes, his attraction to her is based on precisely the fact that she is the only woman 
he hasn’t been able to comprehend, the only woman who hasn’t fallen for him without his 
having to try to imagine what she might be like inside. 
Fanny Price’s moral artlessness and Henry Crawford’s joy in rendering others 
represent the novel’s two models of sympathetic engagement. Critics of the novel have 
almost always worked under the assumption that Austen, whose narrator refers 
affectionately to “my Fanny,” quietly but unmistakably endorses Fanny’s model of 
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sympathy. This is one of the reasons the novel is so controversial, even disliked. Looked 
at another way, however, the novel is even more controversial than commonly supposed, 
for Austen is showing that, contrary to prevailing notions, sympathy as a purely 
aesthetically productive act has its own distinct power. She invites us to appreciate 
Henry’s charm and talent, his moral dubiousness notwithstanding, precisely because he is 
the novel’s one creative character whose skill relies on an imaginative activity related to 
the sympathy that we find so overwhelmingly moralistic and irritating in Fanny. 
 
Jane Austen and Henry Crawford  
I propose that Austen is exploring her alignment with the aesthetically charged 
dimensions of sympathy in Mansfield Park. This novel is Austen’s first to fully employ 
(from its inception as a novel, rather than in its revision) what many credit to be her 
major innovation, free indirect discourse. The narrator moves freely in and out of 
different characters’ minds, undertaking any character, to paraphrase Henry Crawford. 
The narrator enters into Fanny’s mind most frequently in this way, but the narrator enters 
everyone’s mind, including Henry’s—one count has it at nine times for Henry to Fanny’s 
ninety seven.24  
 The narrator, at Austen’s direction, identifies well and promiscuously, 
“undertaking all the characters,” and thereby allowing the readers to do the same. Even if 
we never come to like Mrs. Norris, we have still entered into her thoughts and come to 
know her a little more. This feels morally productive—our access to her allows us insight 
into her moral character, and affects our own moral calculus. But gaining insight into her 
                                                
24 Louis Ann Flavin, The Aesthetic Effects of Free Indirect Discourse in the Novels of 
Jane Austen. 
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thoughts also simply brings us intense pleasure. The affects involved in identification are 
limitless, but whether identification is felt as funny, pleasurable, morally productive, or 
disturbing, the experience is aesthetically charged. It begins with a dramatic entering into 
another, “beyond our own person,” and culminates in an aesthetic, affectively layered 
response.  
By readjusting our focus and attending to these multiple aspects of identification, 
we get a fuller understanding of this novel. In doing so, we find an author who is 
interested in the central role that language and pleasure play in the work of sympathy. 
Henry Crawford is able to find his way into any text, especially if he reads it aloud, as he 
does with Shakespeare and Lovers’ Vows, and even if he knows little else, he knows the 
pleasure of language. Despite the fact that Mary Crawford is shallow and thoughtless, we 
derive great pleasure from her language game about rears and vices. Instead of seeing this 
as a moralistic novel that censures theatricality and asks us to admire an insipid heroine, 
it is productive to retrain our gaze and recognize it as a novel about the pleasures of 
reading and of identification, and about the way that sympathy is a process steeped in 
language and in narrative. Instead of mourning that Mary Crawford—whose zest and 
verbal playfulness reminds us wistfully of Lizzy Bennet—isn’t the main character, we 
might see her as simply one of the many characters, like Fanny, like Henry, that Austen 
inhabits and gives voice to. Rather than view this as Fanny’s novel, and feel frustrated 
with Austen for giving us this wilting, speechless girl for a heroine, I argue that we 
should see the narrative voice, and Austen behind it, as the novel’s main character. In 
Patricia Rozema’s 1999 film version of Mansfield Park, Fanny is depicted as a stronger, 
more interesting and talkative character than she is in the novel. Most controversially, she 
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is depicted as a writer, and we are encouraged to imagine her as a young Austen.  The 
film even has Fanny write Austen’s own impressive piece of juvenilia, a mock school-
room exercise, “The History of England.” Rozema is battling with the same issue I am: 
the problem of Fanny, and the problem of the novel’s seeming conservatism.25 My 
conclusion, however, is different than hers. Rather than rehabilitate Fanny by making her 
more like Austen, I see the novel as one in which Fanny is a decoy. We are forgiven, 
certainly, for assuming at first that she is the heroine; the novel sets us up for that reading. 
But by examining her in relation to Henry Crawford, and in light of the novel’s focus on 
acting, we can see that the real main character of the novel is Austen herself, undertaking 
any character, imagining her way into all of them: the sassy, superficial Mary Crawford, 
the talented and handsome but morally bankrupt Henry Crawford, the silly but 
dangerously powerful Mrs. Norris, as well as the fainting, insipid Fanny Price.  
More than moralistic pronouncements or disavowals, this is a novel that admires 
beauty and wit, and enjoys making fun of others. Mary Crawford’s jokes, beauty, and 
skill with the harpsichord are admired and held in contrast to Fanny’s boring attempt to 
say something improving about trees to Edmund: “Cut down an avenue! What a pity! 
Does it not make you think of Cowper? ‘Ye fallen avenues, once more I mourn your fate 
unmerited’” (41). We can’t help but laugh at Mr. Rushworth when, after we’ve been told 
that he “liked the idea of his finery [for his part in the performance] very well, though 
affecting to despise it,” he “step[s] forward with great alacrity to tell [Edmund] the 
agreeable news. ‘We have got a play,’ said he. ‘It is to be Lovers’ Vows; and I am to be 
                                                
25 In addition to tweaking Fanny’s character, Rozema’s film also differs from the novel in 
its more explicit incorporation of the issue of slavery on Sir Thomas Bertram’s Antigua 
estate. In Rozema’s version, Fanny becomes increasingly outraged the more she learns.   
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Count Cassel, and am to come in first with a blue dress and a pink satin cloak, and 
afterwards am to have another fine fancy suit, by way of a shooting-dress. I do not know 
how I shall like it” (98). Another, more thorough takedown is of Mrs. Norris, and it is 
done largely through free indirect discourse. While the young occupants of Mansfield 
Park are choosing a play that will suit them for a private theatrical, the narrator reports 
that “an enormous roll of green baize had arrived from Northampton, and been cut out by 
Mrs. Norris (with a saving, by her good management, of full three quarters of a yard), and 
was actually forming into a curtain by the housemaids” (92).  The reader knows that in 
fact Mrs. Norris spends her brother in law’s money quite freely, and is only frugal when 
it comes to her own small fortune. However, within that parenthesis, we see Mrs. Norris 
patting herself on the back for her excellent management of Sir Thomas’s expenses 
despite the fact that she has just bought baize for a private theatrical of which he would 
surely disapprove. (There is also the fact that the amount—three-quarters of a yard—is 
negligible.) The joke continues after Sir Thomas returns from Antigua and shuts down 
the theatricals: 
Mrs. Norris contrived to remove one article from his sight that might have 
distressed him. The curtain, over which she had presided with such talent 
and such success, went off with her to her cottage, where she happened to 
be particularly in want of green baize (134). 
Again, Mrs. Norris’s thoughts are being accessed by the narrator for fun: it is Mrs. Norris 
who invents the pretext that it will upset Sir Thomas to see the green baize, remembers 
her talent and success at overseeing the curtain-making, and decides that she truly needs 
some green baize. Mansfield Park is a novel invested in language, playfulness, nasty 
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humor, and playful, interesting, but not necessarily moral, imagination into the lives and 
minds of others. This investment in the pleasure of performance and the multiplicity of 
selves that good actors can produce is extended in Emma to even more radical ends.  
 
II. “If it was a falsehood, it was a very pleasant one:” Playing Your Part in Emma 
 
Austen the “Imaginist”  
Among Austen critics, Emma tends to be everyone’s favorite, and Mansfield Park 
everyone’s least favorite novel. Emma is an “imaginist,” Fanny is “insipid;” Emma flirts, 
Fanny withdraws; Emma makes mistakes and is loved in spite of, or because of this 
quality, Fanny watches and judges the mistakes of others. And yet, there are similarities 
in the approach critics tend to take in discussing the two novels, especially a tendency to 
describe both in moralistic terms. Mansfield Park teaches, according to many critics, that 
acting in private theatricals is bad and leads to loose morals, problematic flirtations, and 
even adultery. In Emma, the moral lessons are all directed at Emma herself. As Eve 
Sedgwick puts it in “Jane Austen and the Masturbating Girl” (1991), “Austen criticism is 
notable […] for its unresting exaction of the spectacle of a Girl Being Taught a Lesson — 
for the vengefulness it vents on the heroines whom it purports to love, and whom, 
perhaps, it does…”  (833) In response to this critical landscape, Sedgwick made available 
an alternative mode of reading Austen: “It is partly to interrupt this seemingly 
interminable scene of punitive / pedagogical reading, interminably structured as it is by 
the concept of repression, that I want to make available the sense of an alternative, 
passionate sexual ecology — one fully available to Austen for her exciting, productive, 
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and deliberate use, in a way it no longer is to us.” (834). With Sedgwick, I hope to show 
some of the ways that Austen is not a moralistic writer, slapping her heroines on the 
wrist, but rather one who explores the delicate boundary between thinking morally and 
being a creator of fiction—an “imaginist.”  
One area to which Austen’s imagination returns again and again is the subject of 
authenticity. She was forever, in her fiction, thinking about whether people are what they 
purport to be and what happens if they aren’t. This exploration, with Mansfield Park and 
Emma, is, I argue, conducted by thinking about authenticity and acting, or the act of 
putting on roles. In Mansfield Park this was overt. Under the cover of her 
overwhelmingly moral heroine, Austen creates enough clearance to explore her relation, 
as author, to the novel’s best actor and worst person. In so doing, she suggests that a self 
can contain many characters, and that identification can be a performance without any 
moral component. In Emma, the relation between acting and fiction-writing is less overt, 
but, in some ways, more pervasive. In Emma, I argue, acting is what everyone is doing all 
the time. Such a claim may seem perverse—Emma wraps up, after all, with Knightley 
saying things like: “My Emma, does not every thing serve to prove more and more the 
beauty of truth and sincerity in all our dealings with each other?" (457) Mr. George 
Knightley, arbiter of all that is true in this novel, representative of the right thoughts and 
best behaviors, knight in shining armor, and Saint George of England, schools devious 
Emma and makes things all right in the end. Or, that’s how the novel is often read. I 
argue, however, that Knightley is himself a master of characters, and that the novel shows 
that human relations are a constant putting on of characters. This is to say that Austen 
posits, in this novel, that there is no such thing as an authentic self or behavior. Instead, 
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Austen is exploring what it means to be a character in many senses: a character in a novel 
who is characterized, for example, as having fine moral judgment but who nevertheless 
loves a naughty woman like Emma; in life, one might be described as having character 
(being a fine upstanding gentleman like Knightley, for example); in a novel and in life, 
being a character implies that the self might be unstable, and that one’s character might 
really be one of several characters (as is the case most obviously with Frank Churchill). 
Austen considers the character of her fictional character, Knightley, in both senses—he is 
a fine character, and he is also a person in character. Thus, Knightley is not entirely 
dissimilar from Frank Churchill who is characterized by his putting on multiple 
characters, or, for that matter, from Henry Crawford. By looking at the way Emma 
portrays people portraying themselves to others, I will show that the author’s 
representative is not Knightley who schools Emma into marriageability with his message 
of authenticity and truth. Instead, I argue that Austen shows truthfulness itself to be but a 
performance, a character to assume but not an authentic self. In Emma, Austen shows that 
we are all, even Knightley, always playing a role.   
 
 “Dear Jane”  
Reading Austen as a moralistic writer satisfies a longstanding critical urge that is 
still hard to work against, but this perception of Austen is a feature of history, not a 
reliable truth. The image of “dear Aunt Jane,” later shortened to “Dear Jane” or just 
“Jane,” began in earnest, as is well know, with her nephew’s 1869 publication, A Memoir 
of Jane Austen, which increased the popularity and circulation of her works dramatically, 
but hardened the image of the author into, as Kathryn Sutherland has written, “a 
 58 
comfortable figure, shunning fame and professional status, centered in home, writing 
only in the intervals permitted from the important domestic duties of a devoted daughter, 
sister, and aunt” (Sutherland, Memoir, xv). In short: by the mid-Victorian period, Austen 
had received public treatment that painted her as perfectly reflective of the Victorian cult 
of true womanhood. Sutherland brilliantly plots what happens with this image of the 
kindly aunt through the long and storied course of readership and criticism, revealing the 
ways that certain narratives came to congeal. For example, Sutherland argues that during 
the dislocating and horrific experience of the First World War, Austen’s seemingly 
regulated world and language served the much-needed function of making the world 
appear to have meaning and coherence. For Kipling’s “Janeites,” for example, “Jane” is a 
therapeutic presence who creates order out of a hellish war experience and holds out the 
promise of a stable England. The epigraph alone tells the story of a whole century of 
Austen criticism:  
Jane lies in Winchester—blessed be her shade! 
Praise the Lord for making her, and her for all she made! 
And while the stones of Winchester, or Milsom Street, remain, 
Glory, love, and honour unto England’s Jane!  
“Jane” is England’s mascot, representing virtue and as much stability as the stones on 
which her heroes and heroines walk. Sutherland then connects the post-war pride in 
national values, and the production of, among other things, R. W. Chapman’s Oxford 
University Press editions of Austen. These texts, Sutherland suggests, participated in the 
promotion of old-fashioned English values, and depicted a version of Austen that has had 
a lasting and troubling effect on Austen scholarship to this day. The Chapman edition, as 
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Sutherland shows, leaves out many things, most strikingly the fact that Austen was a 
wartime writer (as Chapman was a wartime editor) and obscures her relation to ideas in 
the act of making her a safe and stable vehicle for the reproduction of moral English life. 
Austen the moralist is, thus, a product of our uses for her.  
D.W. Harding, one of the first to argue against the “Dear Jane” narrative, wrote, 
rather radically in 1939, that Jane Austen “has none of the underlying didactic intention 
ordinarily attributed to the satirist.” Gilbert Ryle, in his 1966 essay on what he argues is 
Austen’s Shaftesburian influence, argues that in her novels she was concerned with moral 
problems, but was not didactic or what I’ll call moralistic. Lionel Trilling’s influential 
writing on Austen, however, suggests that Harding’s and Ryle’s writing on a non-
moralistic Austen was outside the critical norm. For Trilling, Austen was interested in 
moral thinking insofar as her novels promoted and produced moral growth, both in her 
characters and for her readers. As Marilyn Butler has written, “He saw Mansfield Park as 
a case-study of the process whereby, with pain and danger, the self became a moral 
agent” (xi).  
That Austen is a moral thinker is clear. Her novels give character and action to the 
moral debates of her time. Whether she is a didactic moralist is, it would seem from 
contemporary criticism, still a lot less clear. D.A. Miller, for example, in Narrative and 
its Discontents: Problems of Closure in the Traditional Novel (1989), argues that 
Austen’s closures are always moral.  He writes that the paradox in Austen’s writing is 
that though her novels always promote knowledge, truth, and goodness prevailing over 
falsehood, error, and evil or less-goodness, she first needs, in order for there to be a story, 
the absence of all the good stuff in order for it to be prevailed over. For Miller, this 
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constitutes a real problem: what is a novelist who ideologically stands at the closure side 
of things to do about the fact that if she is to create a story, she needs to mostly spend her 
time withholding closure? Miller, in this book, sees Austen as ideologically opposed to 
ambiguity. Rather than show that narrative and ideology are in constant and unsettled 
battle in Austen, he argues that ideology wins. Miller’s claims are of a piece with a larger 
trend of Foucault-inspired criticism that is suspicious of the past for the covert ways its 
values were enforced and that sees Austen as, ultimately, another promoter and enforcer 
of conservative values.26   
Among contemporary Austen critics, there are, broadly speaking, two camps: 
those who, along with Marilyn Butler, see the novels as betraying a political and social 
conservatism and those who, along with Claudia Johnson, see Austen as essentially an 
                                                
26 In his later book on Austen, Jane Austen and the Secret of Style, Miller writes about 
what he calls “Austen Style”—an “Absolute Style” derived from being outside of what 
she describes. Miller shows that Austen creates protagonists who are themselves stylish 
and outsider-ish, but who then necessarily renounce this status at the novel’s end. He 
observes that this renunciation of Style always happens, surprisingly, rather happily, and 
argues that it is because Style is wedded to a fear of shame. To renounce Style in favor of 
marriage, then, is a liberating act, and even her most Stylish leading ladies are more than 
happy to trade insecure Style for secure ordinariness. Austen, though, if she is to remain 
Austen the writer, must not release herself from Austen Style, and must retain her 
intimate relationship with shame. In this later reading of Austen, Miller recognizes and 
indeed builds a dialectical tension into his reading of Austen: she recognizes what might 
be an easier and happier choice (marriage, ordinariness, insider-status) but chooses to 
maintain a harder, less happy position (single, extraordinary, outsider-y). While I take 
issue with some of Miller’s assumptions (that she is unhappy as a single woman and that 
marriage mattered as much to her as he says it does) his premise that her writing comes 
from a divided place is similar to mine: to be a moral person and follow the rules is 
certainly good, and perhaps easier, too. To think deeply about the rules, and about right 
and wrong, and from that interrogation, to discover the potential for dark, unmoral 
thoughts is harder and alienating, and yet it is Austen’s writerly necessity. In order to 
marry, Emma must tamp her overly active imagination, but Austen can never tamp hers. 
Mansfield Park and Emma are absorbing and masterful marriage-plot novels with 
satisfying endings, but they are also meditations about the art of the imagination and the 
slippery, hall-of-mirrors Style moral path it takes one down if one is to do it at all well.   
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ironic writer who depicts with biting sarcasm that which appears conservative. The 
Butlerians tend to focus on the staid settings, customs, characters, and expectations we 
see represented in the novels, while the Johnsonians tend to focus on language and 
pleasure and the way those undercut the novels’ depictions of conservatism. In Butler’s 
preface to the 1988 edition of Jane Austen and the War of Ideas she quotes Terry 
Eagleton on the “scandal of [her] book:” “it sheared coolly through decades of diplomatic 
Trillingesque talk about Austen’s ‘tensions’ and finely tuned ambivalences and actually 
said that, well, when you get down to it, she’s just a straight Tory” (Butler, xvii; 
Eagleton, 24-25). To sheer coolly through decades of ambivalent talk and to offer some 
straight truth sounds admirable, but, I argue, inappropriate to a discussion of Austen, 
whose writing is deeply committed to ambiguity rather than to ideology. In what follows, 
I will show that rather than shearing coolly through anything, in Knightley’s adamant, 
declarative mode, Austen asks questions that don’t have clear answers about the 
complexity of identity, and the social demands of being somebody stable when in fact we 
are multiple. I will show that it is precisely ambiguity that Austen aims to identify as the 
universal human experience, and that, contrary to the critical history of Austen that, from 
its “Dear Jane” narrative to the Foucauldian or the Butlerian assertions of her old-
fashioned conservatism, she is not a moralistic or didactic writer, nor a Tory writer, nor 
even an ideological writer. In this study of Emma, I will show that she is a writer 
interrogating the degree to which anyone can ever be a truthful and authentic self.   
 
Seeming, not being, in Emma    
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Emma begins with these words: “Emma Woodhouse, handsome, clever, and rich, 
with a comfortable home and happy disposition, seemed to unite some of the best 
blessings of existence; and had lived nearly twenty-one years in the world with very little 
to distress or vex her.” Critics have focused on that word, “seemed,” often asking some 
variety of the question: Why did it only seem, and what was the reality? I argue that there 
is no straightforward answer to that question and that in fact the “seemed” is only meant 
to suggest that, in fact, everything “seems” but nothing “is.” It’s not that Emma “seems” 
one thing but “is” another—it’s that she, and everyone, “seems” one thing or another all 
the time.    
This “seeming” but not being extends to Knightley and to the very character of 
the English gentleman. Claudia Johnson argues convincingly, in her afterword to 
Equivocal Beings: Politics, Gender, and Sentimentality in the 1790s—Wollestonecraft, 
Radcliffe, Burney, Austen (1995), that Austen’s novels, especially Emma, were central to 
the construction of the nineteenth-century English Gentleman. Responding to the 
tradition of Emma criticism that addresses Emma as transgressive in some gendered way 
-- frigid, lesbian, or masculine—Johnson argues that actually, “Where this novel is 
concerned with gender transgression, it is from the masculine, not the feminine side” 
(196). Rather than show the normative English gentleman as an eighteenth-century 
sentimental hero, Austen invents the English gentleman that, to this day, we associate 
with gentlemanliness. Johnson shows that Mr. Woodhouse is a man in the sentimental 
mode and should be, therefore, the gentleman of the novel. “The qualities that typify 
him—sensitivity, tenderness, ‘benevolent nerves,’ allegiance to the good old ways, 
courtesies to the fair sex, endearing irrationality, and even slowness, frailty, and 
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ineptitude itself—also typify the venerated paternal figures crowding the pages of Burney 
and Radcliffe, to say nothing of those of Edmund Burke” (198). Of course, Mr. 
Woodhouse is not the model for manhood in this novel, nor is “gallant Mr. Elton” or the 
“chattering coxcomb” Frank Churchill; Knightley is.  
Deviating from the model for the sentimental hero of the eighteenth-century, that 
of the nineteenth, which Knightley originates, is, according to Johnson, “a man of few 
words. Whereas an earlier generation of sentimental men had made a spectacle of their 
affect—of honorable feelings so powerful as to exceed all possibility of control, thus 
saturating handkerchiefs and liberally bedewing eloquent pages—the manful Knightley 
retreats from display, cultivating containment rather than excess…And this new, plain 
style of manliness is a matter of national import, constituting the amiable, ‘the true 
English style,’ as opposed of course, to the aimable, the artificial, the courtly, the 
dissembling, the servile, and (as the tradition goes) the feminized French” (201). In other 
words, what Austen does in Emma is to recreate the English gentleman in a style of 
reticence, quiet strength, and benevolent wisdom—a revision so powerful that it now 
strikes us as normative, to the point that, as Johnson argues, criticism of Emma takes it 
for granted. But, in fact, Knightley is a new type in English literature. Drawing on 
Johnson’s reading of Emma, I argue that the next step in re-seeing Knightley is to see that 
even the Truth-upholding Knightley is engaged in role-playing. He originates and enters 
into the character of the English Gentleman with such aplomb that he inspires a shift in 
literary and historical masculinity so successful that it is almost unnoticed.  
Knightley is often taken to be Austen’s surrogate in the novel—the person who 
foresees much of the plot and is in the right regarding behavior and character. I argue that 
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once again, as in Mansfield Park, Austen is playing with character-surrogacy, and that in 
this novel, she investigates what it means to be both a truth-teller and an actor—a double-
life that, as a novelist, she is particularly interested in. Contrary to most interpretations 
that take for granted that the novel promotes authenticity and truth, I argue that the novel 
shows relations to be necessarily performative and identities to be various. Further, I 
argue that Austen, through Knightley, shows truth itself to be unstable given that we are 
all always playing a role.  
The idea that people are characters who take on multiple characters (who “seem” 
but never actually are) is suggested everywhere in Emma. When the Westons host a 
dinner party on a snowy winter evening, Mr. Elton is delighted by the idea of an extended 
opportunity for flirtation, while John Knightley, as uptight as his brother and as 
hypochondriacal as his father-in-law, is vexed at the idea of going out in the snow. But 
when they arrive, they have to arrange their faces, arrange the outward depiction of their 
moods, and put on the right character for a social evening: “Some change of countenance 
was necessary for each gentleman as they walked into Mrs. Weston's drawing-room;—
Mr. Elton must compose his joyous looks, and Mr. John Knightley disperse his ill-
humour. Mr. Elton must smile less, and Mr. John Knightley more, to fit them for the 
place” (117). When Emma is coaching Harriet into swapping her romantic interest in Mr. 
Martin for Mr. Elton, she highlights Mr. Eliot’s virtues by describing them as a good 
model or pattern for any young man in search of a persona.   
In one respect, perhaps, Mr. Elton's manners are superior to Mr. 
Knightley's or Mr. Weston's. They have more gentleness. They might be 
more safely held up as a pattern. There is an openness, a quickness, almost 
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a bluntness in Mr. Weston, which every body likes in him, because there is 
so much good-humour with it—but that would not do to be copied. 
Neither would Mr. Knightley's downright, decided, commanding sort of 
manner, though it suits him very well; his figure, and look, and situation in 
life seem to allow it; but if any young man were to set about copying him, 
he would not be sufferable. On the contrary, I think a young man might be 
very safely recommended to take Mr. Elton as a model. Mr. Elton is good-
humoured, cheerful, obliging, and gentle. (E, 31). 
Emma speaks of these men as patterns and models as if they have slipped into costume 
and as if any young man in the market for a character could do the same. Indeed, what 
Emma is discussing here is the matter of manners, and she is using the language of the 
conduct manual in a novel that, among Austen’s other novels, became one of the 
textbook novels of manners. Emma takes for granted that manners are assumed, not 
indexes to the soul. Conduct manuals and novels of manners describe the moral 
imperative to behave correctly. What Austen shows, however, is that this moral 
imperative is to behave well, but not to be anything except an adopter of the appropriate 
behavior, calibrated to the context. Manners are transferable and situational, not reflective 
of the self, the real, or the authentic—if they weren’t there wouldn’t be conduct manuals. 
The fact that manners are context-driven and transferable, which is to say not 
tethered to an “authentic” origin, is hard to square with Knightley who, as Emma points 
out, is not an easy model to follow precisely because of how fixed and authentic he 
seems. But Knightley, as the novel shows, has assumed a role defined by its performance 
of truth. Knightley’s supposed authenticity is a persona that he performs expertly, though 
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he does, importantly, slip from time to time. Take, for instance, his uncharacteristic 
arrival in a carriage at a party at the Coles’. Emma “was pleased to see that it [the 
carriage] was Mr. Knightley's; for Mr. Knightley […] was too apt, in Emma's opinion, to 
get about as he could, and not use his carriage so often as became the owner of Donwell 
Abbey.” Their conversation about his character, and her commendation of his playing it, 
in her mind, correctly, is telling:    
"This is coming as you should do," said she; "like a gentleman.—I am 
quite glad to see you."  
 
He thanked her, observing, "How lucky that we should arrive at the same 
moment! for, if we had met first in the drawing-room, I doubt whether you 
would have discerned me to be more of a gentleman than usual.—You 
might not have distinguished how I came, by my look or manner."  
 
"Yes I should, I am sure I should. There is always a look of consciousness 
or bustle when people come in a way which they know to be beneath 
them. You think you carry it off very well, I dare say, but with you it is a 
sort of bravado, an air of affected unconcern; I always observe it whenever 
I meet you under those circumstances. Now you have nothing to try for. 
You are not afraid of being supposed ashamed. You are not striving to 
look taller than any body else. Now I shall really be very happy to walk 
into the same room with you."  
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"Nonsensical girl!" was his reply, but not at all in anger. (216-217)  
The question is not just what the appropriate manners are for someone in Knightley’s 
station—whether it befits the master of Donwell Abbey to use a carriage at all times, or 
to save money and healthfully walk instead—not only whether these manners and 
behaviors are visibly reflected but also whether they reflect what they seem to reflect. 
Emma thinks that Knightley is, for once, traveling through Hartfield in the manner 
appropriate to a gentleman and the owner of the best property in the area. What he 
doesn’t reveal is that his behavior is indeed gentlemanly, but in a different way: he 
arrives in his carriage because he wants Miss Bates and Jane Fairfax to have a method of 
conveyance to and from the party, and not have to walk, a fact only revealed to Emma 
through Frank’s gossipy patter later that night: “Mr. Knightley's carriage had brought, 
and was to take them home again. Such a very kind attention—and so thoughtful an 
attention!—the sort of thing that so few men would think of. And, in short, from knowing 
his usual ways, I am very much inclined to think that it was for their accommodation the 
carriage was used at all. I do suspect he would not have had a pair of horses for himself, 
and that it was only as an excuse for assisting them” (226). Emma reads his arrival in a 
carriage as an appropriate status marker.  In fact, though, it is an act of noblesse oblige. 
He performs his position in society, and enacts an authentic gentlemanly self. But, 
crucially, part of this performance requires of Knightley to keep the truth from Emma. He 
lets her think what she wants and smiles at the disparity in their understanding of the 
situation, hiding the truth because it suits him to hide his good deed and because in this 
case, it is required for this particular performance. If this act of gentlemanliness serves to 
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make him even more authentic a gentleman, it also serves to make his authenticity that 
much more a performance of authenticity.  
  
 “The whole truth” 
At stake in this argument is whether Austen is making any claims about truth and 
authenticity in this novel, what they are, and whether they coincide with Knightley’s 
claims to and about truth and authenticity. By way of addressing this question, I want to 
look at the depiction of “truth” in the novel. Knightley is, notoriously, often right in 
predictions for the future and in his readings of people. He predicts that the relationship 
between Emma and Harriet won’t come to any good. He is right that there’s something 
going on between Frank and Jane. He is right that there’s something disingenuous about 
Frank’s claim that he is unable to manage his own time and visit his father whenever he 
chooses. He is right about many things. But so are many other people, including people 
who are regularly schooled by Knightley for being wrong.  
The discussion Emma and Knightley first have about Harriet and Mr. Martin is 
often taken as another example of Knightley getting it right, but nestled within this 
conversation are some very interesting statements of truth that come from Emma. 
Knightley expresses “surprise and displeasure” and stands up “tall in indignation” upon 
hearing that Harriet refused Mr. Martin’s proposal of marriage. Emma responds by 
reminding Knightley that women, who have very little power at all, do have the power of 
refusal. In her typically playful manner, she scoffs, “Oh! To be sure, it is always 
incomprehensible to a man that a woman should ever refuse an offer of marriage. A man 
always imagines a woman to be ready for anybody who asks her” (58). Later, in the same 
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conversation, she reminds Knightley that it wouldn’t be so odd if a man above Harriet in 
station fell in love with her, as men often do fall in love with women for their looks rather 
than for their qualities of mind: “Till it appears that men are much more philosophic on 
the subject of beauty than they are generally supposed; till they fall in love with well-
informed minds instead of handsome faces, a girl with such loveliness as Harriet, has a 
certainty of being admired and sought after…” (61). This is an example of something that 
happens again and again throughout the course of the novel. Of course, she is wrong: she 
shouldn’t have meddled and Harriet should have accepted Mr. Martin. But Emma’s truth-
telling should not be overlooked. It is true that women are valued primarily for their 
beauty and not for their opinions, that they are thought idiotic if they exercise any of 
them, and that as such women have very little power. Again, Austen weaves a paradox 
for her readers: characters are often both right and wrong, and truth is less stable than it 
might appear. As Knightley later concedes, Emma is right that Harriet has some excellent 
qualities, and that Emma has really improved her. This novel is narrated in two modes, 
primarily: unmediated dialogue and free indirect discourse. This scene is notably told in 
the former mode, a narrative mode that excludes the narrator’s voice and opinion. Each 
person’s words are taken at face value, and the reader responds to them based on 
everything else that has come before, and based on what they bring to the text. It is up to 
the reader here to make judgments on each conversant’s truth-telling or rightness, and, 
like in actual conversations, the result is probably that each person seems somewhat right 
and somewhat wrong. That’s the best we can get: what seems right.   
Another example of the murkiness between truth and falsehood in the novel is 
Emma’s Mr. Dixon theory. Every time I re-read Emma, her theory is more compelling, 
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even though I know it to be false. This is perhaps enhanced by my forgetting the details 
every time (largely because Austen designed the novel to keep these characters at a 
remove, never to appear) but every time I return to the novel, I can’t quite remember 
what the details of Emma’s misconception are, and each time I read her theory, I think to 
myself that it’s actually not that unfounded. She suspects that a plain girl is jealous of her 
beautiful friend for being preferred, at times, by her husband. Not only is this not that 
unlikely, we don’t actually know that it isn’t the case, since we never hear from Mrs. 
Dixon. It is probably likely that, even if Mr. Dixon never gave a thought to Jane in any 
romantic way, Mrs. Dixon still at times doubted herself and feared the worst. 
Furthermore, in this novel of desires that don’t always get directed at the right object at 
first, it wouldn’t be that strange if Mr. Dixon did at first desire Jane, or at least consider 
Jane an object of potential desire before marrying Jane’s plain but wealthy and class-
appropriate friend. Even if he’s not the one who bought the piano, which is really all that 
we know, who is to say that he didn’t harbor a little flame for the more beautiful, more 
accomplished friend? This is, of course, a bit of imaginative play on my part, and yet 
none of it seems unfounded in a novel that is itself a series of close observations of the 
blunders and missteps that are the stuff of love. In fact, it is the kind of “imaginist” 
matchmaking that the novel itself depicts and plays with denouncing, while all the while 
showing its powerful “imaginist” pleasures.27  
                                                
27 See Bharat Tandon’s “Jane Austen and the Morality of Conversation” for more on 
Austen’s “gleefully disproportionate and indecorous” juvenilia, the way it informs her 
mature work, and especially for his exploration of her “double ironies” in which 
characters can be right in larger ways even when they’re wrong. Tandon’s example is 
Catherine in Northanger Abbey: she is wrong about General Tilney being a murderer, but 
she is certainly right that he’s even worse than he at first appears. 
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Truth, far from being straightforwardly upheld in the embodied form of 
Knightley, is actually destabilized in this novel. Not only is Emma sometimes right even 
when she’s wrong, but what’s right and wrong is sometimes unknowable. Much has been 
written about the fact that Frank Churchill’s letter explaining his behavior doesn’t explain 
nearly enough, but I argue that this is not because it’s Frank, for whom secrets and 
evasions are natural—it’s because there is no central, accurate narrative, for him or 
anyone. A fully explanatory letter cannot, in keeping with the vision of human nature this 
novel depicts, exist. Which is all to say that Frank Churchill’s remarkable sin of 
concealment (his first name is one of the novel’s most simplistic but satisfying jokes) is 
not actually such a sin after all, nor is it so remarkable. We are always concealing things, 
intentionally and unintentionally, to others and ourselves. Mrs. Weston exclaims to 
Emma, upon their discovery of Frank’s engagement, “I can hardly believe it.—I thought I 
knew him” (405).  What Frank did was wrong, surely, but perhaps Mrs. Weston’s first 
mistake was thinking she knew him, or anyone. Frank was acting—playing the part of a 
single man, and playing it too well—but everyone in the novel has secrets, including 
from themselves, and plays multiple characters.   
Even in the moment of Emma and Knightley’s love becoming known to each 
other, in which they supposedly open up to one another completely, a secret remains un-
confessed, and feelings and thoughts in general move at too “wonderful [a] velocity” to 
be shared in their entirety. Despite being, as he claims, unable to make speeches, 
Knightley delivers a touching confession of love to Emma. While he does so, “Emma’s 
mind was most busy.” While she listens to him and comprehends every word, she is also 
managing to think about all of the following: her newfound happiness, her latest mistake 
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with Harriet, her real sorrow at Harriet’s predicament, her belief, though, that a 
Knightley-Harriet match would have been “unequal and degrading.” Knightley speaks in 
his plain and honest manner, and while he does so, Emma’s mind races and any response 
she might offer, the novel insists, would necessarily be incomplete. How to tell the whole 
truth when the mind can move so rapidly and contain so many conflicting emotions?  
Emma refrains from telling Knightley that she had accidentally caused Harriet to fall in 
love with him, and it’s a secret she takes with her to the end of the book. Even in this 
moment of love-fueled confessions, her heart is closed on at least one important matter. 
Even in the moment where Emma is supposed to be schooled into truthful authenticity by 
the exemplary Knightley, she maintains her selfhood, which is to say that she remains 
unknowable to him. Further, we don’t ever learn what she said in response to Knightley’s 
confession of love. He tells her it is hard for him to make speeches and then makes one. 
The narrator then takes over to report: “She spoke then, on being so entreated.—What did 
she say?—Just what she ought, of course. A lady always does.” We never find out; all we 
know is that she plays her part, the role of the lady in love being proposed to by a reticent 
gentleman, admirably.   
Once Emma and Knightley have become lovers, Emma shows him Frank’s letter 
of explanation, to which Knightley responds, in his rather school-master-y manner, “My 
dear Emma, does not everything serve to prove more and more the beauty of truth and 
sincerity in all our dealings with each other?” (457). Not only does this little speech make 
any serious reader of Austen’s playful irony groan, it is completely outside the tone and 
tenor of the novel as a whole. Further, it’s unrealistic and undesirable. Truth and sincerity 
in all our dealings? Does he now want to hear exactly and in full what’s on Emma’s mind, 
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as he was wise enough not to want on Box Hill? Putting aside the obviously dystopic 
effects of a world with complete truth and sincerity in all our dealings (or, at least the 
brain-numbing effects of a world of honest and open Miss Bateses), truth and sincerity 
are shown to be aspirations, but not practicable and not even always desirable. 
Furthermore, truth and sincerity, when we do see them, are themselves a role.  
Knightley is not truth itself, he is not the embodiment of truth, he performs it. 
Truthfulness is part of his character’s persona. But even Knightley slips from his role. As 
Mary Waldron writes, “Far from being above it all, Mr. Knightley is involved in the same 
kind of social/moral confusion as Emma and all the other characters…” (115). He takes 
his carriage to the party in order to perform his noblesse oblige, and withholds from 
Emma why he brought his carriage, while being ribbed by her for having finally done the 
proper gentlemanly thing, because it suits his role to retain that information, even though 
it is an omission and a deviation from straight-forward openness. Additionally, he isn’t 
honest with himself or anyone about his feelings about Frank. He dislikes him and 
distrusts him from the beginning, and while some of his reasons are legitimate (it’s not 
likely that Frank is truly unable to visit his father on occasion and it is ridiculous to go all 
the way to London to get a haircut), the real reason he doesn’t like Frank is because he’s 
jealous of his flirtation with Emma, and resents the general assumption that Frank and 
Emma are intended for one another. Knightley’s performance of honesty has a blind spot 
when it comes to Frank; he breaks character when it comes to his exaggerated antipathy 
to Frank because of his feelings for Emma. And it’s not just with Frank that Knightley’s 
performance of honesty and sincerity are compromised. Knightley has biases about 
Harriet that he doesn’t acknowledge and that are as deluded as Emma’s. When he expects 
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her to marry Mr. Martin, he thinks highly of her. When he hears that she has turned down 
Mr. Martin’s proposal, he speaks of her as an idiot who has neither birth nor merit to 
recommend her. Waldron writes in depth about this scene in which Knightley’s opinion of 
Harriet (and of Mr. Martin) changes rapidly and unfairly, concluding: “In his previous 
account, Martin has been ‘“very well judging”’, now his love has overcome reason; 
before, ‘“he could not do better”’, now ‘“he could not do worse”’; and the ‘“fair lady”’ is 
little better than a base-born idiot. Is this the sober, rational thinker we have at one level 
been let to expect?” (123).  Knightley is not the novel’s spokesperson, nor is he even 
perfectly truthful. Rather, he performs truthfulness expertly, though with notable breaks 
in character, and in doing so, underscores the novel’s representation of character as a 
performance, even when the character is one that performs unperformativeness.  
 
 “Very great amusement in tricking us”  
So, if the novel isn’t a public service announcement on behalf of truth, what is it? 
It might help to look first at the moment when Emma and Frank first meet after Frank’s 
engagement becomes openly known. Emma tells Frank that he must have enjoyed his 
secret immensely, and gotten “great amusement in tricking us” (489). He insists that he 
didn’t and that it was torture, but we readers saw him at it. If it did produce a few 
moments of torture for him, it also produced many more of pleasure. And it is along these 
lines that I propose to look for meaning in this novel, rather than accept Knightley’s 
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lesson about truth. The novel is full of little in-jokes and winking gestures, to say nothing 
of the word games, charades, enigmas, riddles, and quizzes the characters partake in.28 
The novel promotes pleasure, lightheartedness, jokes, and tricks by showing its 
opposite in Knightley, a veritable party-pooper. At the party at the Coles’, Jane, whose 
musical talent has been touted throughout the novel, plays and sings for the group, and 
does so beautifully. Knightley, however, breaks it up like a parent telling the kids to 
knock it off.  
Towards the end of Jane's second song, her voice grew thick.  
"That will do," said he, when it was finished, thinking aloud—"you have 
sung quite enough for one evening—now be quiet."  
                                                
28 For pleasure’s sake, I’ll go through a few of my favorite of the novel’s little tricks. As 
Jill Heydt-Stevenson has written in her book, Austen’s Unbecoming Conjunctions: 
Subversive Laughter, Embodied History, about the persistent presence of the body in 
Austen’s novels (which many consider to be body-less), Mr. Woodhouse is perhaps not a 
hypochondriac for nothing—his symptoms and concerns call to mind venereal disease. 
This in itself is a hilarious joke, which, Heydt-Stevenson argues, contemporary readers 
would have picked up, and the frequency with which Mr. Woodhouse sits by the fire or 
vaunts the healing powers of gruel (supposed treatments for syphilitic symptoms) makes 
the joke repeatedly pleasurable. (Heydt-Stevenson doesn’t mention one thing I noticed on 
a recent re-reading, which is that Mrs. Goddard, the head of the school in which Harriet is 
placed, is said to have “formerly owed much to Mr. Woodhouse’s kindness, [and] felt his 
particular claim on her.” I couldn’t help feel, after having read Heydt-Stevenson, that one 
wouldn’t be remiss to wonder whether Mr. Woodhouse paid a great deal of attention to 
Mrs. Goddard and her pupils in any way untoward. This is just a hypothesis, but another 
one that made me giggle in a way that felt sanctioned by the text itself.) Another favorite 
trick of mine is one that the narrator plays. Early in the novel, the narrator suggests that 
Mr. and Mrs. Weston have their hearts set on a match for Emma. At this point, Frank 
hasn’t showed up, and the main male contender for this role is the ever-present 
Knightley. The reader wouldn’t be faulted for thinking that it is Knightley they mean, and 
only finds out much later that the hoped for match is one between Emma and Frank.  
Through this little trick, the narrator plants the idea of a Knightley and Emma union in 
the mind of the reader, while also providing a moment of pleasure for re-readers who will 
only pick up on the trick the second time through. 
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Another song, however, was soon begged for. "One more;—they would 
not fatigue Miss Fairfax on any account, and would only ask for one 
more." And Frank Churchill was heard to say, "I think you could manage 
this without effort; the first part is so very trifling. The strength of the song 
falls on the second."  
Mr. Knightley grew angry.  
"That fellow," said he, indignantly, "thinks of nothing but shewing off his 
own voice. This must not be." And touching Miss Bates, who at that 
moment passed near—"Miss Bates, are you mad, to let your niece sing 
herself hoarse in this manner? Go, and interfere. They have no mercy on 
her" (232).  
Miss Bates, in her real anxiety for Jane, could hardly stay even to be 
grateful, before she stept forward and put an end to all farther singing. 
Here ceased the concert part of the evening, for Miss Woodhouse and 
Miss Fairfax were the only young lady performers; but soon (within five 
minutes) the proposal of dancing—originating nobody exactly knew 
where—was so effectually promoted by Mr. and Mrs. Cole, that every 
thing was rapidly clearing away, to give proper space. 
It is of course Frank, in contrast to the over-protective fogey Knightley, who originates 
the suggestion that people dance and continue to have some pleasure. Knightley doesn’t 
object to the dance (the reader waits for it, and can hardly believe he doesn’t) and we 
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catch a glimpse of him, through Emma’s eyes, standing, as per usual, outside the fun. 
Emma’s observation that “He was no dancer in general” is, especially at this moment, a 
rather comic understatement.  
Another night of entertainment and fun is planned, this time at the Westons’ (the 
novel is structured around opportunities for fun: planning, waiting for, and then enjoying 
(or not) various social engagements) and Knightley’s response (reminiscent of Fanny 
Price in its hatred of noise and fun) is: “Very well. If the Westons think it worth while to 
be at all this trouble for a few hours of noisy entertainment, I have nothing to say against 
it, but that they shall not chuse pleasures for me.—Oh! yes, I must be there; I could not 
refuse; and I will keep as much awake as I can; but I would rather be at home, looking 
over William Larkins's week's account; much rather, I confess.—Pleasure in seeing 
dancing!—not I, indeed—I never look at it—I do not know who does.” Could any 
statement be more against the mood and tone of the novel? 
 “What a banal, reductive and limiting ‘moral’”  
The novel, then, puts Knightley’s overly sober and the novel’s playful ways in 
opposition. Michael Gamer, in a collection of essays on the Box Hill scene published in 
Romantic Circles (2000), writes: “But as [Claudia] Johnson has argued persuasively, 
Austen often raises such polemical antitheses—here opposing verbal transparency to 
verbal play and obfuscation—‘in an exploratory and interrogative, rather than hortatory 
and prescriptive, manner’ (Johnson, xxi)” (Gamer, paragraph 2). Verbal transparency 
(Knightley’s truth) versus verbal play (Austen’s interest): this is the polemical antithesis 
Emma sets up. So what of the arguments that many critics have made, and extremely 
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persuasively, that Knightley is the novel’s spokesperson, the representative of Austen’s 
message (and here we move back again to Butler’s camp)? George Levine, in the same 
issue, bemoans the unsavory moralism of the novel as he sees it:  
Perhaps the most difficult thing for a modern reader of Emma to do is to 
take it straight, to accept Mr. Knightley as the moral authority the story 
seems to make him and to agree that Emma should indeed marry him 
(paragraph 1).  
But, Levine argues, it must be taken “straight:”  
[…] Emma offers itself as a novel that is, through its various detours and 
duplicities, what it claims to be, and this, for skeptical modern readers, is 
rather hard to take (paragraph 5).  
Levine, himself a modern reader, doesn’t like the fact that this novel teaches “humility 
and circumspection:” “What a banal, reductive and limiting ‘moral’ for a novel so 
extraordinarily rich in nuanced dancing around doubleness of meaning, around the virtual 
inaccessibility of a stable and verifiable truth, around the edgy if muted excitement of 
female independence and imaginative play!” (Levine, paragraph 1). But where Levine 
argues that this dancing around doubleness is ultimately not the novel’s message, and that 
Knightley’s moral message is, I argue that Knightley’s moral message is continually and 
variously played with and cannot be held up as Austen’s message. Knightley is not 
always “right”—nor is he in a novel that values being right above being imaginative. The 
tension between being right and being an “imaginist” is the point. It is not a novel about 
pure pleasure, nor is it a novel about the value of moral lesson-making. It is about the 
tension between those. The novel is so interesting because it is a dialectical text, not one 
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that can be settled one way or another; it is so compelling and formally interesting 
because of the tension between Knightley’s correctness and Emma’s playfulness, and 
everything these opposing ideals stand for. This novel would be a bore if it were more 
clearly Knightley’s novel. It wouldn’t allow Emma’s brilliant, naughty playfulness and, 
to be frank, it would be a party pooper. And if it were Emma’s novel, it wouldn’t have 
the seriousness and interest in moral questions. But it has both—the two elements are 
married literally and figuratively—and I argue that it is a novel that is interested in what 
happens to play and imagination in the face of morality.  
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CARING UNCARINGLY: SADOMASOCHISM IN 
CHARLOTTE BRONTË’S VILLETTE 
 
“Lucy is the bossiest bottom”  
—Eve Sedgwick29 
 
Our various ways of theorizing such 
encounters with relation shape our different 
views of the political and affective 
consequences of social embeddedness. We 
are constantly asking, What do our 
distinctive responses to each other and our 
cases tell us about the structural conditions 
that produce the encounter with 
nonsovereignty in the first place?  
—Lauren Berlant and Lee Edelman, Sex, or 
the Unbearable, viii  
 
 In this chapter, I continue to argue for the frequency of nineteenth-century 
novelists’ investment in depicting a relational, rather than individual, framework for 
experience that is centrally defined by the inability to know others. Furthermore, I show 
that this unknowable relationality often produces negative feelings and behaviors that the 
novelists in this study, far from condemning, actually encourage, showing that they can 
often be productive of pleasure or other useful outcomes. This chapter addresses these 
questions through an analysis of Charlotte Brontë’s Villette and the role of these feelings 
and the behaviors they elicit in the context of ethics of care theory. I show that even the 
paradigmatically isolated, individual Lucy Snowe is deeply embedded in a social context 
revolving, largely, around care-relations. Furthermore, I show that Brontë’s investment is 
not in Lucy’s redemption through a therapeutic recovery of healthy subjectivity, but 
rather, in her pleasure, perversion, and the normality of anti-social feelings and behaviors 
                                                
29 This was said in a 2007 Seminar at the CUNY Graduate Center entitled “Reading 
Relations in the British Novel.” While I wasn’t there, Sedgwick’s remark was passed on 
to me by Miciah Hussey.  
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inherent in care relations.30 Over the course of the novel, Lucy experiments with the odd 
power-dynamics that care entails—the powers that employ you in care-giving roles, and 
the powers invested in the act of caring—and develops the ability to control both her 
abasement and her mastery. Because of this particular set of power dynamics, trust is 
essential to care relations, and yet, the problem of other minds can be more pronounced 
and damaging in these contexts than in others. In response to these challenges, power 
dynamics, and tendencies toward both self-concealment and careful watching of others, 
Lucy becomes adept at sadomasochistic roleplay, and learns to derive pleasure in both 
being controlled and in controlling others.  
Christopher Lane, in “Charlotte Brontë on the Pleasure of Hating” (2002), writes 
that “few critics have addressed her novels’ preoccupation with hatred or claimed that 
this trait determined her characters’ ontological relationship to the world. Highlighting 
the obstacles that thwart these protagonists, these critics turn her fiction into a form of 
protest while finding ways to reconcile her heroines to women’s limited opportunities. 
This curtails Brontë’s interest in hostility, viewing her work as redemptive in aim and 
merely a therapeutic extension of her life” (199). With Lane, I argue that to view 
Brontë’s novels, especially her last—which Matthew Arnold described as 
“disagreeable,”31 and which Harriet Martineau called “almost intolerably painful” 
because “[Lucy Snowe] allows us no respite”32—as ultimately redemptive or therapeutic, 
whether for its characters or its author, is to overlook Brontë’s pleasure in the tensions 
                                                
30 Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive rejects normative, 
socially productive and reproductive forms of relationality and serves as a foundation for 
some of my thinking in this chapter.  
31 Letter to Mrs. Forester, 14 April 1853. McNees, Critical Assessments. Vol 3, 610.   
32 Review of Villette, in McNees, Critical Assessments. Vol 3, 589. 
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she constructs. Where Lane focuses on hatred, I look instead at a range of negative 
affects that inhere in and around power, and I look at the pleasures, rather than the 
recuperations, those affects can produce.  
In the groundbreaking Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer and the 
Nineteenth-Century Imagination (1979), Gilbert and Gubar do attend to Lucy's more 
negative, strange cast of feelings, but in the context of their repression. Here, I focus 
instead on the pleasure Lucy derives from these feelings and behaviors. For good reason, 
Lucy’s professional and social disenfranchisement as a woman has been a central node of 
Villette scholarship, and this feminist criticism often either depicts her as repressed and 
oppressed or, alternatively, as writing from a place of ultimate professional and authorial 
release. Brenda Silver, for example, writes in “The Reflecting Reader in Villette” (1983) 
that Villette “responds to the limited plots available for women” by creating an 
unconventional narrator who shapes a new kind of fiction. “Lucy is deliberately creating 
not only a new form of fiction for women, but a new audience—part critic, part 
confidant, part sounding board—whose willingness to enter her world and interpret her 
text will provide the recognition denied to women who do not follow traditional paths of 
development” (92). Lucy, in this reading, is a feminist vanguard creating community and 
opportunity for women, and if she has a tendency toward isolation or silence, it is 
nullified by the text itself. Silver writes: “Speak she must, though, for to remain silent 
would be to become the cretin who makes mouths instead of talking, and whose silence 
becomes a metaphor for Lucy’s own potentially arrested development. To overcome this 
two-fold silence, Lucy evolves another reader, a nonjudgmental reader, a sharer of the 
insights that she cannot communicate to those more in tune with the accepted social 
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codes” (103). I agree with Silver that Lucy creates her own community through a 
readership she is intently focused on forming and training. However, the readership she 
creates is far from reformed or nonjudgmental; on the contrary, Lucy, who constantly 
judges, expresses disdain, or disgust, trains a readership to be eminently judgmental, 
hostile, and unrepentant.  
Indeed, Lucy’s strange, untrusting, mildly abusive treatment of her readers forms 
a readership that teeters from submissive to aggressive. In Dear Reader: The Conscripted 
Audience in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction (1996), Garrett Stewart follows Silver’s 
line of thinking and expands on Villette’s relationality vis-à-vis the Lucy-reader 
relationship. Most famously, she not only hides her recognition of Dr. John from him, but 
she also keeps it from her readers.  Another episode of this perverse treatment is the 
elusive, much discussed ending. Lucy’s reticence about M. Paul’s end requires us, her 
trained readers, to do the killing and the mourning of M. Paul for her. She has trained her 
readers to not be naïve, and so when she dangles the possibility that he might be alive, 
she willfully demands that her readers be the ones to reject that possibility and declare 
him dead. Lucy has trained her reader to be executioner. The novel ends not with a 
transformed Lucy, trained to behave, feel appropriately, and exhibiting a healthier 
subjectivity. Instead, she remains a character immune to our therapeutic expectations, 
unrepentantly perverse in her relationships, including with her readers, and likely with 
her students and teachers at her new school.33    
                                                
33 Villette interestingly complicates Frank Kermode and D.A. Miller’s arguments about 
the unnarratability of happiness and marriage. It ends not on a life of fulfilled marriage, 
nor on a life of fulfilled and healthy subjectivity, but because it simply isn’t practicable to 
continue narrating a life of unrepentant, pleasure-producing nastiness.  
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 Part of my intention is to contribute to a broader reexamination of the Victorian 
period, one that challenges the impression, which has proven more resilient than a 
cockroach in the pensionnat’s attic, that the Victorians were prudes, controlled by their 
manners, consumed by conduct manuals, and above all, civilized.34 Peter K. Andersson, 
argues that “the established picture of the Victorian period [its supposed prudishness and 
repression] lingers…not only in popular media, but also in academic research” (439). He 
traces this established picture to two main sources. First, to Norbert Elias’s writing, 
furthered by Cas Wouter’s research, on the “history of mentalities from the late Middle 
Ages until today” (439) which led to “an ‘informalization’ of manners and an 
‘emancipation of emotions’ in the twentieth century” (439) only after an “increasingly 
formalized regime of manners” in the nineteenth that produced a “complicated system of 
introductions, invitations, calls, leaving calling cards, ‘at homes,’ receptions, dinners, and 
so on” (440). Second, and much more notoriously in the context of Victorian literary 
scholarship, and also more directly pertinent to scholarship on Villette, Andersson traces 
this established picture to Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish (1975) and its outsize 
influence on Victorian scholarship. In large part because of Foucault’s historicist 
theorization of reformist movements and their impact in the creation of a totalizing 
culture of discipline, scholars continue to depict the period as cartoonishly civilized and 
straitlaced, and, in so doing, maintain a flattering distance between savvy contemporary 
scholar and repressed, repressing Victorians. In this chapter, I argue that these persistent 
                                                
34 Kelly Hager’s provocative Dickens and the Rise of Divorce destabilizes the idea that 
the Victorian novel is dominated by conclusive and productive marriages, and argues that 
it is instead replete with depictions of far-from ideal relationships. This work has served 
as a useful model and complement for this chapter, which argues for a complete 
reevaluation of our assumptions about a period and asks us to see new patterns or to see 
in optical illusion of the vase two faces.   
 85 
tropes of, in Andersson’s words, “visitations and hat-tippings” (440) are belied 
throughout the Victorian period, that they represent a fantasy of Victorians affluence and 
leisure and a discounting of lived experience, particularly among working classes, and 
that Villette shows us perhaps most explicitly what is actually a dominant, if obscured 
from view, trope of the nineteenth-century novel: the manipulation of power in pursuit of 
queer or non-normative forms of pleasure.    
Neither Lucy’s writing, nor her relationship with M. Paul, nor her care 
relationships, even when she becomes master of her own school, bring Lucy into a closer 
or more productive society with others. On the contrary, these relationships—with her 
readers, her distant partner, her wards—thrive on the basis of her comfort in and pleasure 
with powerplay and sadomasochism. As Talia Schaffer puts it, “In the simplest form, we 
can say that Lucy…does not care for the objects of her caregiving. In Lucy’s case, this 
dissonance causes intense stress, but she also, paradoxically, cherishes it as a guarantor of 
her psychological liberation” (Lucy, 2). The fact that she contains all these habits, 
behaviors, and feelings, that she is at once, for example, self-abasing and prone to 
abasing others, brings to the fore the final aspect of Villette I will address: Lucy’s 
multiple personalities are explored in part through the novel’s focus on acting and the 
performances inherent in powerplay. In the context of acting, sadomasochism and the 
role-playing it entails, Lucy’s variety of selves is less perplexing. The acting scenes 
remind us that the authenticity of selfhood is a specter, as ghostly as the novel’s nun, and 
as changeable as the nun who turns out to be Alfred de Hamal. Artless authenticity is 
possible, but not for chameleon-like Lucy Snowe, whose very name suggests heat and 
cold, light and dark.  
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Liberal individualism and ethics of care   
Lucy Snowe has been considered a paradigmatic isolated individual for good 
reason. She has no relations, no background or family, no home, and offers no 
explanations; she prefers to be left alone, unattached, and independent; she resists being 
known. Mary Jacobus writes in “The Buried Letter: Feminism and Romanticism in 
Villette” (1980) that “the seed of Villette” (42) is the inalienable rights of self. And yet, 
she is in fact deeply embedded in several interconnected social worlds. This social life, 
however, is not based on mutual respect and reciprocity. On the contrary, her 
relationships are marked by uneven care and sadomasochism. Lucy isn’t an atomistic 
individual, she is a relational being who functions fluently in the language of disturbing 
relationships that are phenomenologically normative. If this strikes readers as odd—and it 
still does—it is because we are not accustomed to seeing a character so at home in the 
dangers and disappointments of relationships. Lucy’s oddity lies not in her isolation, but 
rather, in her disturbing expectation that relationships are necessarily disturbing.   
Lucy’s social orbit is continually disappointing: Dr. John fails to recognize her 
feelings, Ginevra Fanshawe teases and annoys her, Polly takes her for granted, Madame 
Beck abuses and surveils, and M. Paul’s love takes on abusive, constricting forms. But 
this is not to say that we should read Lucy’s social alterity, her proclivity for seeking out 
privacy, and her narrative deceptions at face value. Lucy is always in some way engaged 
in a conversation with her social world—with people from her past whose literal return is 
an uncanny event that seems paranormal but reflects her continued relationship with 
people not in her immediate proximity, as well as, of course, with people she is engaged 
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with in her present—and her supposed desire to be a free agent is not only never possible, 
but is also never actually depicted as desirable from the perspective of the narrative that 
Lucy herself produces. And yet, this continual disappointment underscores the fact that 
Brontë isn’t writing about happiness, and her writing isn’t oriented toward emancipation. 
Lucy’s relationships are unsatisfying and lopsided. They are not sympathetic encounters 
in which there is fellow feeling or mutual understanding. Not even, or perhaps especially 
not, her relationship with M. Paul.  
This novel, in addition to being about a person who claims to be independent but 
is in fact extremely interdependent, is about the backbone of interdependence: care 
relationships. As I wrote in my introduction, care theory both responds to the inequities 
inherent in justice-approaches to ethics, and creates inequities that it doesn’t adequately 
resolve. Ethics of care argues for the interdependence of all people, both at their infancy, 
and throughout their lives in ways that fluctuate and always loom. To build an ethics 
around this central fact of interdependence that privileges care as a site of ethical thinking 
and work yields a system oriented toward equality across spectra that aren’t typically 
equal especially in care relations. Ethics of care aims to prioritize care work not just 
among women, the poor, migrants, and those to whom care work often calls, but among 
men, and those more affluent and enfranchised. However, in the rehabilitation of care, in 
its elevation to a field of ethical thinking and society-construction, there is an 
overreliance in the theory on the good sides of care, on embracing and taking back a site 
of ethical work that is centered on love, respect, protection, and mutuality.   
However, it is a fact of care that it is built on structural inequities—someone 
needs care for a reason, and the other is giving care for a reason—and that these 
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inequities can be difficult to overcome, and can produce distinctly uncaring feelings. For 
example, a parent caring for an infant can become overwhelmed at the helplessness of the 
cared-for and the thanklessness of the tasks associated with keeping it alive. A care 
worker employed to look after someone else’s children might be forced into performing 
aspects of love and care that are not felt simply to keep their job.35 Thus a central 
problem in ethics of care is the question of what to do about the wide gulf between care 
and one’s feelings while providing care. Frustratingly, this chasm is not sufficiently 
addressed in ethics of care theory. Often enough, the care-giver provides care while 
inhabiting a variety of affective states, including, for example, love, guilt, or hatred. And 
of course, people in care-taking roles often dispense bad or unsympathetic care. Where 
Jane Eyre ends in a marriage that is made possible by Rochester’s disability and need for 
care, and highlights care as an attractive vocational outlet for women and men alike, thus 
promising a kind of ideal mutual care relationship,36 Villette returns to the issue of care 
but presents instead an array of badly given care, care that doesn’t ever get returned to the 
care-giver, and care given with feelings that are far from caring. While ethics of care 
theory doesn’t do enough to theorize these discrepancies, the novel as a form, and Villette 
in particular, can help us understand what it means to care without caring, to care for pay, 
and to care while learning to experiment with the power dynamics inherent in care work. 
In this chapter, I extend the ethics of care to include bad care, mutual antagonism, and 
intentionally charged power relations. Rather than just focusing on the more pleasing 
                                                
35 See Arlie Russell Hochschild’s The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human 
Feeling, and Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo’s “Blowups and Other Unhappy endings,” in 
Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild’s Global Woman: Nannies, Maids, and 
Sex Workers in the New Economy.  
36 See Christopher D. Gabbard’s “From Custodial Care to Caring Labor: The Discourse 
of Who Cares in Jane Eyre.”  
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aspects of care, Villette helps us see that the uglier sides of care can also be built into an 
ethics of care. Care can be exercised through dominating, uglier forms of care, and 
performed with a range of negative feelings. Indeed, it often is.      
   
Sadomasochism, Power, and Lucy Snowe  
 The power dynamics inherent in care work, especially in care work performed as 
labor in an economic marketplace, produce a variety of affective responses in the 
characters thus employed. Zelig St. Pierre peacocks and performs her understanding of 
her own sexual power. Madame Beck and Dr. John, care-givers of a different class but 
still caring for payment and not quite affluent, wield power in radically different ways, 
Madame Beck through close guard of her troops, Dr. John through obliviousness, which 
has a power of its own. In Lucy’s telling, she began her social existence as a docile, meek 
wretch, but even from the earliest scenes, by being a close observer of others, Lucy 
obtains a kind of power. What she learns over the course of the novel is how to use this 
attention and insight, and to use this power for her own pleasure, whether by controlling 
her own abuse, or abusing others. That is to say, Lucy’s response to the power dynamics 
inherent in care work is to be insistently antisocial and to learn to use power as a tool in 
her own transgressions. The novel posits sadomasochism as a response to the 
problematics of care.  
From her unpaid care for Paulina when they are both children, to her paid care for 
Miss Marchmont (a job she initially turns down), and her paid work first as bonne for 
Madame Beck’s children, then as English teacher in her school (most care theorists 
include education as a form of care work), Lucy learns to derive pleasure from the abuse 
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inherent in caregiving, and she also discovers her own power to abuse others. She learns, 
in other words, to use the uneven power dynamics inherent in case relations as a tool for 
pleasure. Claire Jarvis, in Exquisite Masochism: Marriage, Sex, and the Novel Form 
(2016), argues that masochism is a vehicle for para-sexual sexual pleasure in a novel 
form that has trouble containing actual sex. The pleasure I argue that Lucy derives from 
the abuses of care work is, likewise, non-genital but nevertheless deeply sexually 
gratifying.  
 For Freud and later Gilles Delueze and Frances Ferguson, sadism and masochism 
were completely different emotional states with different perversions and impulses. 
Deleuze argued that sadomasochism was a problematic term, bringing together two states 
and forms of desire that are radically opposed. Jarvis is similarly interested in masochism 
as distinct from sadism. Havelock Ellis and later Foucault argued that sadism and 
masochism were complementary and as impulses often existed within the same person. 
Indeed, masochism requires a paradoxical capacity to ask for and direct one’s own 
abasement, while sadism requires an attention to the limits and needs of the other so 
extreme that power is only a part of the pleasure, which must also derive from studied 
attention to the others’ limits. The lines between masochism and sadism are blurred, and 
their expression constitutes a very complex form of deeply layered role-play.   
 With these latter thinkers, I argue that Lucy’s response to the tyranny of power in 
this novel is to learn the pleasures of sadism and masochism in order to move between 
them. Sara Ahmed, calling power an affective economy, writes that, like all affects, it 
doesn’t reside in a person or outside a person but rather moves between people. Contrary 
to the psychological approach, feelings aren’t “within,” they are in circulation. I use this 
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thinking to help me understand Lucy’s sadomasochism: the feelings associated with 
pleasure through abjection or through abuse circulate, they don’t inhere within a person. 
The feelings of abjection and, complementarily, of pleasure in abusing others, are not 
“within” Lucy, but rather “stick” to her in certain social circumstances, to use Ahmed’s 
term. Lucy discovers access to these affective economies—the pleasure of abusing and 
paining others, and of being abused and pained—primarily in her relationships, especially 
with Ginevra Fanshawe, Dr. John, and M. Paul, Madame Beck, and in her pedagogy.  
Lucy’s complex, layered sadomasochism can be seen in her signature social 
stance of keeping others at arm’s length while at the same time drawing them very close. 
Often, this is coupled with finding others repellent while also being deeply attracted to 
them. This can be seen in her relationship with Ginevra Fanshawe, the coquette with 
whom Lucy herself coquettes.  
She was not proud; and—bonne d'enfants as I was—she would forthwith 
have made of me a sort of friend and confidant. She teased me with a 
thousand vapid complaints about school-quarrels and household economy: 
the cookery was not to her taste; the people about her, teachers and pupils, 
she held to be despicable, because they were foreigners. I bore with her 
abuse of the Friday's salt fish and hard eggs—with her invective against 
the soup, the bread, the coffee—with some patience for a time; but at last, 
wearied by iteration, I turned crusty, and put her to rights: a thing I ought 
to have done in the very beginning, for a salutary setting down always 
agreed with her (96). 
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Lucy discovers early that she can be rough with this hardy tease, and that she doesn’t 
have to fawn at her or even be nice. Ginevra comes to Lucy to complain, to ask for many 
little favors, Ginevra eats half of Lucy’s breakfast (“the morning pistolets or rolls, which 
were new-baked and very good”), and Lucy in turn can speak bluntly, and tease her back, 
and have someone light and bright in her company. What she establishes with Ginevra is 
a relationship in which she can assert boundaries and establish her independence, gain a 
kind of social satisfaction, and be both the abused and the abuser. She constantly marvels 
at her beauty and enjoys simply looking at her. “Notwithstanding these foibles, and 
various others needless to mention—but by no means of a refined or elevating 
character—how pretty she was! How charming she looked, when she came down on a 
sunny Sunday morning, well-dressed and well-humoured, robed in pale lilac silk, and 
with her fair long curls reposing on her white shoulders.” Lucy revels in Ginevra’s 
beauty, and in the fact that this creature has chosen Lucy as her confidante. There is a 
pleasure in the self-abasement inherent in being chosen by the beauty. Lucy has a 
perverse attraction to Ginevra’s annoying qualities, and makes an effort to keep her close 
because of these qualities. In the passage describing Lucy’s habit of sharing her 
breakfast, Lucy writes with a faux-naiveté about the nature of their relationship:  
This way consisted in a habit she had of making me convenient. […]I 
don't know why I chose to give my bread rather to Ginevra than to 
another; nor why, if two had to share the convenience of one drinking-
vessel, as sometimes happened—for instance, when we took a long walk 
into the country, and halted for refreshment at a farm—I always contrived 
that she should be my convive, and rather liked to let her take the lion's 
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share, whether of the white beer, the sweet wine, or the new milk: so it 
was, however, and she knew it; and, therefore, while we wrangled daily, 
we were never alienated. (2771)  
Lucy claims to notice that Ginevra makes her convenient (she gets extra breakfast, and 
the lion’s share of beer, wine, or milk while on expeditions), but of course the more 
interesting thing about this passage is the fact that Lucy is making herself convenient to 
Lucy because Ginevra is convenient to Lucy. Having a companion clinging to her arm 
who she can abuse but who also abuses her is Lucy’s social position of choice. Ginevra is 
a beautiful girl who is sought after by many men, including one that she herself is 
interested in. This is a form of torture Lucy can’t resist, and it’s amplified by the 
flirtatious, even sexual frisson of their roleplaying. With Ginevra, Lucy gets the pleasure 
of submission but also the corollary pleasure of knowing her own power, should she 
choose to flip Ginevra over and force her to submit.  
 The two men in Lucy’s life—Dr. John and M. Paul—are also tested and 
experimented with on these terms: to what degree will they be satisfying partners for 
abuse given and received? Both challenge Lucy’s self-determination, and both elicit a 
wide range of emotions from her. Importantly, none of these emotions allow for 
complacency, satisfaction, or even happiness, and yet both are attractive to her on those 
very grounds.  Her relationships with both Dr. John and M. Paul suggest that troubling 
relationality defines our social existence, and that the choice to remain apart and self-
governing is not practicable. Lucy’s strangeness, therefore, is not that she prefers 
isolation, and it is not that her relations are so troubled and troubling, but, rather, that 
unlike most other fictional characters, and unlike us, her readers, she expects the 
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relational world she finds herself in and maneuvers deftly within it, mobilizing sadism, 
masochism, shame, and hauteur, aggression and passivity as they suit her.   
Full of abuses for its readers, the novel fools us for at least the whole middle 
section into imagining that it will close with Lucy and Dr. John’s wedding bells. Indeed, 
so many of Lucy’s narrative deceits involve Dr. John (most famously she refrains from 
telling her reader and Dr. John himself that she knows who he is), and many of her 
feelings in the first half of the novel—and her experiments producing feelings in others, 
including her readers—are worked through with Dr. John. Dr. John cares for others 
professionally, and yet he is distinctly ineffectual as a carer for Lucy. He has no 
sympathy, no ability to know how she feels or what might hurt her. He writes to her and 
then ignores her, lavishes her with attention when it suits him and then forgets about her 
when he falls in love with Paulina (after having used her previously during his infatuation 
with Ginevra). Oblivious to her feelings for him, oblivious to anything that doesn’t relate 
to himself, he is a care-giver without the capacity for emotional care or support.  
In particular, Dr. John lacks depth and insight, making him an inadequate care-
giver to those whose wretchedness demands depth and sensitivity. He falls in love first 
with the shallow and beautiful Ginevra Fanshawe, and then with the simpler Paulina 
Home, whose surname reveals her safe distance from the uncanny. Most damning of all, 
he fails to read Lucy and know her feelings toward him, and this shallowness is a feature 
of the limits of his care. In a novel of abasement, buried letters, and workaday 
wretchedness, Dr. John’s care is inadequate. His shallowness is in some ways most 
apparent when he fails to respond deeply to the performance he spontaneously takes Lucy 
to. Lucy watches Dr. John watching the play, recognizes keenly that his failures are in the 
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shallowness of his feeling, and his resultant inability to respond adequately to needs that 
are wild, pained, and untamed:  
For what belonged to storm, what was wild and intense, dangerous, 
sudden, and flaming, he had no sympathy, and held with it no communion. 
When I took time and regained inclination to glance at him, it amused and 
enlightened me to discover that he was watching that sinister and 
sovereign Vashti, not with wonder, nor worship, nor yet dismay, but 
simply with intense curiosity. Her agony did not pain him, her wild 
moan—worse than a shriek—did not much move him; her fury revolted 
him somewhat, but not to the point of horror. Cool young Briton! The pale 
cliffs of his own England do not look down on the tides of the Channel 
more calmly than he watched the Pythian inspiration of that night (301).  
The fire that comes next, and that leads Dr. John to Paulina, springs not from him, who is 
described by Lucy as “impressionable…as dimpling water, but almost, as water, 
unimpressible” (300, italics in the original). Dr. John’s failure is his simplicity, his 
blindness to the moans and shrieks that surround him, and this sets the limits of his care.  
 Lucy’s well-known deceit, both to Dr. John and the reader, of keeping her 
knowledge of his identity to herself, is just one example of her perverse enjoyment of his 
abuse. In the face of not being known by someone who should really have recognized 
her, Lucy suffered but also derived satisfaction and gratification. Rather than tell him the 
truth when he catches her looking at him intently, “observing the colouring of his hair, 
whiskers, complexion” (111), and accuses her, speaking to her for the first time, she puts 
her head down and resumes some work she had dropped. The pleasure of keeping herself 
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in an abased position to him is also tinged with the pleasure of holding power over him. 
He thinks she has been looking at him critically, and her silence and show of humility 
only serves to allow him to continue to think that if he wishes. “There is a perverse mood 
of the mind which is rather soothed than irritated by misconstruction; and in quarters 
where we can never be rightly known, we take pleasure, I think, in being consummately 
ignored. What honest man on casually being taken for a housebreaker, does not feel 
rather tickled than vexed at the mistake?” (112). Because Dr. John is not susceptible to 
being abused by Lucy—he couldn’t care less, really, and you have to care to be a 
satisfying object of someone’s abuse—Lucy turns it outward, to her reader. It’s not a 
coincidence that Lucy’s biggest, most notorious trick and degradation of her reader is in 
relation to Dr. John.  
When it becomes clear, if it was ever unclear for any credulous readers, that Dr. 
John is not going to be the man to make Lucy an offer of marriage, the novel’s focus 
switches abruptly to M. Paul—indeed, the penultimate section ends with a chapter on M. 
Paul and the entire final section is dedicated to illuminating the progress of Lucy and M. 
Paul’s relationship—and his form of relating is tested, shown to be more complex than it 
first seemed, and ultimately turns out to be a more ideal form of relationality for Lucy. 
Like Madame Beck, M. Paul is an expert in espionage. His surveillance extends to a 
secret room rented across the alley from the school, a perfect perch from which to 
observe the students and teachers, especially, Lucy. Unlike Madame Beck, M. Paul’s 
characterization never portrays him as an independent, atomistic individual. He is needy 
and jealous—his moods depend entirely on his perception of the treatment and esteem he 
receives from others, and his surveillance is more a method for gathering as much 
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intelligence on how others view him as a method for controlling others in a world 
dependent on individualist self-protections. He seems to live entirely for the opinions of 
others—he knows himself only by comparing himself to others, and through the esteem 
of others. Early in the novel, Lucy’s opinion of him becomes one of the most important 
for M. Paul, and her responses to him either give him validation, or they knock him off 
his feet and cause him to sulk, or, more often, to rage. At first his obsessive tracking of 
her opinion of him seems to derive from a competitive interest and unease. He insists, to 
her chagrin, that she is very much like him, and this insistence seems to fuel his anxiety 
that he will lose his special place as the most powerful teacher in the pensionnat. As the 
narrative progresses, his concern with her opinion of him is more clearly the result of his 
growing romantic attachment to her, however conscious.  
 Lucy’s opinion of M. Paul becomes so important to him that her behavior has the 
capacity to change his humor from “a mood which made him as good as a new sunbeam 
to the already well-lit first classe” to, a few moments later, exhibiting “the shadow of 
some great paroxysm—the swell of wrath, scorn, resolve.” M. Paul has the capacity to 
abuse Lucy, as in the time he locks her in the roach-infested attic to learn her lines for a 
last-minute performance in Madame Beck’s fete day play. But sometimes his storming, 
influenced as it is by Lucy’s power over him, makes him vulnerable to Lucy’s abuse. 
Take for instance M. Paul’s fete day, when everyone brings him gifts, stacking them in a 
great pyramid on his desk. One by one, everyone makes their offering, including 
Mademoiselle Zélie St. Pierre who leaves him an extravagant “bouquet of hot-house 
flowers.” When he notices that Lucy hasn’t added to the growing pyramid, “five minutes 
might have elapsed, and the hush remained unbroken; ten—and there was no sound.” 
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Lucy knows why he is silent and what he is waiting for—a present from Lucy—and Lucy 
has brought something to give him: the watchguard that he saw her making, and which 
caused him to fly into a rage because he thought it was for someone else. And yet she sits 
on her box with the watchguard, keeping him in suspense. Finally breaking his silence, he 
asks several times, “Est-ce là tout?” Still, she keeps silent instead of giving him the 
watchguard. She knows just what will anger him and cause him to feel insecure of her 
approval or care, and her discovery of this power is significant for her, the withholding of 
gratification pleasurable. As M. Paul begins his lesson, Lucy says, “I can't at all 
remember what this "discours" was; I did not listen to it: the gulping-down process, the 
abrupt dismissal of his mortification or vexation, had given me a sensation which half-
counteracted the ludicrous effect of the reiterated "Est-ce là tout?"” With M. Paul, she has 
the opportunity to experiment with her relationality in ways she hadn’t had before. Most 
of her scenes of abuse involve withholding, making him wait, delaying his gratification—
his body contorts and responds, while hers is immovable, controlled, and—in her more 
modest and stern dress—untouchable.  
 Madame Beck’s school management is an important model for Lucy, and 
Madame Beck herself is an important player in Lucy’s universe of powerplay and 
shifting hierarchies of domination. Indeed, Madame Beck functions as a nexus of many 
of the critical concepts here, and serves to usefully complicate discussions about ethics of 
care, the feelings appropriate to care, and the relationship between liberal individualism 
and the relational power dynamics of sadomasochism. Madame Beck is a rugged 
individualist who is nevertheless enmeshed in several interlocked communities, and she 
provides for Lucy an arena in which she thrives, largely due to Madame Beck’s abuses. 
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Though most critical attention to Villette focuses on Lucy Snowe herself, there has 
certainly been a great deal of criticism on Madame Beck’s surveillance, and surveillance 
in the novel in general.37 I argue that this surveillance is a form of social attention, an 
aspect of relationality, and that Foucault’s panopticon is an important site of relational 
attention. Though she is described in terms of archetypal liberal individualism, Lucy’s 
narrative undermines the very concept of autonomous agency, instead showing Madame 
Beck to be an interdependent relational being whose disturbing relationality relies on all 
manner of deception and exploitation. Her relationality is, crucially, couched in the 
language of liberalism:  
Yet, woe be to that man or woman who relied on her [Madame Beck] one 
inch beyond the point where it was her interest to be trustworthy: interest 
was the master-key of Madame's nature—the mainspring of her motives—
the alpha and omega of her life. I have seen her feelings appealed to, and I 
have smiled in half-pity, half-scorn at the appellants. None ever gained her 
ear through that channel, or swayed her purpose by that means. On the 
contrary, to attempt to touch her heart was the surest way to rouse her 
antipathy, and to make of her a secret foe. It proved to her that she had no 
heart to be touched: it reminded her where she was impotent and dead. 
Never was the distinction between charity and mercy better exemplified 
than in her. While devoid of sympathy, she had a sufficiency of rational 
benevolence: she would give in the readiest manner to people she had 
                                                
37 See for example Joseph Boone’s “Depolicing Villette: Surveillance, Invisibility, and 
the Female Erotics of “Heretic Narrative,” NOVEL: Vol 26, No. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 
20-42.  
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never seen—rather, however, to classes than to individuals. "Pour les 
pauvres," she opened her purse freely—against the poor man, as a rule, 
she kept it closed. In philanthropic schemes for the benefit of society at 
large she took a cheerful part; no private sorrow touched her: no force or 
mass of suffering concentrated in one heart had power to pierce hers. Not 
the agony in Gethsemane, not the death on Calvary, could have wrung 
from her eyes one tear (83).  
Madame Beck does only what is in her “interest,” a central word in the discourse of 
individualism. If that interest aligns with yours, you’re in luck. If not, then don’t expect 
any favors. Furthermore, in the tradition of liberal individualism, she privileges the 
abstract over the particular. Justice relies on abstract principles: for it to work, the court 
of law must prevail over the suasion of particular and sympathetic parties that complicate 
principles.  
 Relatedly, her characterization as a classic liberal individual centers around her 
distinct absence of sympathy. Her heart is locked and immune to the influence of others. 
If her feelings are appealed to, she recoils. Only if a request is made known to her in 
rational, abstract terms can she be motivated to offer aid. She would give charity to “les 
pauvres,” the abstract poor, but never to the individual making a specific and personal 
claim on her sympathy. Even with her own children, she has no feeling, only a rational 
desire that they be healthy, have a good education, and grow up to be functioning adults 
and citizens. It is in her interest that her children thrive, but she does not feel for them or 
display anything approaching love or even affection. This safety from feeling, and this 
outright unembarrassed care for self is, as Lucy observes, immensely impressive, and 
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represents a fitness for a greater sphere of influence—a political one, even. Lucy is only 
partly facetious when she claims: “That school offered her for her powers too limited a 
sphere; she ought to have swayed a nation: she should have been the leader of a turbulent 
legislative assembly… In her own single person, she could have comprised the duties of a 
first minister and a superintendent of police” (84). The ideal outlet for her individualism, 
were she not a woman, would be leadership of the foremost nation of individuals, 
themselves striving to achieve higher stations in life.    
 But the novel is more complex than that, and reveals just how reliant she actually 
is on others. First, and most obviously, she is reliant on her pupils and their families for 
sustenance. She organizes her pedagogical aims around what will please the students and 
the families. She relies on them and panders to them accordingly. She makes leisure a 
regular feature of her pupils’ days because more than anything, she needs to keep 
everyone happy to keep the engine of her school, and income, running smoothly.  She 
plans her fete to engage and entertain her pupils and their families. Additionally, her 
surveillance, far from typifying her independence and individualism, points to how 
reliant she is on her teachers, and how important she feels it is to have information about 
them. In a world in which you need others, but in which those others might lie, cheat, or 
steal (in Hobbes’s brutish world), it isn’t unreasonable to feel you need to spy on them. 
The social contract, even as it focuses on the individualism inherent in human relations—
the opacity of other people and the safety we therefore need for our persons and 
property—is founded on the realities of relations: deception, violence, and competition. 
Madame Beck’s surveillance reminds us that the social contract is an admission of our 
reliance on unreliable others.  
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 She is also reliant, in more sinister ways, on a few people in particular. Madame 
Beck relies on her cousin and employee, M. Paul, for the important role he plays in the 
school, as well as for the social role he plays for her, often keeping her company in her 
private salon and occupying the role, it turns out, of love interest. Along with Madame 
Walvarens and Pere Silas, Madame Beck conspires to keep Lucy Snowe and M. Emanuel 
apart. Madame Walvarens and Pere Silas don’t want him to marry because they don’t 
want him to find a new outlet for his generosity, off of which they are living. Madame 
Beck doesn’t want them to marry because she entertains thoughts of marrying M. 
Emanuel herself. At any event, she doesn’t want him to belong to anyone other than her. 
Lucy, happening upon this group of co-conspirators in the park one semi-hallucinatory 
evening, calls them “the secret junta.”  
The fact that Madame Beck’s relationality is disturbing and sinister shouldn’t 
blind us to the fact of her social connectedness, her reliance on others, and her particular 
social contract with those in her orbit. This disturbing relationality serves Lucy, strangely 
enough, particularly when Madame Beck forces Lucy to, without warning, teach a class, 
an activity which serves to instill in Lucy a new understanding of her pleasure in abusing 
others and obtaining power over them.  When Madame Beck invites her to teach a lesson 
as a substitute at the last minute, her anger, resentment, irritation, and disgust are 
mobilized into classroom management tools and ultimately garner respect and obedience 
from her students. Importantly, her pleasure in dominating never becomes domesticated 
or safe through her work in the classroom, and her teaching is in no way figured as 
therapeutic. Lucy’s feelings persist, but they become productive as well as pleasurable. 
By tapping into the variety of roles she is becoming adept at taking on, Lucy enacts a 
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performance of abuse. In the moment of struggle, as Schaffer puts it, “Lucy must quickly 
develop a new method, and what she develops is acting. She substitutes dramatic visual 
tableaus of violence for words” (Lucy, 14).  
Madame Beck, plotting to fire her English teacher Mr. Wilson, begins scrutinizing 
Lucy, first asking her whether she has teaching experience, which Lucy assures her she 
does not, and then watching her anyway, over the course of two weeks, while Lucy is 
teaching her children. Finally, Madame Beck comes abruptly to Lucy with the request 
that she teach one lesson, “just that the pupils might not have it to say that they had 
missed their English lesson” (86). Lucy describes her immediate reaction: “with my usual 
base habit of cowardice, I shrank into my sloth like a snail into a shell…If let to myself, I 
should infallibly have let this chance slip” (86).  Lucy’s apathy, her preference for 
inaction now that she has the comfort of a secure job and a place to live, might have 
prevented her from taking the opportunity to take on a more challenging and fulfilling job 
and improving her status, both socially and economically. “I was capable of sitting 
twenty years teaching infants the hornbook, turning silk dresses, and making children’s 
frocks” (86). Madame Beck’s insistence, her aggressive and insensitive demand that 
Lucy drop her work and come do a “short dictation exercise” (86), changes Lucy’s life, in 
part because Lucy learns in this scene to perform aggression, insensitivity, and nastiness 
herself. She is crying on her way to the classroom, and when they’ve “reached the carre, 
a large square hall between the dwelling-house and the pensionnat” Madame Beck says 
“sternly:” “Dites donc…vous sentez vous reellement trop faible?” (“Tell me, you really 
think you are that weak?”) (87). This challenge rouses Lucy, who otherwise might have 
“gone back to nursery obscurity, and there, perhaps mouldered for the rest of my life; but 
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looking up at madame, I saw something that made me think twice ere I decided” (87). 
Lucy’s apathy, an affect best maintained in isolation, is challenged when she comes up 
against Madame Beck. Her affects don’t become more positive—she doesn’t become 
motivated, or excited about the prospect of educating young minds. She doesn’t develop 
socially productive feelings to ease her transition into teaching. On the contrary, her fear, 
defensiveness, anger, competitiveness, and resentment are mobilized into something 
useful. She doesn’t become invested in her care work, she becomes attentive to the ways 
she can use the power inherent in the position for her own gratification.  
These negative but relational affects continue to serve Lucy when she enters the 
classroom full of girls not so much younger than herself, but importantly superior in class 
status, who are “rondes, franches, brusques, et tant soit rebelles” (straightforward, frank, 
brusque, and a little rebellious) and who have experience “throw[ing] over timid 
teachers” (88). True to form, the students attempt to sabotage her, disdaining the idea that 
a bonne will teach their class, and also simply enjoying the opportunity to cause trouble 
and have fun rather than work in class. Three “titled belles in the first row…opened the 
campaign against her…by a series of titterings and whisperings” (89) which spreads 
quickly into “a growing revolt of sixty against one” (90).  In the face of this insolence and 
rebellion, Lucy is anxious, feels inferior to her position, fears her lack of French language 
skills, and is disgusted by these students and their behavior. But her growing pleasure in 
being both powerless and powerful is called upon in this scene. “All I could now do was 
to walk up to Blanche—Mademoiselle de Melcy, a young baronne—the eldest, tallest, 
handsomest, and most vicious—stand before her desk, take from under her hand her 
exercise-book, remount the estrade, deliberately read the composition, which I found very 
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stupid, and, as deliberately, and in the face of the whole school, tear the blotted page in 
two.” 
This doesn’t quite quell the rebellion, however, and a dark-eyed Catalonian is still 
rioting loudly in the back, so Lucy coolly surveys her body structure and facial features, 
thinks to herself, “I thought I might manage her,” and marches up to her with an air of 
casual carelessness, and then swiftly pushes her into a closet and locks the door. It turns 
out nobody likes this girl anyway, and the students are all thrilled to see this action taken 
against her. Lucy’s campaign against the students is won, and it is precisely her abuse of 
them—through some carefully chosen proxies—that seals her victory. Madame Beck, 
who has characteristically been watching through a spy-hole, promotes her from nursery-
governess to English teacher.  
Lucy’s long-felt powerlessness is turned around in this scene, as she practices the 
performance of power, meting out abuse instead of only receiving it. Her abuse from her 
care-work employer, Madame Beck, and from those she is charged to care, gives way to a 
charged scene with props—the workbook, the closet—flushed cheeks and beating heart, 
and a discovery of her own sadistic pleasure in power. While this scene might not be the 
sexiest—though Lucy’s performative, exhibitionist tearing of the blotted page in two is 
quite suggestive—it sets the stage for the kinds of power play Lucy learns over the course 
of the novel, and suggests how deeply connected it is to her employment as a care 
worker.   
This short episode, in which Lucy is approached by Madame Beck and then enters 
into a kind of battle in the classroom, is a central moment in Lucy’s story. Compared to 
Nel Nodding’s description of the centrality of education to care work, it is a shocking 
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account. Whereas Noddings focuses on fostering happiness in education, on 
responsiveness and modeling, and on holistic approaches to the student rather than on 
punitive measures and tests, Lucy’s education-as-care is punitive, violent, and distinctly 
unfocused on happiness.38 For the first time in her story, her ugly feelings are central to 
her comfort, her self-respect, and her position in society and among her peers.39 The 
scene also highlights the usefulness of the ugly feelings of others—Madame Beck’s 
aggressive disgust and pushy impatience are central to Lucy’s decision to act and break 
out of her apathetic comfort as a bonne. Likewise, the students’ disdain of Lucy’s lower 
class position and their nastiness toward her as a substitute teacher inspires in her a 
corresponding nastiness. She embarrasses one of the titled belles, producing a rippling of 
fear, awe, and probably schadenfreude among the students, who no doubt enjoy a public 
shaming of the “eldest, tallest, handsomest, and most vivacious” of the school’s young 
nobility. She ambushes another girl, whose imprisonment in a closet probably also 
produces a round of schadenfreude among the students—delight at the swift and harsh 
punishment of a racially marked girl the students all “dreaded and hated.” Lucy’s actions 
as a teacher are hardly calm, sweet, or loving.  She does not possess any of the ideal 
educator’s qualities—she would not receive any teaching awards in todays’ schools. And 
yet, it is her nastiness, anxiety, disdain, frustration, feelings of inferiority, and pent up 
anger that propel her to success in this classroom. By mobilizing ugly feelings among her 
students, capitalizing on their long-simmering, class- and race-based prejudices, Lucy 
                                                
38 See Nel Noddings, The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to 
Education, and Happiness and Education.  
39 See Sianne Ngai’s Ugly Feelings for the negative affects reflected in and derived from 
late capitalism. While it would be anachronistic to apply Ngai’s arguments to the 
Victorian period, her book applies most directly to Villette, in which negative feelings get 
translated into action most explicitly in depictions of labor.  
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asserts her power, makes use of her feelings, and practices ways of tapping into the 
abuses that give her pleasure.  
Crucially, Lucy’s success, her entrance into a new and more esteemed socio-
economic position, and her battling of her apathy comes not from socially or morally 
productive feelings like sympathy, but her ugly, antisocial feelings like resentment, 
anger, anxiety, and disdain. Lucy’s resentment of these students, and of Madame Beck’s 
power, is crucially not figured in this scene as ressentiment, a passive-aggressive and 
non-productive figuration of overly aggressive negative feelings, but as a resentment that 
has traction and aids her in her labor. The ugly feelings are not transformed into safe or 
domesticated feelings—they retain their dangerous, ugly edge—and the scene in the 
classroom is in no way figured as therapeutic. Lucy’s ugly feelings persist, but they 
become productive.   
 
“Rather than be a companion, I would have made shirts and starved”  
 Fundamentally, both sadomasochism and relationality trade on boundary-
crossing, welcome and unwelcome. The blurring of personal boundaries is a risk inherent 
in care professions, especially when the care worker comes from outside the dependent’s 
family, and is at once in need of boundaries and expected to be worker, friend, and quasi-
family member. Lucy is keenly aware of this danger and its impact on her professional 
choices. Of the standard nineteenth-century employments available for single women, 
being a governess (a’la Jane Eyre) or a nurse (a’la Mary Garth) mixes you up in the 
family in ways that constrict one’s independence and potentially one’s sense of self, or 
dignity. Working in a school, even as governess to the headmistress’s children, provides 
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more boundaries: there, her boss is another worker, drawn in many directions, and though 
she is notorious for surveillance, her surveillance, in its strange pleasures for Lucy and in 
its pervasiveness, is not as personally invasive as is, for example, Mary Garth’s place 
with Mr. Featherstone. While there is hardly any personal time or space at a school, there 
is at least the freedom of not being in someone else’s private home. This confusion 
between personal and professional is evident in Lucy’s description of her first prospect of 
employment, with Miss Marchmont: “It seemed that a maid, or rather companion, who 
had waited on her for some years, was about to be married; and she, hearing of my 
bereaved lot, had sent for me, with the idea that I might supply this person's place” (38-9) 
In the off-hand remark, “or rather companion,” Lucy implies that not only is there a vast 
difference between being a maid and being a companion, but that the difference is often 
elided in reality. Miss Marchmont, however, has the goodness, as an employer, to be 
frank about the difficulty of the life she is offering to Lucy, and Lucy, not liking the 
sound of the job, turns it down. Having had the opportunity to assert her rights as an 
applicant on the job market—to hear the job description, to meet the employer, and to 
accept or deny the offer—paves the way for her ultimate acceptance of the job. If she 
hadn’t first said no and received respect and approval despite her refusal, she might not 
have said yes. Immediately after turning down the job and receiving a sympathetic 
response, Miss Marchmont undergoes “a paroxysm of pain.” Lucy tends to her, and 
discovers that Miss Marchmont is an impressive and admirable patient. The experience of 
tending to her, and of seeing what kind of sufferer she is, allows for a bond to develop. 
“… By the time she was relieved, a sort of intimacy was already formed between us [...] 
She sent for me the next day; for five or six successive days she claimed my company. 
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Closer acquaintance, while it developed both faults and eccentricities, opened, at the 
same time, a view of a character I could respect” (39-40). Once Lucy sees what kind of 
relationship her position in the house will entail—once she sees that it will be hard work, 
that she will be intensely intimate with Miss Marchmont, but that she can respect this 
person for whom she will serve as maid as well as companion—she can accept the 
position, and the relationality it occasions. She will suffer, but she will suffer for and with 
someone whose simultaneous suffering is compelling and suggestive of depth.  
 Lucy receives another job offer to be a “companion” later in the novel from 
Paulina Home, one she refuses. Paulina views Lucy as indispensible, latching onto her 
when she is present and summoning her when she is not. She suggests that Lucy leave the 
pensionnat and Rue Fossette to live with her and her father. Lucy reports:  
Mr. Home himself offered me a handsome sum—thrice my present 
salary—if I would accept the office of companion to his daughter. I 
declined. I think I should have declined had I been poorer than I was, and 
with scantier fund of resource, more stinted narrowness of future prospect. 
I had not that vocation. I could teach; I could give lessons; but to be either 
a private governess or a companion was unnatural to me. Rather than fill 
the former post in any great house, I would deliberately have taken a 
housemaid's place, bought a strong pair of gloves, swept bedrooms and 
staircases, and cleaned stoves and locks, in peace and independence. 
Rather than be a companion, I would have made shirts and starved (345). 
Lucy frames the above claim as a general unwillingness and unfitness for private care 
work (being a governess or a companion). This is to some extent hyperbolical, an 
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extreme response to the particular case of being companion to Paulina. After all, she has 
already worked as someone’s companion (Miss Marchmont’s) and as someone’s 
governess (for Madame Beck’s children, before being promoted to English teacher). To 
say that she would rather “make shirts and starve” is then not entirely true as a general 
claim but this passage brings into focus many of the same concerns with caretaking that 
were raised when Lucy had the opportunity to work for Miss Marchmont, and that clearly 
depict a consistent opinion on both her fitness as an employee in various fields, and on 
her needs when it comes to finding work that suits her. Care work, especially in the 
cared-for’s home, threatens to reduce freedom, complicate the boundaries between 
employee and employer, and, importantly, to isolate the care worker. When working for 
Miss Marchmont, Lucy found that these concerns were in check, and that her employer 
respected Lucy’s need for boundaries and self-governance (which Lucy established in her 
original rejection of the job offer and which Miss Marchmont accepted, however 
provisionally) and offered companionship in turn that she enjoyed.  
Paulina, a much weaker woman than Mrs. Marchmont, would not have the mental 
and emotional resources to give Lucy the boundaries she would need, nor is she someone 
who commands Lucy’s respect as Mrs. Marchmont and Madame Beck both do in their 
different ways. Paulina follows Lucy around from room to room, literally refusing to give 
Lucy space. Many have remarked on Paulina’s last name for the second half of the novel, 
“Home,” suggesting not only the uncanny returns in the novel, but also underscoring the 
difference between Lucy and Paulina: Paulina has a home, Lucy does not; Paulina would 
like Lucy to join her home, Lucy knows it would never become a home. To accept 
Paulina’s offer and live in her home would be to give herself up, and accept the needs of 
 111 
a person as above her own. Paulina is not self-aware, she is needy, and she doesn’t 
recognize, to use George Eliot’s terms, that others have equivalent centers of self. She 
does not allow for the fact that Lucy has her own feelings and history, never probing into 
Lucy’s life or even recognizing that there is one. Most notably, she is oblivious to the fact 
that both women are romantically interested in the same man. Lucy is keenly aware, of 
course. Some of Lucy’s extreme language in the passage quoted above comes, no doubt, 
from this awareness. It is one thing to watch Dr. John and Paulina fall in love, and even 
to counsel both Dr. John and Paulina in their courtship, but it would be another thing 
altogether to work for her, to be her employed companion. Lucy is not willing to be a 
caretaker under those circumstances. She would rather buy “a strong pair of gloves, 
[sweep] bedrooms and staircases, and [clean] stoves and locks,” and “make shirts and 
starve” than work for Paulina.  
Lucy’s response to Paulina’s job offer is, in my reading, not a proof of her 
atomistic independence, but rather, proof of the challenge she faces integrating the desire 
to be independent with the reliance she has on others, for community and even emotional 
sustenance. When she says she would rather do all kinds of difficult forms of labor than 
be in Paulina’s employment as companion, she is not asserting her independence from 
others so much as expressing an exasperating need for others, for employment and 
survival, as well as an emotional reliance on others through which she can thrill to the 
disappointments, pleasures, and pains that excite her. In ensuring boundaries and refusing 
certain kinds of work, Lucy is not engineering happiness or healthy sociality for herself. 
On the contrary, she is identifying the kinds of abuses she is interested in, and refusing 
the kinds that would require her to numbly serve those she doesn’t respect. As Schaffer 
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says, “Lucy’s ‘pleasure’ derives, perversely, from controlling her own degradation” 
(Lucy, 22).  
 When Lucy is able to derive enjoyment out of the degradations of care, she 
thrives. But with Paulina, there is no interrelational frisson, no enjoyment in submission, 
and with the “poor deformed and imbecile pupil, a sort of cretin” entrusted to her during 
the long vacation, there is even less. The cretin does not have the powers of mind 
necessary to either command respect, as Mrs. Marchmont did, or provide pleasure, as 
abusing and being abused by Ginevra does. The cretin is just a body whose needs, 
including even the most private needs, must be attended to. “I did my best to feed her 
well and keep her warm, and she only asked for food and sunshine, or when that lacked, 
fire. Her weak faculties approved of inertion…it was more like being prisoned with some 
strange tameless animal, than associating with a human being” (180). Lucy suffers deeply 
in this period of care; her suffering leads to her illness, the revelation of one of her 
biggest narrative tricks, and her reunion with the Brettons. But it’s worth noting that in 
this period of near-complete isolation, during which time she is responsible for even the 
“personal attentions to be rendered which required the nerve of a hospital nurse” (180), 
Lucy does contrive a thrilling interpersonal relationship of a sort. Lucy imagines herself 
to be subservient to the ultimate dominator: God. “How I used to pray to Heaven for 
consolation and support! With what dread force the conviction would grasp me that Fate 
was my permanent foe, never to be conciliated. I did not, in my heart, arraign the mercy 
or justice of God for this; I concluded it to be a part of His great plan that some must 
deeply suffer while they live, and I thrilled in the certainty that of this number, I was one” 
(180). There’s a joy, a thrill, to this kind of self-pity, and to this kind of abasement before 
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a master. Lucy’s relationship with God gives her what the cretin cannot: the 
interrelational tensions and thrills she craves and feeds on.  
 Lucy’s employment, and her behaviors and feelings while in those difficult roles 
of subservience, have caused critics to read her as an individual aiming for greater 
isolation and as existing in a liberal world of individualism, surveillance, and personal 
interest and advancement. I read these feelings and behaviors differently: as a source of 
both pleasure and pain, and as a relational style Lucy cultivates. Amanda Anderson, in 
Powers of Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the Cultivation of Detachment (2001), writes 
that Villette “self-consciously takes up questions of detachment in its foregrounding 
different modes of observation, alienation, and cultivated emotional distance” (46). 
Crucially, though, Lucy cultivates closeness, connection, and community. If Villette were 
just a novel about alienation and cultivated distance, it would not be nearly as strange a 
novel as it is. It is precisely in its confusing mixture of distance and closeness, narrative 
clarity and obscurity, emotional intensity and vagueness that the novel achieves bizarre 
and appealing shape. Anderson acknowledges this. She claims that “In a sense the novel 
is an extended record of Lucy’s refusal of the limited and sometimes even damaging 
forms of detachment that manifest themselves around her, even as she aims, with uneven 
results, to claim a detachment she can call her own” (47). But what Anderson calls 
“damaging forms of detachment,” I call the kinds of relations that Lucy cultivates.  
  
“I played it with relish”: Sadomasochism as Performance  
The care relations that Lucy relishes are ones that allow her to perform her own 
degradation, to control her abasement or to abase others in a controlled role play. 
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Throughout the novel, Lucy discovers and develops her ability to perform, and act out.  
While Lucy’s performance in the classroom, discussed above, is one of her finest, it’s not 
her only performance in the novel. Lucy’s more straightforward acting on Madame 
Beck’s fete day serves to underscore how broadly acting figures not just on the stage but 
in every day life. I have argued in this dissertation that while Mr. Knightley, in Emma, is 
often read as the very archetype of authenticity, Austen shows that he is actually always 
playing a role: that of the new figure of the English gentleman. In Villette, however, 
Brontë envisions a world in which it is possible to be wholly authentic, but in which 
authenticity means not Knightley-like good manners, but rather a lack of self-control, a 
nasty lack of filter, emotional frailty, and a mercurial temperament. The only person in 
the novel who embodies this Brontëan authenticity is M. Paul. To M. Paul, life is a 
drama, but he is not acting. When he asks Lucy to perform in the vaudeville, he says, 
“Listen! The case shall be stated, and you shall then answer me Yes or No; and according 
to your answer I shall ever after estimate you” (153). He is not in control of his 
performance of the role of drama queen.  
 Lucy, however, is eminently in control of her roles, and when she is asked to play 
the foppish lover competing with a steadfast man for the love of the coquette, played by 
Ginevra, she masters the role to the point where she is even able to improv, deepening the 
role into several performances at once. While practicing, locked in the attic and sitting 
atop a trunk and a box stacked high enough to keep her from the rats, cockroaches, and 
beetles, Lucy begins finding her way into the role. “Entering into its emptiness, frivolity, 
and falsehood, with a spirit inspired by scorn and impatience, I took my revenge on this 
‘fat’, by making him as fatuitous as I possibly could” (155). She masters the role by 
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mobilizing her “scorn and impatience.” Once again, Lucy finds use for her anti-social 
feelings.  
 When Lucy is actually on the stage, performing in front of the whole school, the 
visiting parents, and the assortment of permitted “jeune hommes,” she finds even more 
feelings to mobilize: curiosity at Ginevra’s “acting at some one” (161, italics in the 
original), jealousy of her attentions, jealousy at the sense that she was acting at Dr. John, 
defensiveness for Dr. John at the budding realization that he is the “sincere lover” that 
Ginevra was acting indifference to, jealousy at the idea that Dr. John loves Ginevra, and 
emboldened wickedness at her ability to act the play so well that she can manipulate the 
character to help her uncover what Ginevra is up to. M. Paul says, between the acts, that 
“he knew not what possessed us” (161) but the readers can recognize this ability of 
Lucy’s to read a situation, see more than everyone else can see, and perform accordingly. 
Her insight into Ginevra’s double-meanings while acting and her reciprocal performance 
are just like her insight into Dr. John’s identity and her performance of silence in 
response, or like her insight into M. Paul’s sensitive, artless authenticity and her 
subsequent sadomasochistic power-playing.   
What has emerged in this discussion is a response to care work that relishes the 
power discrepancies because they produce a frisson of abuse and pleasure. However, 
you’ll have noticed that these are not scenes that involve consent; M. Paul does not 
consent to the role he is reduced to by Lucy’s slow, drawn out, sexual withholding, as in 
the watchguard scene. Lucy’s students don’t consent to being made examples of, to 
having their articles torn, or to being locked in closets for Lucy’s excitement. So Lucy’s 
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access to sadism and masochism is, while deeply social and collaborative, also essentially 
masturbatory.  
The scene of sadism or masochism is a scene by definition: it necessitates a mise-
en-scene, multiple characters, often props: and it involves role play and performance. 
And yet, Lucy’s chosen partner for sadomasochistic gratification—M. Paul—is uniquely 
unqualified for these scenes, in part because he is completely and utterly authentic, 
unable to perform a role, unable to control his angry abuses or his cowed flagellations. 
Lucy, on the contrary, is a masterful performer as we learn when she performs the role on 
Madame Beck’s fete day of the foppish lover competing with a steadfast man for the love 
of the coquette, played by Ginevra. She masters the role to the point where she is even 
able to improv, deepening the role into several performances at once, and playing a 
sexual game with Ginevra in order to understand who her lovers are, and to perform her 
multiple attractions to Dr. John and Ginevra.   
  Brontë’s final gift to her readers in her final novel is a final chapter that lends 
itself to endless fascination and interpretation. Many read M. Paul’s death as a re-
instantiation of Lucy’s loneliness and isolation, as a state of affairs perhaps in some 
unacknowledged way preferable for her than his return would have been. With him dead 
at sea, she can retain her independence doubly—as mistress of her own school, and as 
mistress of her own self, without a husband to limit her freedom. M. Paul gave her 
freedom by giving her a school, but he engaged her to be his wife. With his death, critics 
have suggested that the novel redemptively ends with her hard-earned, long-desired 
freedom. It won’t be a surprise that I read the ending differently. Maybe M. Paul’s death 
is necessitated by Lucy’s having outgrown him. He was an essential player in her sexual 
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development, but his inability to perform limits his potential for her. We can only hope 
that in Lucy’s new school, she finds someone—another teacher, a pupil’s parent, someone 
in Paulina and Dr. John’s circle—who can match her perversions and take part in her 
scenes. 
M. Paul’s obsessive tracking of others’ opinions of him, his surveillance, his 
desperate desire to know where he stands in others’ esteem, especially Lucy’s, and his 
symbiotic sadomasochism, whereby he is the perpetrator and recipient of pain, actually 
results in an ability to relate to Lucy better than anyone else has. He recognizes that she 
doesn’t want isolation: she wants a relationship in which she is not a dependent, in which 
she dispenses and receives pain, and in which she recognizes the agony of life in her most 
precious, real relations. She desires relations in which her dependence on others is 
balanced against an ability to freely play out her emotional range: relations in which she 
can receive and dispense pain, watch and be watched, control and be controlled. If M. 
Paul’s parting gift to Lucy is a school, we can think of this as the seed of a community as 
full and complex as Madame Beck’s school community. What Lucy will do with this 
community, what range she will allow for her feelings, and what partners for 
experimentation she’ll find, is the mystery the novel leaves us with.   
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FOREBODING AS CRITICAL READING PRACTICE: 
OR, READER, YOU WERE RIGHT  
ABOUT WILKIE COLLINS’S THE WOMAN IN WHITE 
 
“I have a bad feeling about this.” 
—Star Wars, Indiana Jones, etc.  
 
“Epistemology will demonstrate that we 
cannot know, cannot be certain of, the 
future; but we don’t believe it. We 
anticipate, and so we are always wrong.”  
—Stanley Cavell, “The Avoidance of Love: 
A Reading of King Lear,” 322 
 
We’ve seen that in Austen and Brontë’s novels, authenticity and affect are 
performative, historical, and contextual. Further, we’ve seen that negative affects are not 
only natural responses to structurally determined expectations, but they also crucially 
make things happen and produce pleasure. For Austen, authenticity is seen to be 
performative, and inhabiting characters is pleasurable, even when it’s mischievous or 
outright wrong. For Brontë, the problem of other minds is especially dangerous for the 
disenfranchised, including those employed in care relations. But as Lucy Snowe 
discovers, the negative feelings that emerge out of the treacherous power dynamics of 
care relations can be productive of pleasure and expand the boundaries of care itself. In 
this chapter, I turn to sensation fiction, the nineteenth-century genre most overtly 
concerned with questions of affect (sensations drive plots and reading experiences alike), 
authenticity (are characters who they say they are?), and ways of knowing (with law, 
intuition, and communal knowledge competing for authority). Though the affective 
dimensions of sensation fiction are often described in terms of anxiety, I will attend in 
this chapter to a feeling related to but different from anxiety: foreboding, or the feeling 
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you have when you’re right about the dangers or disappointments at hand. My attention 
to foreboding importantly attends to instances when we do know others, and links that 
knowledge to feelings of foreboding. In so doing, foreboding reveals ways in which 
feelings, in relying on patterns and contextual information, participate in knowledge-
making. But foreboding might do a better job at this than other feelings, like, for 
example, anxiety broadly understood or fear. As Martha Nussbaum argues in The New 
Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an Anxious Age (2012), fear 
and anxiety are self-directed, narcissistic feelings, and rely on the relationship between 
external patterns (i.e., incidents of terrorism) and internally motivated precautions (i.e., 
fear for personal safety). Thus, those impacted by fear might potentially disregard facts 
such as that most incidents of terror in the United States are inflicted not by Muslim 
extremists but by White Christians, and might, as a result, wind up protesting against the 
opening of a Muslim cultural center near the World Trade Center site in New York. 
Foreboding, by contrast, opens up conversations about fears that are rooted in reality and 
thus, about what kinds of action are appropriate in relation to this knowledge-based 
feeling structurally organized around observed patterns. For example, it is foreboding, not 
anxiety, to observe that a pattern of refusals to name terrorism committed by White 
Americans as such will have damaging and lasting global impacts.  
This chapter on sensation fiction thus turns to the genre’s ur-text, Wilkie Collins’s 
The Woman in White, to examine the ways that it distinguishes between foreboding and 
anxiety, and relates the former to discourses of authenticity and knowledge. Most critics 
have described this novel as a pressure cooker of anxiety, both for characters and readers. 
Our bodies and feelings, and those of the central characters, are continually ravaged by 
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anxiety-provoking twists and turns, horrors, and dangers. And yet, I argue in this chapter 
that it is worthwhile to consider the differences between anxiety—a generalized feeling 
that hovers above and exists irrespective of reality—and foreboding—a more specific 
feeling that rests on foretelling actual danger and holding complex patterns of behaviors 
against a sense of vulnerability. By differentiating between anxiety and foreboding, I 
show that the novel is concerned with what it means when fear is authenticated by reality, 
with what knowledge and authenticity have to do with feelings associated with danger, 
and with the degree to which feelings and thoughts are overlapped, joint processes.40 The 
foreboding that courses through the novel is so well founded in fact precisely because it 
is not just Fosco whose inauthenticity is dangerous and disturbing, but it is also, 
disturbingly, Hartright. When inauthenticity is so pervasive, when it touches the obvious 
villain as well as the supposed hero, suspicion is the only reasonable response, and 
foreboding the dominant, evidence-based, useful feeling.    
The Woman in White is a gripping novel in part because of all the suspicious acts 
and behaviors dominating the plot, including drugging, spying, confining, and falsifying. 
What’s so gripping has been spoken of as the production of constant ripples of anxiety, 
dosed as on a drip to both characters in and readers of the novel. As D.A. Miller points 
out in “Cage Aux Folles: Sensation and Gender in Wilkie Collins’s The Woman in White” 
(1986), “No reader can identify with unruffled characters like Gilmore or Mrs. 
Michelson, even when they narrate parts of the story, because every reader is by 
                                                
40 For the relationship between knowledge and the domestication of the seemingly 
naturally English detective figure, see Caroline Reitz’s Detecting the Nation. In her 
account, the detective’s authority stems importantly from knowledge, not violence. The 
use of knowledge in her history informs my focus on knowledge as a component 
distinguishing anxiety and foreboding.   
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definition committed to a hermeneutic project that neither of these characters finds 
necessary or desirable. Instead we identify with nerve-wracked figures…” (110). The 
sources and implications of the anxiety have been debated hotly41, but whether anxiety is 
the best way to describe what’s happening has not. There is a difference between, for 
example, anxiety that reflects reality by showing conditions in which actual events are 
distorted, for good reason, beyond recognition, and anxiety that reflects reality by 
anticipating and diagnosing it accurately. That is not to say that anxiety that distorts 
reality is less real, it’s just that this novel registers that it’s different, and this novel is 
concerned with exact correspondence. In other words, Hartright and Marian aren’t 
anxious cases, they’re anxious about how corrupt things really are. They are anxious, 
fearful, terrorized by actual, artful corruption and manipulation. What they experience is 
foreboding—true anticipation of what is to come. Further, readers who rightly doubt 
Hartright and Marian, likewise feel foreboding, and they should.  
Unlike Collins’s Moonstone, for example, in which there are numerous red 
herrings, such as Roseanna Spearman’s suspicious suicide suggestive of guilt, there are 
no red herrings in The Woman in White. Every suspicion we have turns out to be 
justified: Jane Catherick’s letter recommending Glyde and explaining their justification 
for putting her daughter in an insane asylum is just as suspicious a document as we 
suspected; Fosco’s power over Glyde and domination over his domesticated wife is just 
as sinister and bodes just as badly as we supposed; the people we supposed to be guilty 
                                                
41 Rachel Ablow, in “Good Vibrations: The Sensationalization of Masculinity in The 
Woman in White” gives a useful rundown of what critics have ascribed the novel’s 
anxiety to: gender (Pykett, D.A. Miller, Trodd, Williams), class boundaries breaking 
down (Loesberg, Thomas), urbanization and depressive capitalism (Cvetkovich), sanity 
vs. insanity boundary instability (Kurata, Leavey, Taylor, Shuttleworth), feminization of 
writing and male writerly identity (Schmitt).  
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parties are just as guilty as we feared. All this suggests that it’s not anxiety that drives 
readerly pleasure, but on the contrary, it’s narrative confirmation. Identifying with, as 
Miller put it, “the nerve-wracked” also means, significantly, reaping the same pleasures 
upon being justified. Adjusting our terminology, therefore, from anxiety to foreboding, 
makes available certain discussions about the authenticity of feelings, the authentication 
of feelings based on their source, and the appropriateness of certain feelings to their 
circumstances. Reading The Woman in White as a story of foreboding opens up the 
possibility to identify circumstances when suspicious reading is justified, in both our 
lives and reading practices.  
This pervasive suspicion is, of course, the bread and butter of our nineteenth-
century critical inheritance: from the Panopticon, to the police, to the neighborly policing 
that obviates the need for the police, arguments about totalizing suspicion are nothing 
new.42 This is especially the case in sensation fiction. As Andrew Mangham writes in his 
Introduction to the Cambridge Companion to Sensation Fiction (2013), “There is 
something about the sensation novel’s methodological skepticism (or, in plainer words, 
its unwillingness to leave anything undoubted and unquestioned) that led to a powerful 
ability to question fixed traditions and ideologies in complex and radical ways” (3). What 
I show, however, is first, that there’s a difference between suspicion as a matter-of-course 
behavior, and suspicion when used for particular cases based on particular information 
and pattern-recognition. Second, suspicion in the form of foreboding can be thrilling. The 
feedback loop of authenticating one’s foreboding is warranted and pleasurable in this 
novel.  
                                                
42 See, for example, Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, and D.A. Miller’s Novel and the 
Police.  
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This novel’s insistence on the justification of fear, on the actual dangers posed to 
bodies, and on the difference between anxiety and foreboding prompts me to rethink 
contemporary criticism on surface and depth reading practices. When it comes to Fosco, 
suspicion turns out to be just, depth turns out to be surface, and care, in particular, turns 
out to be as misapplied as it seems. There are scant red herrings, false assumptions, or 
wrong turns. When it comes to Hartright, a lack of suspicion and a trust in the power of 
love and sympathy are misapplied—surface reading is a mistake.43 What are the critical 
implications of reading this novel in the terms of the surface and depth debate? What 
kind of society is being imagined here, and what are the implications for a readership 
encouraged to be suspicious, on the grounds that suspicion is always grounded? I show in 
this chapter that, crucially, foreboding opens up a space for actionable suspicion. 
However, as is the case with reading, which necessarily ends, foreboding, too, can’t be an 
eternal condition. Precisely because foreboding involves accurately discovering, for 
example, danger, it necessarily can’t always be useful. It is grounded on reality, and so 
must be continually dictated by the evidence available. Because foreboding is externally 
motivated, it is temporary, and different from, for example, paranoia or anxiety.  
 Upon reuniting with Marian and the presumed-dead Laura and hearing their 
stories, Hartright seeks a consultation with Mr. Kyrle to convince him of the truth of 
Laura’s survival and to determine a strategy for demanding justice.  Kyrle listens with a 
“calmly attentive face,” and responds with a claim about English practices of credulity 
that bear striking resemblance to contemporary conversations about surface and depth 
reading practices.  
                                                
43 See Ablow for a challenge to the notion that Hartright’s ability to identify Laura’s true 
identity stems from sympathy and love.    
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Let me tell you the result of my experience on that point. When an English 
jury has to choose between a plain fact, on the surface, and a long 
explanation under the surface, it always takes the fact, in preference to the 
explanation. For example, if Lady Glyde (I call the lady you represent by 
that name for argument’s sake) declares she has slept at a certain house, 
and it is proved that she has not slept at that house. You explain this 
circumstance by entering into the state of her mind, and deducing from it a 
metaphysical conclusion. I don’t say the conclusion is wrong—I can only 
say that the jury will take the fact of her contradicting herself, in 
preference to any reason for the contradiction that you can offer…In short, 
there is no case, Mr. Hartright—there is really no case” (452).  
Kyrle claims that surface reading just makes sense, and that the straight-forward, plain-
sense Englishman will naturally tend toward a surface interpretation of events. 
Hartright’s challenge in this novel, and it’s a steep uphill battle, is to prove to plain-
dealing, surface-trusting Englishmen that in this case, the surface is the suspicious, that 
the basic facts about the case are precisely the ones that sound most outrageous and 
unbelievable.  
 Kyrle and Hartright’s conversation resembles debates in contemporary critical 
discourse on the degree to which we should be in the practice of looking to reveal what’s 
underneath the surface, whether suspicion is a legitimate critical posture to assume as a 
matter of course, and whether we are treating texts fairly. In “Has Critique Run Out of 
Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern” (2004), Bruno Latour asked: “While 
we spent years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden behind the appearance of 
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objective statements, do we now have to reveal the real objective and incontrovertible 
facts hidden behind the illusion of prejudices?” (227). Rita Felski, in After Suspicion 
(2009), wrote that “the animating spirit of our inquiry is the conviction that appearances 
deceive and that texts do not willingly surrender their secrets. Instead of being 
emblazoned in the words on the page, meaning lies beneath or to the side of these words, 
encrypted in what the literary work cannot or will not say, in its eloquent stuttering and 
recalcitrant silences…The hermeneutics of suspicion promotes a sensibility that prides 
itself on its uncompromising wariness and hypervigilance” 28-29). Sharon Marcus and 
Stephen Best, in their introduction to an issue of Representations (2009), propose to 
“broaden the scope of critique” by exploring the affordances of “surface reading:” “We 
were trained in symptomatic reading, became attached to the power it gave to the act of 
interpreting, and find it hard to let go of the belief that texts and their readers have an 
unconscious” (1). Eve Sedgwick, whose Epistemology of the Closet inaugurated Queer 
Studies and was therefore a touchstone of the kind of symptomatic or suspicious reading 
that Latour, Felski, Best and Marcus argued against, proved ever flexible and 
intellectually exploratory, introducing the idea of “reparative reading” as early as 2003. 
By way of opening “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, Or, You’re So Paranoid, 
You Probably Think This Essay is About You,” Sedgwick describes a conversation she 
has with her friend, activist scholar Cindy Patton, about the history of the AIDS 
epidemic. Patton tells her, “Any of the early steps in its spread could have been either 
accidental or deliberate … but I just have trouble getting interested in that” (123). 
Sedgwick sees in Patton’s words a potential response to critique generally: “it suggests 
the possibility of unpacking, of disentangling from their impacted and overdetermined 
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and historical relations to each other some of the separate elements of the intellectual 
baggage that many of us carry around under a label such as ‘the hermeneutics of 
suspicion’” (124). Instead of asking “Is a particular piece of knowledge true, and how can 
we know?” Sedgwick suggests that we might instead ask “What does knowledge do—the 
pursuit of it, the having and exposing of it, the receiving again of knowledge of what one 
already knows? How, in short, is knowledge performative, and how best does one move 
among its causes and effects?” (124). Rather than fetishize knowledge itself, Sedgwick 
proposes that we look at how knowledge is performed, affords power, and produces 
effects. I propose that foreboding is, therefore, a form of reparative reading. It asks what 
knowledge can do, and in its pattern-seeking, it avoids the constants of paranoia or 
anxiety.   
 In this novel, and the Victorian period, there is much to be suspicious about, and 
indeed, sensation fiction has been a natural home for suspicious and historicist 
scholarship. Andrew Mangham argues that sensation fiction’s “queering of 
characters…exposed tensions and injustices at the heart of Victorian idealism” (3), that 
“the sensation format’s knack of questioning and probing beneath surfaces leads to 
important representations of class, race, and gender” (4), and that “the form’s obsession 
with masquerade and questions of identity disrupts the narrative in a way that raises 
questions about what is considered to be ‘normal,’ and how we recognize it” (4). Pamela 
K. Gilbert argues, in A Companion to Sensation Fiction (2011), that sensation fiction, 
because of how deeply embedded radical revision was into its publication culture, 
challenges our “now traditional commitment to close reading” (3). Because the serial 
would often be a very different text than the three-volume edition, which might in turn be 
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different from the next edition, sensation fiction challenges us to read contextually and 
historically, a mode we should take beyond the problematic walls of the sensation genre. 
“Studying popular fiction, because of its focus on immediacy and the site of 
consumption, has highlighted a broader problem in studying Victorian literature that few 
scholars have carefully considered in reading Eliot or Tennyson, though they probably 
should: readings that hinge on particular words in a particular context are likely to be 
called into question once situated in the broader context of the non-linear, mutating, 
increasingly rhizomatic structure of Victorian literary, publishing, and consumer culture” 
(4).  
 Perhaps even more fundamentally than that, however, is the centrality of secrecy, 
suspicion, authenticity, and identity to the genre of sensation fiction. In The Serious 
Pleasures of Suspense: Victorian Realism and Narrative Doubt (2003), Caroline Levine 
argues that nineteenth-century novels across genres—from realism to suspense and gothic 
plots, and from high to low—train readers to suspend judgment and remain in suspense. 
Sensation fiction does this especially well, she argues, using Collins’s The Moonstone as 
an example. Against D.A. Miller’s claim that, as Levine puts it, “very little is actually 
mysterious in the novel” (47), she shows that the scientific experiment at the heart of the 
novel’s resolution demands that readers and characters suspend their judgment. “The 
delay of the experiment compels us to admit that our beliefs—however much we are 
attached to them—do not necessarily correspond to the facts of the world” (50). We all 
have to hold our breaths and see what the experiment yields. This withholding of 
judgment, I argue, yields maximum pleasure in The Woman in White because our 
hypotheses are ultimately proven right.   
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Patrick Brantlinger has argued that “in place of the empiricist realism that strives 
to be objective, direct mimesis, the sensation novel seems to substitute a different 
measure of reality, based on primal scene psychology, that now reads objective 
appearances as question marks or clues to mysteries and insists that the truth has been 
hidden, buried, smuggled away behind appearances” (26). That is to say that whereas 
realism relies on access to an objectively real world, sensation fiction belies mimesis’s 
power by showing how much is hidden from view and unknowable. The Woman in White 
complicates this dichotomy by showing that mimesis must accommodate the conflation 
of the obvious and visible with the hidden and unexpected.    
 Turning my attention to foreboding, then, allows me to make several interventions 
at once: it collapses surface and depth, deals in both interiority as well as external reality, 
and attends to the validity of feelings precisely because they have the power to do this 
collapsing work, precisely because they move between surface and depth, interior and 
exterior. Much of affect theory has taken as a central concern what affects do, and what, 
in particular, they do politically. Ann Cvetkovich, writing about feelings in relation to the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, wonders “what makes it possible for people to vote for 
Bush or to assent to war, and how do these political decisions operate within the context 
of daily lives that are pervaded by a combination of anxiety and numbness? How can we, 
as intellectuals and activists, acknowledge our own political disappointments and failures 
in a way that can be enabling? Where might hope be possible?” (1). Cvetkovich clarifies 
that hope is not meant to function redemptive or pastorally, but rather, “the goal is to 
depathologize negative feelings so that they can be seen as a possible resource for 
political action rather than as its antithesis” (2). Her book, Depression: A Public Feeling 
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(2012), maps the function and potential of depression on lived experience of 
contemporary political, personal, national life.  Sianne Ngai’s Ugly Feelings looks at the 
role of negative emotions in political disaffection, and speculates on the “politically 
ambiguous work” (1) of more minor feelings less associated with “the classical political 
passions (5). Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, in their introduction to The Affect 
Theory Reader (2010), write that hard as it is to pin down and define affect, it is 
undeniably a force, something “that can serve to drive us toward movement, toward 
thought and extension, that can likewise suspend us (as if in neutral) across a barely 
registering accretion of force-relations, or that can even leave us overwhelmed by the 
world’s apparent intractability” (1).  
 When I started writing this chapter, it was the summer of 2016 and Hillary 
Clinton’s election to the Presidency of the United States seemed imminent. I returned to 
the chapter for a round of edits in late-November 2016, while we are instead processing 
the fact of a Donald Trump Presidency. As a nation, we have been relying on affect 
theory more than in recent memory to make sense of what has happened. Every day, the 
news media and my peers alike have been asking the same questions: What does anger do 
that other feelings can’t, and how can we keep it going? What is the place of hope, if 
any? What are the differences between public and private depression? What affects are 
some Americans—white Americans, white female Americans—structurally enabled to 
inhabit, that others are foreclosed from for reasons that are directly racial, historical, and 
structural? Who can cry in public, who can show resentment in public, who can smile in 
public? What does the question, “How’re you feeling?” mean in times like these? 
Alongside all these questions, I’ve also been turning again, with renewed urgency, to my 
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distinction between anxiety and foreboding. What was the role of foreboding in these past 
few months running up to the election? Who had it, and what difference would it have 
made if more of us had had it? What action does foreboding enable that anxiety, its 
closest sibling, forecloses? Critical attention to foreboding seems more important than 
ever, as we look ahead to the known unknown of racism, misogyny, xenophobia, and to 
attacks on the very institutions that enable the free flow of information, information we 
rely on to accurately forebode. Further, when our nation’s president mocks emotion as 
hysterical, or faked for show, it serves us to think about the forms emotion takes, to 
clarify the ways that emotion and knowledge work together, and make things happen.  
 
Performances of Authenticity: Just Reading Under the Surface   
In this novel of foreboding, the tension derives from the conflict between truth, 
critique, and investigation on the one hand, and artfulness, deceit, and performance on the 
other. Characters masquerade as authentic, and obtain control through that deception. 
Being found out, interrogated, or critiqued would reveal inauthenticity, and damage or 
dismantle power and control. In this strange circus act of a novel, there are two 
competing ringmasters, both of whom perform authenticity and obtain control from that 
performance: the obese light-footed man and the aspirational drawing master. Together, 
they control the actions and narratives of the manly woman, the identical women, and the 
man so full of hot air he goes up in flames. Fosco’s performance is marked by a 
flamboyance so extreme, it appears the very stuff of authenticity. Hartright, meanwhile, 
plays a middle-class Knightley—upright, strong, not at all flamboyant—but unlike 
Knightley, his performance is not just of respectable gentleman, but also of reliable 
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editor, calling things as he wants them, and stitching together a narrative that has no 
checks or balances while masquerading as courtroom truth.44 In addition to performing, 
Fosco and Hartright both direct performances: Fosco with manipulation and chemistry, 
Hartright with editorial control and the coaching of Laura’s post-asylum and identity theft 
performance.   
Fosco is able to control everything, even his shocking, “odious corpulence” (220). 
In fact, Fosco’s threat derives from the control he exercises over his performance of 
complete authenticity, such that he passes as a unique oddball who can’t help being the 
way he is. He charismatically presents as so “extraordinary” and with such a “marked 
peculiarity” (221) that it seems he couldn’t possibly be purposefully performing his 
idiosyncrasy. He cultivates a persona, with his “cockatoo, two canary birds, and a whole 
family of white mice,” his extravagantly chivalrous relations with his wife, and his 
ostentatious outfits, such as his “broad straw hat…with a violet colored ribbon round it” 
paired with a “blue blouse, with profuse white fancy-work over the bosom…with a broad 
fancy belt” over “nankeen trousers, displaying more white fancy-work over the ankles, 
and purple morocco slippers” (230). Unlike Knightley’s performance of authenticity, 
where his performance becomes so tied to authenticity that the performance becomes 
invisible, Fosco’s supposed authenticity derives from his deeply performative, glaring, 
strange flamboyance. Fosco is authentically a performative counterfeit.  
Fosco doesn’t trick Laura who dislikes him right away. She reads beneath the 
surface of his flamboyance, suspicious of his over-the-top chivalry, whether with herself 
                                                
44 See Rachel Ablow’s “Good Vibrations: The Sensationalization of Mascuinity in ‘The 
Woman in White’” and Ayelet Ben-Yishai’s chapter on The Woman in White in Common 
Precedents: The Presentness of the Past in Victorian Law and Fiction.  
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or with her husband. Fosco charms Marian against her better judgment, but the charm 
doesn’t last long, as she learns to be suspicious, and to read into his surface. One thing 
Marian wonders early in the novel, for example, is how he achieved such mastery over 
his wife. Marian writes in her journal:  
As Eleanor Fairlie (aged seven-and-thirty), she was always talking 
pretentious nonsense, and always worrying the unfortunate men with 
every small exaction which a vain and foolish woman can impose on long-
suffering male humanity. As Madame Fosco (aged three-and-forty), she 
sits for hours together without saying a word, frozen up in the strangest 
manner in herself…On the few occasions when her cold blue eyes are off 
her work, they are generally turned on her husband, with the look of mute 
submissive inquiry which we are all familiar with in the eyes of a faithful 
dog…. How far she is really reformed or deteriorated in her secret self, is 
another question…. And is the magician who has wrought this wonderful 
transformation—the foreign husband who has tamed this once wayward 
Englishwoman till her own relations hardly know her again—the Count 
himself? This in two words: He looks like a man who could tame 
anything.  (218-219).  
Marian considers multiple interpretations here. She notes that Madame Fosco has become 
stupefied, and lives in fear. Perhaps this is because he is a terrifying person, nowhere near 
as chivalric when they are behind closed doors. Perhaps his charisma is a form of magic. 
Perhaps the magic is money: Fosco has inspired her to silence and collaboration by 
inducting her into the rites of his conspiracy to reclaim money. Or perhaps the description 
 133 
of Fosco as a “magician” sarcastically refers to the magic of chemistry—this is perhaps 
reading too suspiciously, but perhaps Marian is speculating that Fosco controls his wife 
through the magic of sedatives, easy to do with the bon-bons he is forever feeding her. In 
any event, Fosco’s charisma and persona is compelling and dangerous precisely because 
of his masterful performance of authenticity.    
One of Fosco’s most effective disguises is flattery: many of his tricks rely on 
fawning performances, often to the domestic workers he or Glyde employ. Fosco’s cook 
in St. John’s Wood, Hester Pinhorn, reports in her narrative, solicited by Hartright, that 
“he [Fosco] was not a bad master: he had a monstrous civil tongue of his own; and a 
jolly, easy, coaxing way with him. I liked him a deal better than my mistress” (410). Mrs. 
Michelson, the housekeeper at Blackwater Park, has far greater exposure and is far more 
effusive in her approval of his “moral character” (369). In a climactic period in the plot at 
Blackwater Park, after Fosco catches Laura in contact with Anne Catherick, Fanny, 
Laura’s maid, is abruptly fired and Laura locked in her room, Marian writes letters to the 
family lawyer’s partner, Mr. Kyrle, and to their uncle, Mr. Fairlie. These letters are to be 
brought to their recipients by the recently dismissed Fanny. As Marian slips out of the 
house to deliver the letters to Fanny, she checks to see where Fosco is and finds an 
unexpected scene. “[I] saw, to my surprise, that he [Fosco] was exhibiting the docility of 
the birds, in his most engagingly polite manner, to the housekeeper. He must have 
specially invited her to see them—for she would never have thought of going into the 
library of her own accord. The man’s slightest actions had a purpose of some kind at the 
bottom of every one of them. What could be his purpose here?” (314). In her testimony of 
the time of Marian’s illness and Laura’s departure from Blackwater Park, Mrs. Michelson 
 134 
mentions this episode in the context of her admiration of Fosco’s kindness: “He had the 
manners of a true nobleman—he was considerate towards every one. Even the young 
person (Fanny by name) who attended on Lady Glyde was not beneath his notice. When 
she was sent away by Sir Percival, his lordship (showing me his sweet little birds at the 
time) was most kindly anxious to know what had become of her, where she was to go the 
day she left Blackwater Park, and so on. It is in such little delicate attentions that the 
advantages of aristocratic birth always show themselves. I make no apology for 
introducing these particulars—they are brought forward in justice to his lordship, whose 
character, I have reason to know, is viewed rather harshly in certain quarters” (367). 
Fosco, of course, is pumping Mrs. Michelson for information about Fanny, sure that she 
will be delivering letters on behalf of Marian and Laura. His masterful performance of 
kindness and flattery enables his deceptions and maneuvers, and he finds easy targets in 
those not often flattered.  
 By comparison, Sir Percival Glyde is authentically a brute, able to present himself 
and his suit successfully by performing a Knightley-esque gentlemanliness to Marian and 
Laura, but underneath that single, simple layer of performance lies a fairly two-
dimensional bully. While performing, he is controlled, well-mannered, and 
unobjectionable. Once safely married to Laura and back in Blackwater Park, he drops the 
no-longer-necessary act, as Marian notes: “My sole motive for distrusting his honesty, 
sprang from the change which I had observed in his language and his manners at 
Blackwater Park, a change which convinced me that he had been acting a part throughout 
the whole period of his probation at Limmeridge House. His elaborate delicacy; his 
ceremonious politeness, which harmonized so agreeably with Mr. Gilmore’s old-
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fashioned notions; his modesty with Laura, his candour with me, his moderation with Mr. 
Fairlie—all these were the artifices of a mean, cunning, and brutal man, who had dropped 
his disguise when his practiced duplicity had gained its end…” (255).   
 Sir Percival can control his character to a degree, but he does have tic, a 
connected series of somatic release hatches that he can’t control: his nervous cough, his 
restless and bouncing leg, and his temper. Even when he is playing the part of humble, 
courteous suitor, the anxiety driving his efforts breaks through his controlled act. It 
comes through often, including at the moment when he expects to hear whether Laura 
will decline to marry him. “There was suppressed anxiety and agitation in every line of 
his face. The dry, sharp cough, which teases him at most times, seemed to be troubling 
him more incessantly than ever” (169). After hearing that she declines his offer to decline 
his offer, he is relieved but still unsure where he stands, and Marian observes “one of his 
feet, softly, quietly, incessantly beating on the carpet under the table” (169). He is able to 
mask his bad temper in that probationary period, but when he is safely married to his 
source of income, his temper is quick and lacks control. It is up to Fosco to quiet him and 
enable him to achieve his pecuniary goals—Fosco is a kind of prosthesis to Sir Percival, 
who, once he had achieved his marriage, doesn’t have the control or energy to keep up 
his act, though there is much work still to be done. Sir Percival’s acting suggests that 
underneath the character, there’s another, true character: underneath the well-mannered 
gentleman is a true self: a brooding, nasty, boring man who is interesting enough to have 
a family scandal but not interesting enough to have more complexly layered selves. He is 
boringly knowable—once you peel back the single layer, his authentic self is exposed and 
it’s pathetic and simple.  
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Hartright is in many ways the most complicated performer of the lot. The nature 
of Hartright’s interest in Laura has surprisingly not been much-questioned in recent 
criticism, and yet even a lightly suspicious reading of the novel begs the questions: Is his 
ability to recognize Laura a true sign of his love, a wishful fantasy made real, a vehicle 
for the continuation of his aspirations, or an invention that he forcibly manifests as a 
reality? Is he a true middle-class gentleman with the bad luck to fall in love where he 
doesn’t belong, and the ambition to doggedly first absent himself and then, sensing 
danger, serve truth and save the day? Or is he an aspirational climber, as manipulative as 
Fosco, though without the liveliness, flamboyance, and specialized chemical knowledge? 
As Rachel Ablow writes, “For the most part, they [recent critics of Collins’s novel] have 
understood The Woman in White to revolve around Walter’s development from a youth, 
nervously susceptible to the sensations of his body, into a self-disciplined and reliable 
adult member of society” (157). And yet, as Ablow shows, his intentions and motivations 
are never quite clear, nor is his veracity. While most readers believe that it is Hartright’s 
sympathy with Laura, incubated over a long period of tested love, that enables him to 
recognize her, it isn’t actually clear that she is Laura, and even if she is, it isn’t clear that 
sympathy and love serve as his compass. As Ben-Yishai shows, the novel itself as written 
and edited by Hartright is a vast manipulation of past and present tense, designed to 
establish his legitimacy as landed English gentleman. He makes himself appear to have 
always been right, and therefore to have always been legitimate in the communal sense of 
having achieved “a long-awaited and well-deserved return to his rightful place” (148).  
Hartright has a habit of deciding when he will speak for or on behalf of others, 
adjusting or rewriting their narratives for some conflation of his and our purposes. After 
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declaring to both Marian and Laura his desire to marry and protect Laura and receiving 
an affirmative response from both, Hartright writes, “My position is defined; my motives 
are acknowledged. The story of Marian and the story of Laura must come next. I shall 
relate both narratives, not in the words (often interrupted, often inevitably confused) of 
the speakers themselves, but in the words of the brief, plain, studiously simple abstract 
which I committed to writing for my own guidance, and for the guidance of my legal 
advisor. So the tangled web will be most speedily and most intelligibly unrolled” (422). 
Having entrusted Marian to provide her narrative in the past (whether or how it was 
edited we can never know) Hartright decides that at this critical juncture in the story, it 
would be best if he took over all narrative responsibilities.  
It is no secret that Hartright stands to gain from a living Laura. After being 
drugged, pronounced dead, given a false identity, and made to live in an asylum for two 
and a half months, Laura is weak, easy prey one might say. And indeed, since Laura 
emerges from her ordeal with no memory of her past life, Hartright trains Laura, teaching 
her her lines, directing her in a performance of his dear Laura. This is perhaps an overly 
paranoid reading of Hartright and of The Woman in White, but does not the novel teach us 
that our feelings are best described as foreboding, not anxiety: in other words, that we’re 
right, and that our suspicions are not just a generalized, paranoid dread? We were right: 
Fosco is a dangerous creep, he is interfering with the mail, he is following and lurking, 
his wife is listening in, Hartright is being followed, and on and on. So who’s to say that a 
suspicious reading of Hartright is not in order?  
Of course, questions of authenticity are not simply modes of reading character, 
they are also written into the very plot and control the action: this is a novel about the 
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actual theft of two identities, not simply the theoretical effects of the inauthenticity of 
self. Lady Glyde and Anne Catherick’s identities are actually called into question, and the 
effects of this are more acute than they are for any of the men previously discussed and 
interrogated in terms of authenticity. The two women are manipulated and their identities 
are crossed and effectively erased, whether by death or by trauma. Inauthenticity is a 
vehicle for power, and can be wielded as a weapon, but there is such a thing as 
authenticity. One of the biggest threats of inauthenticity is precisely that it calls 
everything into suspicion. If Fosco can be chivalric on the surface but scheming and 
dangerous underneath, and worse, if Hartright can be heroic on the surface but potentially 
self-serving underneath, then we would be justified in thinking there is no authenticity at 
all. And yet, the novel leaves little room for doubt about whether Lady Glyde is indeed 
the destroyed woman who emerges from the asylum. Fosco’s narrative confirms it, and to 
assume Hartright simply wrote it and entered it into the narrative record would be to 
question all things in an extreme skeptical mode akin to Hume’s theoretical speculations 
about whether we should sit down with certainty that the chair beneath us will catch our 
weight simply because it did so last time. It is precisely this overlay between the 
authenticity of the men and of Anne/Laura that shows us how suspicious and just reading 
practice might be merged: There are some things that are just (the identity of 
Laura/Anne) and there are some things about which one needs to be suspicious, and 
about which foreboding is well-placed. Foreboding relies on knowledge. In order to be 
equipped with verifiable suspicions—in order to experience foreboding—one needs to be 
able to recognize and compare patterns, one needs to have a relationship with history, one 
needs to be paying attention.  
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Care Without an Ethics of Care  
Throughout this dissertation, one of the central sites of relationality and sources of 
negative emotions is care precisely because of the heightened stakes, in care relations, of 
the unknowability of others. In Villette, we saw an articulation of ethics of care that not 
only accounted for, but encouraged the coexistence of uncaring feelings and care work. 
In the next chapter, we will see a character whose unwillingness to provide maternal care 
challenges the very creed of sympathy that many take to be the backbone of Eliot’s 
project, but which I show to be the subject of her continually evolving skeptical critique. 
The provision of care begs the question of authenticity: is care given for caring reasons? 
If not, can the care be trusted? In this novel, hardly a scene or a plot-point goes by that 
doesn’t revolve around care, but care in this novel is always compromised at best, 
dangerous at worst. Further, in The Woman in White, it is characters on both sides of the 
plot’s conflict providing this damaging care. Attending to the care dynamics allows us to 
see how much is at stake in relation to foreboding.  Talia Schaffer writes: “Ethics of care 
asserts that human relations should be understood as interdependent exchanges of 
caregiving and care-receiving, rather than the monadic persona of classic liberal thought, 
often equated with Homo economicus, the rational subject of economic theory who 
makes decisions to further his own interest” (160). What this novel demonstrates is that 
caregiving can be performed by uncaring actors, but that there’s a difference between 
Lucy Snowe, who cares with feelings inappropriate to care, but who is not distracted by 
attempts to further her own interest, and the Foscos, who take on caregiving roles 
exclusively in order to further their own interests. The difference is not that care is 
 140 
provided without feeling, or with feelings inappropriate to care; the difference is that care 
is provided with an underlying self-interest. When self-interest is the driving motivator of 
behavior, foreboding is not only possible, but necessary.  
There is a second but related difference: in The Woman in White, care is provided 
in secret, small, closed off spaces with no oversight. In Villette, Lucy’s particular, 
affectively complex mode of caring is neutralized in part because she is always in a 
community with multiple assigned care givers. It is not dangerous for her to teach or be a 
bonne even though she enjoys abusing others and being abused in part because of the 
surveillance, direct or indirect, of Madame Beck or, more broadly, of a community. So 
not only is a care a form of interrelatedness in Villette, it is also an activity necessarily 
done in physical proximity with other members of the care community. In The Woman in 
White, all the care dispensed is done, necessarily, to achieve the ends of the actors, in 
secret, in sealed off and even secret spaces.   
As in the case of Lucy Snowe, circumstances have not been kind to Madame 
Fosco. After an opinionated youth, she marries against her family’s wishes, is summarily 
cast off and disinherited, and spends her days “sit[ting] speechless in corners” rolling 
cigarettes for her husband, “clad,” as Marian describes, “in quiet black or gray gowns, 
made high round the throat—dresses that she would have laughed at, or screamed at, as 
the whim of the moment inclined her, in her maiden days” (218). Unlike Lucy, she is in a 
position to give bad care to precisely the people she feels wronged by, and has the 
opportunity to right perceived wrongs through this bad care. She is not acting through an 
ethics of care but rather through an individualist self-interest.  
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Fosco, too, often puts himself in a position to provide care, but of course, this is 
because it gives him opportunity to, at best, monitor progress and develop plans 
accordingly, and at worst, dispense drugs to affect desired outcomes. He describes his 
relationship with Sir Percival Glyde in terms of their shared material embarrassments and 
needs. “The bond of friendship which united Percival and myself, was strengthened, on 
this occasion, by a touching similarity in the pecuniary position, on his side and mine. We 
both wanted money. Immense necessity! Universal want!” (614). It is precisely on the 
strength of his and Glyde’s interests that Fosco intervenes in the care of others, and the 
novel’s plot is determined by Fosco’s efforts to resolve his pecuniary position by 
controlling or accelerating others’ need for care. His plan, according to his confession, 
occurs to him at the very moment of his observing the illness and need of Anne 
Catherick: “The details of the grand scheme, which had suggested themselves in outline 
only, up to that period, occurred to me, in all their masterly combination, at the sight of 
the sleeping face. At the same time, my heart, always accessible to tender influences, 
dissolved in tears at the spectacle of suffering before me. I instantly set myself to impart 
relief. In other words, I provided the necessary stimulant for strengthening Anne 
Catherick to perform the journey to London” (617). The sight of a person in need of 
nursing inspires the “grand scheme” to see to his economic interests, and the emotion he 
trumpets at seeing her suffering is simply his requirement that she remain alive a little 
longer, so that she can plausibly die while being identified as Lady Glyde—something 
that would necessitate Lady Glyde’s being in London. The feelings others interpret as 
Fosco’s sincere concern and anxiety for suffering patients is, again and again, the anxiety 
he feels for his own scheme.  
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The one almost-exception is Fosco’s response to Marian’s suffering. The novel is 
pretty convincing on Fosco’s feelings for Marian. As Fosco puts it, “At sixty I 
worshipped her with the volcanic ardor of eighteen. All the gold of my rich nature was 
poured hopelessly at her feet. My wife—poor angel!—my wife who adores me, got 
nothing but the shillings and the pennies” (615). Fosco insists that he did nothing to 
further Marian’s illness; she became ill the night she spent out in the rain, listening to 
Fosco in conversation with Glyde, concocting his plot, and developed delirious fever and 
ultimately typhus all on her own. This is one of two things we have suspicion of Fosco 
for that can’t ever be proved: we suspect he meddled with Marian’s health, but he claims 
he didn’t. (The other is our suspicion that he sedates his wife with medicinal bon-bons, 
though it is just as likely that he simply dominates her into submission, or even that no 
domination is needed and that she is motivated to work submissively alongside her 
husband in the pursuit of recovered fortune.) Our inability to know whether Fosco 
meddled in Marian’s health, coupled with our certainty that he admires, to put it 
euphemistically, “the poetry of motion, as embodied in her walk” (618), leaves a little 
mystery here in the case of Marian and Fosco—appropriate perhaps because it is the only 
love match worth our attention, the only one with spark and characters vivid enough to 
stimulate our imaginations.  
And what of Hartright’s care? Does it stem from an ethics of care or is it, too, 
ultimately an extension of his aspirations and interests? Upon discovering Laura and 
Marian at Laura’s supposed grave, Hartright discovers that Laura is essentially a wiped 
hard drive, containing nothing other than a vague sense of safety and trust around Marian 
and Hartright: “She, who now remembered so little of the trouble and terror of a later 
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time, remembered those words, and laid her poor head innocently and trustingly on the 
bosom of the man who had spoken them” (422). He goes on, telling us what her reduced 
state inspired in him:  
Yes! the time had come. From thousands on thousands of miles away—
through forest and wilderness, where companions stronger than I had 
fallen by my side, through peril of death thrice renewed, and thrice 
escaped, the Hand that leads men on the dark road to the future had led me 
to meet that time. Forlorn and disowned, sorely tried and sadly changed—
her beauty faded, her mind clouded—robbed of her station in the world, of 
her place among living creatures—the devotion I had promised, the 
devotion of my whole heart and soul and strength, might be laid 
blamelessly now at those dear feet. In the right of her calamity, in the right 
of her friendlessness, she was mine at last! Mine to support, to protect, to 
cherish, to restore. Mine to love and honour as father and brother both. 
Mine to vindicate through all risks and all sacrifices—through the 
hopeless struggle against Rank and Power, through the long fight with 
armed deceit and fortified Success, through the waste of my reputation, 
through the loss of my friends, through the hazard of my life. (422)  
Her weakness is narrated in terms of his journey, his role, and the hazards of his life. As 
Rachel Ablow argues, “at least part of the popularity of and relative critical respect 
accorded to Collins’s novel derives from the fantasy of male, middle-class identity that it 
offers—a fantasy that, unlike those offered in later sensation novels, revolves around the 
power of the middle-class man to define himself in highly profitable yet ideologically 
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unproblematic ways. Walter’s power to improve his class position [relies on] convincing 
others of his sympathetic relationship with his wife” (160). In fact, Hartright’s relation 
with his wife is far from sympathetic, and in fact significantly impedes his care for her.  
 One of the paradoxes of Hartright and Marian’s care for Laura is that by walking 
on eggshells around her “weakened, shaken faculties” (443), they drive her deeper into a 
passive, incapacitated state. Earlier in the novel, Laura proved that she is capable of 
bearing up and toughening up under hardships: during the long ordeal of her engagement 
to Glyde, she is in many respects the stronger sister. And this is a novel that values hardy 
women, and has high expectations for their hardiness and capacity. Along with Fosco, we 
admire Marian above all else, precisely because she’s mannish, a proto-James Bond with 
a mustache and Victorian dress. But rather than give Laura an opportunity to face her 
“troubled and terrible past” and potentially recover her memory, they worry about “the 
risk of turning her mind” upon it, and instead treat her like a child or like someone 
incapable of returning to her previous capacities. “We helped her mind slowly by this 
simple means; we took her out between us to walk, on fine days, in a quiet old City 
square, near at hand, where there was nothing to confuse or alarm her; we spared a few 
pounds from the fund at the banker’s to get her wine, and the delicate strengthening food 
that she required; we amused her in the evenings with children’s games at cards, with 
scrap-books full of prints which I borrowed from the engraver who employed me—by 
these and other trifling attentions like them, we composed her and steadied her…” (444).   
 One way they compose and steady her is by returning her to the practice of 
drawing, and later, when she is agitated because she wants to contribute to the household 
income, telling her that her drawings are being sold. “Marian took them from me and hid 
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them carefully; and I set aside a little weekly tribute from my earnings, to be offered to 
her as the price paid by strangers for the poor, faint, valueless sketches, of which I was 
the only purchaser. It was hard sometimes to maintain our innocent deception, when she 
proudly brought out her purse to contribute her share towards the expenses, and 
wondered, with serious interest, whether I or she had earned the most that week” (490). 
Does this overabundance of care, and the treatment of Laura like a child unlikely to fully 
recover, detrimentally affect her recovery? Is it a performance of adequate and good 
care?  Or does it lull her into remaining weak and unrecovered?  
To answer these questions, a study of Marian’s care is essential, as she is so often 
in partnership with Hartright, and in a caring relation to Laura.  Both Laura and Marian 
do everything in their power to maintain the hierarchical dynamics of the caring 
relationship they are in. We first meet Marian with Hartright, and Marian apologizes for 
Laura’s absence: she is unwell but will greet him as soon as she’s able. Laura is often 
depicted as the weaker, less practical, less able of the two sisters. Marian liaises between 
her and Mr. Fairlie, and between her and Hartright. There is one sustained period, when 
Laura is steeling herself to accept Glyde’s proposal of marriage, when she is the stronger 
and more willful of the two sisters, and Marian doesn’t like it. Marian walks into a room 
and finds Laura “walking up and down in great impatience,” and writes: “There was too 
much color in her cheeks, too much energy in her manner, too much firmness in her 
voice” (164). She doesn’t like seeing Laura assert herself, or access her own powers of 
will, and sees this energetic flash of resolve as a danger, not only to Laura, but to her role 
as care giver.  
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When Laura returns from her honeymoon, shaken but resolved to be longsuffering 
and submissive, her power in relation to Marian remains in effect: she has crossed over 
into a realm of experience unavailable to Marian, and she is choosing not to share any of 
her new information with Marian. “I would tell you everything, darling, about myself 
[…] if my confidences could only end there. But they could not—they would lead me 
into confidences about my husband, too; and now I am married, I think I had better avoid 
them, for this sake, and for your sake, and for mine. I don’t say that they would distress 
you, or distress me—I wouldn’t have you think that for the world” (214). Laura is 
choosing to withhold information, there is a set of relations that binds her, and she tries to 
explain her loyalties and rationale to Marian, and in the process, emphasizes that Marian 
is left out of a domain of experience, and makes excuses for keeping her in the dark. 
Marian, as an unmarried woman, couldn’t understand, Laura suggests. And as a married 
woman, Laura has responsibilities toward her husband that she must uphold, even as they 
necessarily exclude Marian. The process of Laura’s marriage—from strength during the 
drawn out acceptance phase to strength upon returning from the honeymoon—demotes 
Marian, and obviates her caretaking responsibilities.  
Luckily for Marian, whose whole existence is defined by tending to Laura, Laura 
is so accustomed to needing Marian that the habits of weakness and neediness remain. 
While Laura is giving the speech quoted above, telling Marian that she will exclude her 
from certain information and insinuating that she knows things Marian will never know, 
she is also described by Marian as “nervously buckling and unbuckling the ribbon around 
my waist” (214). Any person who has ever provided care for someone who eventually 
outgrows certain needs knows the joy of being touched, cuddled, or treated in a way that 
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harkens back to the period of complete dependence. Laura deepens this experience for 
Marian when she tells her she’ll always need her. “‘Oh, Marian!’ she said, suddenly 
seating herself on a footstool at my knees, and looking up earnestly in my face, ‘promise 
you will never marry, and leave me. It is selfish to say so, but you are much better off as 
a single woman—unless—unless you are very fond of your husband—but you won’t be 
very fond of anyone but me, will you?’” (215). Laura’s neediness and reliance on Marian 
is no doubt gratifying to Marian, especially in this phase of Laura’s newfound 
independence. It is also, of course, selfish, as Laura herself notes, and manipulative.  Care 
relations change over time, as the cared-for and care giver have changing needs and 
circumstances. But even as circumstances change for Marian and Laura, neither wants to 
shift with the circumstances. Both latch on to the care dynamic, and reassert it, especially 
when it is insecure.  
It is this mutually insisted-upon, insecure attachment to their care dynamic that 
inspires Marian’s collaboration with Hartright in treating Laura like a child. For Marian, 
Laura’s altered state is a return to the child-like period before Laura’s maturity through 
marriage to Glyde. Laura’s will and knowledge has been obliterated, and she is again an 
innocent creature utterly dependent on Marian’s care. Laura’s insistence that Marian not 
marry and leave her is repeated, but this time, without the selfish manipulation. Marian 
prefers Laura’s marriage to Hartright to her marriage to Glyde in large part because there 
is room for her to be completely in the know, more so than even Laura herself. It enables 
her to participate in a lion’s share of her maintenance and care. And it is in some ways a 
marriage for herself, too, as she and Hartright are in a partnership dedicated to the care of 
their quasi-daughter.  
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Foreboding and Cognitive Impairment: Collapsing Surface and Depth from Both 
Directions  
So, we’ve seen that foreboding is an appropriate and even productive state in this 
novel. We’ve seen that care relations can be particularly dangerous ones, and that 
foreboding has a special use in these contexts. We’ve seen that it’s possible to first have 
the intellectual ability to accurately forebode and then sink to passive inability, as Laura 
becomes a blank slate, without knowledge, and reliant on others for the most basic of 
care. Importantly, then, surface and depth are collapsed in two radically different cases in 
this novel: in the case of foreboding, and in the case of what I’ll call stupidity in the most 
neutral sense possible. In the case of foreboding, there is a truth that is met by a person 
intelligent enough to read patterns against historical precedent. In the case of stupidity, 
there is no ability to read patterns or history, and so surface and depth are the same: they 
are meaningless. After Laura’s traumatic incarceration in the asylum reduces her to a 
state of cognitive impairment, there is no difference between what is on her surface and 
what is below it: both are equally devoid of content. Foreboding requires the accurate 
reading of patterns, the comparative analysis of historical precedent, and the cognitive 
and experimental aptitude for holding multiple possibilities in mind at once. The kind of 
cognitive disability Laura experiences, which entails loss of knowledge, memory, and 
history, makes foreboding impossible. Knowledge is the hinge here: having it in spades 
or not at all leads to this collapse of surface and depth, or of suspicion and just 
interpretation practices. This brings us back to Sedgwick’s provocation that instead of 
pursuing the hermeneutics of suspicion (“This was a time when speculation was 
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ubiquitous about whether the virus had been deliberately engineered or spread, whether 
HIV represented a plot or experiment by the U.S. military that had gotten out of control, 
or perhaps was behaving exactly as it was meant to” (123)) we instead think about what 
knowledge does.  
In this novel, foreboding and knowledge are in a constant feedback loop: 
knowledge produces foreboding, which leads to action to acquire more knowledge that 
can function as proof. Foreboding stems from knowledge and points toward knowledge. 
The knowledge discovered through the foreboding process (Fosco’s confession, the 
discovered copy of the marriage registry, various overheard conversations) does a lot: it 
enables Hartright and Laura to marry and breed an heir to Limmeridge. It also, however, 
causes Marian to fall ill. Foreboding leads her to spy on Fosco and Glyde, and spying 
leads to knowledge that affirms her suspicions. Yet, this distressing knowledge, obtained 
in dangerous circumstances, in rain and cold, yields grave sickness, fever, and a loss of 
the very control she needs most. Lack of knowledge also has a range of effects. Think of 
Laura, who is made simple and happy by her lack of knowledge and her lost ability to 
forebode. Or think of her uncle, willfully walled off from knowledge and uninterested in 
foreboding. Laura is taken care of, but she is also robbed of the ability to forebode, and 
lives at the mercy of her sister and husband, both of whom have an interest in keeping her 
in her near-infantile state of dependence. Foreboding is not a ticket to the ball, then: it 
doesn’t guarantee success. Instead, it might lead to collapse and illness. But it might also 
lead to something else, something better.  
Foreboding and knowledge do a lot in this novel. But what about after the novel? 
Whereas characters and readers follow a near-exact path, foreboding and then 
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discovering knowledge in a tidy, self-congratulatory cycle, the novel ends with a choice 
and a divergence: the characters cease to forebode—Marian, Hartright, and Laura inhabit 
a picture-perfect domesticity of happiness and contentment, with everyone in the role 
they most wanted to assume indefinitely. But does the reader cease to forebode? This is a 
choice, and it’s one that, because of the novel form, which both ends, and is built on 
invention, can’t sustain foreboding: you can’t be satisfied that what you forebode is 
accurate, and you can’t forebode any longer for people who aren’t people, and whose 
lives don’t extend beyond the last page. As readers, we have to decide whether to be 
suspicious when we can no longer ever learn whether our suspicions are true. We can be 
suspicious at the end of the novel, but we can no longer forebode. Ben-Yishai argues that 
the reader, by the end of the novel, is worn out. “By the novel’s end the reader, longing 
for some form of order and stability, is ready to embrace Walter’s frame story of 
restoration, rather than look closely at its disruption. Walter’s legitimation, in this 
explanation, can be attributed to the reader’s exhaustion from sensation; at this point she 
is willing to accept any framework that promises continuity and respite from tribulation” 
(157). Maybe so for some readers, but maybe other readers, readers who have seen the 
relationship between surface and depth, are less sure of Walter’s legitimacy. But what 
does this state entail?    
In much the same way that Sedgwick and others warned against paranoid 
reading’s place as a required methodology for critical practice, we can use this end-point 
for foreboding as a warning against always foreboding. Sedgwick writes: “How are we to 
understand paranoia in such a way as to situate it as one epistemological practice among 
other, alternative ones?….In [Melanie] Klein, I find particularly congenial her use of the 
 151 
concept of positions—the schizoid/paranoid position, the depressive position—as 
opposed to, for example, normatively ordered stages, stable structures, or diagnostic 
personality types….The flexible to-and-fro movement implicit in Kleinian positions will 
be useful for my discussion of paranoid and reparative critical practices, not as 
theoretical ideologies (and certainly not as stable personality types of critics), but as 
changing and heterogeneous relational stances” (128). Foreboding can’t be sustained 
indefinitely, and shouldn’t be: it is a position, a practice, and like any other, it is only 
temporarily useful and, further, inhabitable only according to other, shifting and 
relational contextual circumstances. But what foreboding offers is not to be overlooked. It 
enables a point of contact for affects and actions, it ties cognitive and affective processes, 
and it respects the historical, structural, and contextual. It also attends to the way that 
cultures, institutions, and affective expectations shift: as we saw with Emma’s Knightley, 
the authentic gentleman is a construction, a new breed of man for a particular moment in 
history.  Foreboding, too, in its insistence on mapping evidence against new evidence, 
feeling against proof, suspicion against knowledge, is by its very nature a contextual 
feeling, especially useful in particular moments of history or experience. Foreboding 
allows us to trust our suspicions, while at the same time, seeming them as rooted in 
evidence and dependent on verification.  
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ACKNOWLEDGING OTHERS:  
GEORGE ELIOT’S “EXTENSION OF OUR SYMPATHIES,” REVISITED 
“The minds of all men are similar in their 
feelings and operations; nor can any one be 
actuated by any affection, of which all 
others are not, in some degree, susceptible. 
As in strings equally wound up, the motion 
of one communicates itself to the rest; so all 
the affections pass from one person to 
another, and beget correspondent 
movements in every human creature.”  
—Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 
3.3.1.7  
 
“One will thus never really know with 
whom one is dealing.”  
—Rousseau, First Discourse 
 
“It seems somehow appropriate—whatever 
the scientific equivalent of poetic justice 
may be—that the first animal to be 
successfully cloned was a sheep. Sheep, 
after all, are not famous for their 
idiosyncrasy, for the uniqueness of their 
characters. We had assumed that sheep were 
virtually clones of each other, and now we 
have also been reminded that they are 
inevitably—all but two of them—genetically 
different.”  
—Adam Phillips, “Sameness is All”  
  
 
So far in this dissertation, we have seen Austen’s interest in the ways that 
authentic selves are constructed and shaped by performance and historical context; we’ve 
seen Brontë’s Lucy Snowe derive deep and complex gratification from her role as 
unknowable cipher; and we’ve seen Collins explore the nature of feelings that correspond 
with knowledge. Throughout, I’ve found mainly bad or troubled relations, ones that are 
more complex given their foundation on the grounds of epistemological uncertainty. 
Focusing on the trickier, nastier byproducts of relationality, we have hardly touched that 
fundamental feature of epistemological discussions: sympathy. In this final chapter, we 
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turn finally to sympathy, and to its High Priestess: George Eliot. In so doing, however, I 
show that even the ur-advocate of sympathy, and especially sympathy through and in art, 
is in fact deeply critical of both sympathy’s potential and its effects. It is no great surprise 
to say that Eliot is concerned with sympathy and its difficulties, or with, as George 
Levine puts it in “Daniel Deronda: A New Epistemology” (2010), “the crisis of Western 
epistemology” that is “the mind’s incapacity to get outside itself” (52). To discover “that 
[another] had an equivalent center of self,” as Dorothea does about Casaubon, is one of 
the most important discoveries an Eliot character can make across all of her novels. And 
yet, more often than not, it is the limitations, assumptions, and hierarchical connotations 
of sympathy that Eliot investigates.  
These epistemological questions as they relate to discourses of sympathy take us 
back, once again to the moral sentimentalists. As we saw in Chapter One on Austen, for 
Hume, morality stems from feelings and the passions. You naturally have access to 
morality because you feel something -- approbation, disapprobation, pleasure, pain—
which translates directly to moral response. The problem, however, is that these feelings 
are more active and reliable when initiated in proximity, with people you can see and 
know. The very problem with sympathy, the reason why he considered it insufficient to 
form a stable basis for ethical behavior, is the fact that our sympathy is activated more 
strongly and more regularly for those who are nearest to us—our family—and that it 
becomes weaker in concentric circles outward from there. It “gives the preference to 
ourselves and friends, above strangers” (3.2.2.11). As a corrective, Hume imagined a 
system of justice that “fix[es] on some steady and general points of view” (3.3.1.15, 
italics in the original) that take into account the general good of mankind. Because we are 
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always in flux in situation and feeling and proximities to others, we learn to adopt a 
general point of view according to which we correct our feelings. This privileging of 
feelings is central for understanding Eliot, as is the challenge of closeness and proximity. 
Also vital, however, is Adam Smith’s insistence that we can’t actually know the other’s 
feelings or feel them ourselves: we are always ourselves, simply imagining what the other 
is feeling. In watching a hardened criminal hanging for a crime, we might feel shame and 
desolation, for example, but we can’t believe that the person hanging to death is feeling 
shame or any of our “nice” feelings.   
Just as some of the earliest and most cited theorizers of sympathy had extreme 
doubts about the value and uses of sympathy, so, too, did Eliot. In fact, she added to 
them. In addition to Hume’s anxieties about sympathy’s functionality for those far away, 
Eliot also doubts the power of sympathy for those nearby, and notes again and again in 
her fiction the failure of sympathy in the family context, or more broadly, in cases of 
familiarity. And going farther than Smith, Eliot not only contends that sympathy entails 
imagination and acknowledgment of otherness, she also shows that this is a project of 
domination, involving troubling hierarchies of knowledge and control about and over the 
other. In other words, if the crisis of epistemology is that we can’t know the other, the 
emergency response, for Eliot, is not to exercise the moral muscle in the hopes of 
overcoming the deficiency and seeing into the hearts and minds of others, but rather to 
learn to trouble that very ideal. As she observes in her final novel, sympathy is not only 
sometimes impossible, it is also potentially dangerous, leading to inaction or domination.  
Critics often see as too static what I see as a body of work that displays a mind 
that is constantly thinking dialectically and reassessing what it previously hypothesized 
 155 
about interpersonal relations and ethical obligations. In this chapter, I trouble the idea that 
Eliot’s thinking on sympathy is stable throughout her career. I look at the shifts in her 
thinking, and attend to the tension between sympathy and negative affects. Her essay on 
Wilhelm Riehl’s ethnography of the history and class structure of his native Germany, 
“The Natural History of German Life,” published in the Westminster Review on the eve of 
her novel-writing career, for example, is often taken as a manifesto for Eliot’s lasting 
credo on sympathy. In this essay, Eliot makes the famous claim that “[t]he greatest claim 
we owe to the artist, whether painter, poet, or novelist, is the extension of our 
sympathies” (Essays, 110).  A few lines down, in the same essay, Eliot expands on her 
claim that art enlarges sympathy. “Art is the nearest thing to life; it is a mode of 
amplifying experience and extending our contact with our fellow-men beyond the bounds 
of our personal lot. All the more sacred is the task of the artist when he undertakes to 
paint the life of the People” (Essays, 110). In this essay, Eliot argues that through art, 
through novels for example, the reader will virtually experience other people and 
conditions, and will see and understand more of their fellow men. If depictions of 
peasants are reductive, as Eliot argues they are in her essay occasioned by what she 
argues is Riehl’s non-reductive approach, and depict ruddy cheeks and simple happiness, 
then consumers of that art will have the wrong impression. If depictions of peasants, on 
the other hand, are more true to life, more sympathetic, then they will depict peasants as 
they really are: as moral or immoral, happy or unhappy, healthy or unhealthy as any other 
lot. Reading is therefore a charged moral activity: through it, one is granted more 
opportunities to know the other. This is, as I will show, Eliot’s thinking at the time of 
writing The Mill on the Floss. 
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But what if in spite of every effort, one can’t come to an understanding of the 
other? This is what Eliot takes on in Romola, and furthers in her later career novels. Her 
claims in the Riehl essay remain important to understanding the stakes for Eliot in writing 
fiction, but I show that the ethical problems she is concerned with, by the time she writes 
Romola, have shifted slightly. Rather than rectify the available novelistic representation 
of others in order to expand her readers’ sympathy through increased knowledge and 
identification, I argue that her concern is with the impossibility of knowing the other. The 
ethical dilemmas that Eliot is writing against are no longer “[h]ow little the real 
characteristics of the working classes are known to those who are outside them…” 
(Essays, 108) but, rather, that the real characteristics of anyone, even the self, can remain 
unknown no matter how much effort one expends in trying to obtain that knowledge.  
In Daniel Deronda, these questions remain ever-present, but added to them are ethically 
charged questions about the very subject-position of the sympathizer. What does it mean 
to write about the ruddy-cheeked peasant, even if the project is meant to humanize them? 
How might an over-developed sympathy lead to misery or, worse, inertia and inaction? 
And how might a surfeit of knowledge produce bad relations? Eliot articulated some of 
her most known concerns about sympathy in Middlemarch: “If we had a keen vision and 
feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the 
squirrel’s heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence. 
As it is, the quickest of us walk about well wadded with stupidity.” In Daniel Deronda, 
the consequences are not just personal—overstimulation and overextension through 
excessive sympathy—they are political, and reflect the dangers of knowledge to 
interpersonal and political contexts.  
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In her early fiction, readers and characters alike are intended to arrive at 
knowledge of the other, and if they don’t, they suffer morally or otherwise. Adam Bede, 
Eliot’s first novel, provides near its end a confession, and therefore knowledge, of 
something we already knew to be true: Hetty was responsible for her baby’s death. Along 
with Dinah, we have compassion for Hetty even in advance of her confession, but that 
compassion is then validated by her shattered (and shattering) narrative, delivered to 
Dinah in her cell. We never have to be in suspense: we know enough about Hetty to 
know what likely happened, and we are right. Along with Dinah, through our privileged 
position as readers of omniscient third person narration, we have come to know her, and 
so our ethical response to her is primed. We understand her, we have guesses as to what 
might have happened given her moral weakness and heartbreak, and we later find out we 
are right. Feeling deeply for and about the other to the point of intimate knowledge of 
that other is hard work, but it can be done, as it is by Dinah, and by us, the reader. In The 
Mill on the Floss, the narrator encourages our sympathy by providing knowledge about 
all the characters and their thoughts and feelings. Tom doesn’t stop to think how Maggie 
might feel, to disastrous effects, but if he had tried he could have. Further, though he 
doesn’t make the effort with Maggie, we make the effort with him, following him to 
school and leaving Maggie behind for a while in order that we should know and 
understand him and therefore sympathize with him in spite of his failings. Silas Marner, 
which Eliot wrote while also writing Romola, is a very different type of novel than Eliot’s 
others, hovering on the boundary between realism and fairy tale. Because of its 
allegorical nature, the novel offers more structural symbolism than depth of character 
(with the partial exception of Godfrey Cass who comes closest to having an inner 
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struggle, meager as it is). The questions the novel presents are not ones of sympathy for 
individuals so much as ones about why the world works the way that it does: Why is 
everything beautiful (Eppie coming into Silas’s life) colored by a sinister backdrop (her 
adoption is the product of moral failings, drug addiction, and theft)? Why does tragedy 
follow certain people? The novel unsettles and upsets the real world in this way, asking 
disturbing questions not of the extent to which we can know others, but about the extent 
to which the world responds to us, and even the extent to which it is real. (The novel ends 
with the ontological rather than the epistemological: does Lantern Yard exist?) The novel 
leaves much unsettled, and it is perhaps this willingness to end with unresolved doubt 
that helps Eliot back into the writing of Romola, and into a novel about maintaining and 
even cultivating doubt. In Romola, there are things you can’t know about other people no 
matter how hard you try, presenting a significant ethical dilemma. What are one’s duties 
toward those we don’t know or understand, especially when they themselves waver in 
their ethical behavior or elicit an urgent demand for sympathy? While it may seem 
perverse to skip Middlemarch in a chapter about Eliot, sympathy, and negative affects, 
moving ahead to Daniel Deronda allows me to think more explicitly about power and 
domination.   
 
I. The Mill on the Floss and “the great fundamental fact of blood” 
 
The chapter that describes Mrs. Tulliver contemplating the loss of all her 
household goods is titled, mockingly, “Mrs. Tulliver’s Teraphim, or Household Gods.” 
With the bailiff downstairs and the linens about to be sold, Mrs. Tulliver is reduced to a 
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pathetic state. At the news of their bankruptcy, her first move is to go and line up her 
ladles and sugar tongs, finger the monogram on her linens, and weep before her idols. 
She is a materialist, the narrator is telling us. She cares about her possessions more than 
she cares about her husband, who is lying unconscious a few rooms away. Many readers 
of the novel stop there, seeing this as a thoroughly derisive portrait of Mrs. Tulliver, who 
was previously shown obsessing over her sister Pullet’s cap, fussing over her daughter’s 
unruly hair, and vigorously but ridiculously defending her china with the “small gold 
sprig all over ‘em” (204). The scene in which Mrs. Tulliver weeps over her household 
goods, or gods, is funny the way Mr. Pullet’s constant sucking of candies is funny, or the 
way Mrs. Glegg’s fusty gowns are funny. But it would be a mistake not see the extent to 
which we are also being invited to sympathize with Mrs. Tulliver. “To think of these 
cloths as I spun myself,” (203) she says mournfully when her children appear at the door, 
and silly as it is to cry over tablecloths when her family is suddenly facing abject poverty, 
her response is touchingly human.  For Mrs. Tulliver, her handiwork is the physical 
manifestation of her values and of the time she spent emotionally preparing for a new life 
with a virtual stranger for a husband, albeit a stranger she supposedly chose. Each one 
represents hours of work and reminds her of the time when, as a young woman, she 
imagined what her marriage and her adult life would be like. Now that imagined future 
has come to nothing, indeed because of that virtual stranger who became a husband. To 
have to give them up, especially the ones with initials or “Elizabeth Dodson,” her full 
maiden name, inscribed on them, is devastating and humiliating, and we watch ultimately 
with sympathy.  
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This scene of sympathy is representative for the novel: even in cases where 
sympathy requires overcoming some preconceived notion—in this case, overcoming the 
sense that Mrs. Tulliver is ridiculous—it is eminently manageable. This is true for Tom 
Tulliver, too, who, as Karen Bourrier has argued in The Measure of Manliness: Disability 
and Masculinity in the Mid-Victorian Novel (2015), is difficult to sympathize with in part 
because he represents “a critique of and commentary on the Tom Brown and Tom 
Thurnall types of the muscular Christian and schoolboy novels of the 1850s” (79).  His 
strength and capacity as a self-made man sets him apart from Maggie, as well as from 
Philip Wakem, both more closely identified with giving and receiving sympathy.45 But, 
especially through free indirect discourse, the narrator extends sympathy even toward 
Tom, for example, in the climactic scene in the Red Deeps when Tom, having discovered 
the nature of Maggie and Philip’s relationship, marches Maggie into the Red Deeps to tell 
Philip that they can never see one another again. Tom hurls insults at both Maggie and 
Philip, mocking Philip’s physical disability by laughing at the very idea of his being a 
lover, and telling Maggie that she is a traitor to the family whose feelings for Philip are 
disgusting and disgraceful.  
Tom has never been colder or more conceited, which is saying a lot, and the 
chapter ends with our sympathy squarely on Maggie’s side. Through free indirect 
discourse we are even in her head, with front row seats to her emotions as she rages about 
Tom and even confesses to herself a distressing sense of relief at her forced separation 
from Philip. We have never felt closer to Maggie, or sensed that she was more alone and 
                                                
45 See Forest Pyle’s “A Novel Sympathy: The Imagination of Community in George 
Eliot.” Pyle argues that Maggie and Tom’s irreconcilable differences are an 
incompatibility of genres (he is a character in an epic while she is in a romance) (16). 
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in need of our sympathy. And so it is especially painful and significant that the very next 
chapter, and the next thing to happen in the novel, though the narrator tells us that three 
weeks have elapsed, should be Tom’s success in making enough money to pay back all 
the family’s debts. In other words, immediately after being told that she has been 
dishonoring her father and is a disgrace to the family, Maggie has to watch Tom loyally 
serving his family, as do we. 
Adding insult to injury, Mr. Tulliver, Maggie’s ally and supporter within the 
nuclear family, speaks ill of Philip Wakem, though of course without knowing anything 
about Maggie’s relationship with him. “Tom, my lad […] I’ll tell ‘em it’s you as got the 
best part o’ the money. They’ll see I’m honest at last, and ha’ got an honest son. Ah! 
Wakem ‘ud be fine and glad to have a son like mine—a fine straight fellow—I’stead o’ 
that poor crooked creatur!” (352). After this outburst, the narrator says, “Tom never lived 
to taste another moment so delicious as that; and Maggie couldn’t help forgetting her own 
grievances. Tom was good…” (352). It is Maggie’s voice that is buried in this third 
person narration—it is Maggie who thinks to herself that “Tom was good.” Maggie is 
feeling charitable. She has entered into his happiness and feels it with him, just as we 
entered into her head for a moment and felt with her that maybe Tom is good.  
The narrator regularly puts us in this difficult position of having to sympathize 
with Tom. We follow him to school, not Maggie, effectively schooling us, the reader, into 
caring for Tom as well as for Maggie. We regularly witness Maggie’s small 
delinquencies, as when she forgets to feed the rabbits who die as a result, and we 
sympathize with Tom’s indignation. But we also understand and sympathize with 
Maggie’s feelings.  The narrator always makes sure that it’s six of one, half a dozen of the 
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other. When she tells Tom, after the family goes bankrupt and he has to leave school to 
begin making money, that it’s too bad she didn’t learn bookkeeping because she could 
then have taught it to him, Tom becomes enraged. He tells Maggie: “You teach! Yes, I 
daresay […] You are always setting yourself above me and everyone else […] You think 
you know better than anyone, but you’re almost always wrong” (234). Twice, in the third 
person narration that surrounds this dialogue, the narrator describes Tom’s anger as 
“just”: first, he is described as frowning in the way he always does when he is about to be 
“justifiably severe” and then again, when the outburst is over, the narrator gives 
background to Tom’s emotional state: “Poor Tom! He had just come from being lectured 
and made to feel his inferiority: the reaction of his strong, self-asserting nature must take 
place somehow; and here was a case in which he could justly show himself dominant” 
(234). This repetition is confusing. Is there a shade of free indirect discourse here, or is 
this strictly the narrator’s voice? If the former, then Tom thinks he is just in his anger but 
we can think, along with the narrator, that he isn’t. But, if the narrator shares Tom’s sense 
of justice, then are we supposed to condone Tom’s outburst? In the famous chapter in 
Adam Bede in which Eliot gives us a gloss on her theory of realism and sympathy, she 
tells us that we have to learn to sympathize with even ugly or stupid people. In this novel 
more than in any of her previous, the characters are stupider and uglier, and her 
experiment in sympathetic realism is furthered. The sympathy is harder, but therefore 
even more essential. 
Free indirect discourse, by blurring the distinction between narrator and character 
in a way that resembles the work of sympathy, carries us along this process quite often in 
this novel, but sometimes it can be very hard to know whether free indirect discourse is 
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being deployed, as in the case above. Free indirect discourse requires close reading to 
notice it happening, but even close reading will sometimes not solve the mystery of 
whose words are being voiced. It is this built-in instability that Eliot is drawing our 
attention to with her occasionally ambiguous free indirect discourse. She is reminding us 
of the mediation inherent in free indirect discourse, and in sympathy more generally. As a 
model for sympathy, free indirect discourse is an extremely subtle narrative technique. It 
teaches us that entering into another’s thoughts might be possible –the narrator is able to 
do it, at least, some characters are sometimes able to do it, and as readers we are able to 
do it. It also teaches us that it requires close reading—carelessness and inattention will 
not reveal much about character and human nature in real life, either.  It also teaches us 
that we have to be extremely careful in our thinking about sympathy. Sometimes we 
suppose we have entered into another’s mind and know what they think, but sometimes, 
as in free indirect discourse, we can’t tell, we might be mistaken, we might be 
trespassing, or we might not be able to distinguish between our mind and another’s. 
 
In spite of this challenge, sympathy in The Mill on the Floss is possible, even if 
difficult. Maggie has the capacity to be exemplary in this regard (though she more often 
fails). She anticipates that Tom should be told of her father’s fall (both literal and 
symbolic) before arriving back home and asks permission to go to him at school to break 
the news. Philip, disabled himself, anticipates that Tom will be anxious about his 
recovery after an accident and, with great insight into what must be Tom’s most pressing 
thought, asks the doctor whether he will be lame and then relays the good news to the 
anxious patient. But when sympathy fails, as it often does in this novel, the novel form 
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itself becomes a vehicle for readerly sympathy that surpasses the capacity of her 
characters. True to her review of Riehl, it is the role of The Mill on the Floss to expand 
the sympathies, and Eliot achieves this often through free indirect discourse.46   
 Eliot uses free indirect discourse to model the sympathy that is absent in family-
life, to offer her readers an alternative to kinship networks that fail and family relations 
that disappoint, and to let her readers connect to fictional others who are perhaps more 
real than those in one’s actual household. And in this work, Eliot emphasizes that 
sympathy is most often absent or unperformed in one’s closest relations and with those 
whom we share the most, especially one’s family. Tom and Maggie have similar 
experiences growing up. They share the same jam-puffs, they have the same parents, they 
love the same river. And yet, their feelings couldn’t be further from similar. Similarity is 
not sympathy.47 This important lesson about sympathy is one that Eliot frames in the 
context of family, because family gives her the appropriate model for constructing 
unsympathetic similarity. The Dodsons, for example, assume that since they are all 
similar, they must all agree and feel the same way about things. They are described as an 
inflexible unit, sure of their superiority and united in their tastes early in the novel: 
                                                
46 See Raymond Williams’s “The Knowable Community in George Eliot’s Novels” for a 
critique of the sufficiency of community and sympathy through narrative. Williams 
interrogates the paradox between the ethical and aesthetic projects in Eliot’s sympathy. In 
this chapter, I attend to how this shifts for Eliot, rather than viewing “Eliot’s community” 
as static.    
47 See Audrey Jaffe’s Scenes of Sympathy for more on the role of identification in the 
Victorian scene of sympathy. Jaffe argues that sympathy in the nineteenth century is a 
class-oriented process of reestablishing one’s difference from the downtrodden, poor, or 
pitiable.  
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There were particular ways of doing everything in that family: particular 
ways of bleaching the linen, of making the cowslip wine, curing the hams, 
and keeping the bottled gooseberries; so that no daughter of that house 
could be indifferent to the privilege of having been born a Dodson, rather 
than a Gibson or a Watson. Funerals were always conducted with peculiar 
propriety in the Dodson family: the hat-bands were never of a blue shade, 
the gloves never split at the thumb, everybody was a mourner who ought 
to be, and there were always scarfs for the bearers. When one of the family 
was in trouble or sickness, all the rest went to visit the unfortunate 
member, usually at the same time, and did not shrink from uttering the 
most disagreeable truths that correct family feeling dictated; if the illness 
or trouble was the sufferer's own fault, it was not in the practice of the 
Dodson family to shrink from saying so. In short, there was in this family 
a peculiar tradition as to what was the right thing in household 
management and social demeanor, and the only bitter circumstance 
attending this superiority was a painful inability to approve the condiments 
or the conduct of families ungoverned by the Dodson tradition (43-44).  
Their unity as a group, as signified above by the irony often used in narration about the 
Dodsons, is often less than they would like it to be. While they often bring up their 
cohesion and similarity, it is repeatedly in the context of a complaint about the failure of 
their similarity to produce the appropriate agreement on some seemingly important 
matter. Mrs. Glegg, the sister most dogmatically observant of the Dodson principles, 
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remarks, upon arriving at Mrs. Tulliver’s house punctually only to discover that she is the 
first: 
“I don't know what ails sister Pullet," she continued. "It used to be the way 
in our family for one to be as early as another,–I'm sure it was so in my 
poor father's time,–and not for one sister to sit half an hour before the 
others came. But if the ways o' the family are altered, it sha'n't be my fault; 
I'll never be the one to come into a house when all the rest are going away. 
I wonder at sister Deane,–she used to be more like me. But if you'll take 
my advice, Bessy, you'll put the dinner forrard a bit, sooner than put it 
back, because folks are late as ought to ha' known better” (54, italics in the 
original).  
Regularly, Mrs. Glegg brings up the Dodson ways when they are not being properly 
observed. She is not the only one. All the sisters agree, for example, that it is a shame that 
the children turned out to be so unlike the Dodsons, and too much like the Tullivers. They 
simply cannot understand why, or accept the fact that, their similarity of experience, their 
shared credo, their identity as Dodsons, does not always or even usually result in fellow 
feeling. And in fact, the sisters, when all is said and done, do not enjoy one another’s 
company. As Talia Schaffer writes in Romance’s Rival , and which we can extrapolate to 
refer to the tensions between kinship networks and nuclear families generally: “Where 
other Victorian novels show cousins as people who share memories, kindnesses, and 
mutual respect, the world of The Mill on the Floss forecasts a future of independent 
nuclear-family financial rivals, squabbling over who begs, borrows, or owes money to 
whom. They are not unified but rather operate like species competing to survive…This is 
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a tragedy, of course, for Eliot, the great advocate of networks. [Suzanne] Graver argues 
that Eliot wants to remake the network through art and abstract thought; be that as it may, 
Eliot writes the end of a tradition in which it can be made through marriage” (194-5). It 
can’t be made through marriage, or, indeed, any close relations.  
 Despite their similarities as members of the same family, and indeed, often 
because of their shared upbringing, Tom is unable to understand Maggie. Throughout, 
Tom’s attitude toward Maggie is marked by an unwillingness to attend to her difference. 
He assumes she has the same values that he does, including his adherence to the family 
goal of wreaking revenge on the Wakems. They both love and revere their father. Why, 
then, doesn’t Maggie revile Philip? Tom doesn’t even bother to formulate this question, 
assuming that she should revile him and her failure is a failure of family feeling, and of 
ethics more broadly. Tom, who never thought about the family at all before his father’s 
fall, except to feel that “a proud sense of family respectability was part of the very air 
Tom had been born and brought up in” (189), thinks of himself post-fall as the family 
redeemer. Maggie’s multiple and contradictory needs have no reality to him—he neither 
attempt to know them or understand them. In their childhood, Maggie has no reality for 
him, except insofar as her actions might affect him. She comes into view for him mostly 
when she has done something wrong—eaten the bigger half of their split splice of cake, 
or killed his rabbit. She only exists when she acts on his world, and thus she is never 
considered as a separate person.  
 Troublingly, though he has never made an effort to know her, or see what passions 
motivate her, he has the capacity to be right about her, and passes a judgment on her that 
is true. After she has come back from her almost-elopement with Stephen, Tom says, “I 
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loathe your character and your conduct. You struggled with your feelings, you say. Yes! I 
have had feelings to struggle with; but I conquered them. I have had a harder life than 
you have had; but I have found my comfort in doing my duty” (485). As harsh as it is, 
Tom is, to right: this novel values duty and Maggie has abandoned hers. But in another 
sense, he is unbelievable: what feelings has he had that needed conquering? What 
passions does Tom have to rival Maggie’s? His struggles have included his humiliation 
and boredom while working in his Uncle Deane’s warehouse, and perhaps also his muted 
partiality for his cousin, Lucy Deane, but having followed both Maggie and Tom’s 
consciousness, we know that this similarity of suffering is not likeness, and that it 
prohibits rather than encourages sympathy.  
 
 Eliot’s ethical project to enlarge the sympathies of her readers sometimes rubs up 
against the aesthetic requirements of creating a novel. Troublingly, Adam Bede has to 
lose Hetty in order to learn about pain and experience sympathy. Hetty is sacrificed, and 
the reader is troubled by the exchange. Relatedly, Philip enters a “new life,” an “enlarged 
life,” in which he has learned to love Maggie more than he knew how to before, but the 
ethical process is bound up, ominously, in an aesthetic one. He writes to her, in his 
famous letter absolving her of guilt: “You have raised a dim unrest into a vivid 
consciousness. The new life I have found in caring for your joy and sorrow more than for 
what is directly my own, has transformed the spirit of rebellious murmuring into that 
willing endurance which is the birth of strong sympathy. I think nothing but such 
complete and intense love could have initiated me into that enlarged life which grows by 
appropriating the life of others; for before, I was always dragged back from it by ever-
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present painful self-consciousness. I even think sometimes this gift of transferred life 
which has come to me in loving you, may be a new power to me” (503). As Maggie is 
figured as a gift to him, sympathy is bound up with appropriation. Audrey Jaffe writes in 
Scenes of Sympathy that “in Victorian fiction [sympathy] is always about the construction 
of social and cultural identities, about the individual’s subject relation to the group” (23). 
In The Mill on the Floss, sympathy does more to alter an individual’s sense of self than 
their understanding of the subject of sympathy. Philip is impacted in ways that won’t 
affect his relationship to Maggie. Sympathy is for him, not her, and this relates to the 
aesthetic nature that his sympathy takes. As was the case with Austen’s Mansfield Park, 
the project of ethical imagination is tinged complicatedly with aesthetic production.  
Eliot turns from writing non-fiction to fiction in part because it is through the 
aesthetic project that she feels she will be most able to further the ethical one. When the 
narrator of The Mill on the Floss says, “it is necessary that we should feel it, if we care to 
understand how it acted on the lives of Tom and Maggie,” what he (the narrator is 
gendered male, it seems, in this as in many Eliot novels) means is that through literature, 
we can come to feel for others that we otherwise wouldn’t be interested in even 
considering. Through the aesthetic work we come to know others, which is the 
fulfillment of the ethical work. But, though the ethical and aesthetic are ideally partners, 
they are often in conflict. 
 As Karen Bourrier has shown, Philip is an artist, as well as a sensitive, deformed 
outsider. Philip, like his author, is involved in his final letter in an aesthetic as well as an 
ethical project, and this similarity leaves Eliot with a guarded, but still optimistic sense of 
the power of sympathy: by writing for others and inviting their readership, some form of 
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sympathy is extended; on the other hand, it isn’t imagined as being possible between 
characters. In Mill, reading provides complete knowledge, even though it’s not available 
in life. Eliot’s later fiction takes on this disturbing discrepancy, addressing the gap 
between the illusion of full knowledge that can be made possible in fiction and the 
various illusions about knowledge or the lack of knowledge that plagues us in life.  
 
 
II. Knowledge and Acknowledgment in Romola: "Her soul cried out for some 
explanation" 
 
If Mill reflects faith in sympathy but registers some doubts about its difficulty as well as 
its potential for appropriation and aestheticization, Romola reveals a deeper skepticism 
about the conditions necessary for sympathy, and of sympathy itself. In Romola, the 
novel that marks the middle of her career, and prepares her for her final novels, which are 
read as manifestos of sympathy, Eliot takes as one of her main characters a real, historical 
figure: Girolamo Savonarola, the fifteenth-century Florentine Dominican friar famous for 
his bonfires of the vanities, charismatic leadership, prophesies, and, finally, his 
confession, under torture, of falsehood. Despite years of poring through the archives, 
reading all of Savonarola’s writing, sending George Henry Lewes to archives she 
couldn’t access as a woman, returning to Italy and its libraries and monasteries, 
immersing herself in the culture and language, and even visiting Savonarola’s cell at San 
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Marco, Eliot is unable to come to a conclusion about Savonarola’s inner state;48 even 
after hours of close reading and rereading, the reader doesn’t know what to make of the 
conflicting relationship between prophecy and realism,49 or between Savonarola’s 
confession and his character as previously revealed through narrative; and the eponymous 
Romola herself, despite having an intimate relationship with Savonarola spanning years, 
does not know what to make of him. And yet, finally, Romola does respond to him 
ethically, and she does come to experience a form of sympathy. In reading his confession 
and witnessing his execution with her emotional and critical skills working in tandem, 
Romola comes to an ethical response that remains, crucially, rooted in ambiguity.  
By Romola, then, Eliot suggests that sympathy must be rooted in ambiguity, and 
that it involves recognition that knowledge is inconclusive coupled with what George 
Levine has called, writing about Daniel Deronda, “disciplined intensity of feeling.” 
Levine writes, “It is only in Daniel Deronda that George Eliot risks challenging the ideal 
of rational and detached objectivity with her deep-seated belief that knowledge is always 
implicated in and sustained by feeling. Objectivity for her [in Daniel Deronda] is 
possible not through elimination of the self and feeling but through a disciplined intensity 
of feeling” (69). While Levine sees Eliot’s challenge to “rational and detached 
objectivity” only in Daniel Deronda, I find it pronounced in Romola, too, and see this 
challenge as essential to understanding Eliot’s evolving views on sympathy. In Romola, 
Eliot not only critiques the ideal of dispassionate “rational and detached objectivity” on 
                                                
48 For details on George Eliot’s research and preparations while writing Romola, see 
Gordon S. Haight (343‒66) and Nancy Henry (129‒30). For insight and background on 
Eliot’s use of sources, see Felicia Bonaparte’s The Triptych and the Cross. 
49 Felicia Bonaparte argues that the novel is not a work of realism but, rather, a symbolic 
novel (15) or, as she also argues, a poem (5).  
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its own without feeling, but also interrogates objectivity, calling into question her own 
previous thinking on sympathy as being produced in response to knowledge derived by 
training careful attention on an other. But rather than stopping at this skeptical impasse, 
Eliot hypothesizes a way through her skepticism, radically revising her earlier positions 
on sympathy, imagining it instead as a way of acknowledging an other rather than 
knowing him or her. This shift from knowledge-based to acknowledgment-based 
sympathy is most visible in her treatment of Savonarola. 
Eliot’s claims in her early Riehl essay remain important to understanding the 
stakes for Eliot in writing fiction, but the ethical problems she is concerned with, by the 
time she writes Romola, have shifted. Rather than rectify the available novelistic 
representation of others in order to expand her readers’ sympathy through increased 
knowledge and identification, she asks questions about instances—common as they are—
when it is impossible to know the other. The ethical dilemmas that Eliot is writing against 
are no longer “[h]ow little the real characteristics of the working classes are known to 
those who are outside them . . .” (260) but, rather, that the real characteristics of anyone, 
even the self, can remain unknown no matter how much effort one expends in trying to 
obtain that knowledge.  
By setting the novel deep in the past, and centering it on the experiences of a real, 
historical, and unknowable figure, Eliot asks questions about what to do when others are 
ultimately unknowable—when knowledge is not enough. In the face of this chasm, Eliot 
suggests that sympathy is arrived at by honestly facing the limits of one’s knowledge and 
holding that up against one’s own “disciplined intensity of feeling.” In what follows, I 
will borrow from Stanley Cavell and call this humbled merging of feeling and knowledge 
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“acknowledgment.” In Cavell’s essay “Knowing and Acknowledging” (1976), he 
articulates a way of proceeding ethically in spite of our skeptical inheritance, arguing that 
acknowledgment goes beyond knowledge. Whereas knowledge suggests certainty (I 
know you’re in pain), acknowledgment entails a response even in the absence of certainty 
(I acknowledge that you’re in pain even if I can’t know it). Cavell gives the following 
example, using the plain language he inherits from ordinary language philosophy and that 
helps him overcome the logical positivism he found stifling. “From my acknowledging 
that I am late it follows that I know I’m late (which is what my words say); but from my 
knowing I am late, it does not follow that I acknowledge I’m late—otherwise human 
relationships would be altogether different than they are” (257). Later in the same essay, 
Cavell ups the ethical ante:  
I might say here that the reason ‘I know you are in pain’ is not an 
expression of certainty is that it is a response to this exhibiting; it is an 
expression of sympathy. (‘I know what you’re going through’; ‘I’ve done 
all I can’; ‘The serum is being flown in by special plane.’) But why is 
sympathy expressed in this way? Because your suffering makes a claim 
upon me. It is not enough that I know (am certain) that you suffer—I must 
do or reveal something (whatever can be done). In a word, I must 
acknowledge it, otherwise I do not know what ‘(your or his) being in pain’ 
means” (263; emphasis in the original).  
Cavell overcomes the impasse of skepticism by arguing that to know is not the point and 
so it doesn’t matter that it’s impossible. Instead, acknowledgment is the adequate and 
appropriate ethical response given our skeptical condition, and acknowledgment requires 
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that something happen. When the limits of knowledge are mingled with the “disciplined 
intensity of feeling,” a person can be said to acknowledge the other, thereby doing 
something to or for that person.50  
In the novel’s last scenes, Romola does not know what Savonarola feels, and yet 
she acknowledges his pain. That is all she can do given his impending execution and her 
inability to actually hold knowledge of his inner state. Rather than depicting what I’ll 
called knowledge-based sympathy, as Eliot had in her earlier novels, in Romola, she 
articulates what I call acknowledgment-based sympathy: a sympathy that recognizes the 
skeptical position, and that requires instead a response that derives from studied critical 
detachment and “disciplined intensity of feeling.” When Romola, watching Savonarola’s 
execution, comes to feel what he is feeling, she is displaying acknowledgment, not 
knowledge. This process is largely not explained by the narrator, and as readers, we are 
tasked with going through the process alongside her. We are asked to acknowledge that 
Romola’s identification is itself acknowledgment-based, which is to say that we as 
readers have to enter into an ethical position that necessitates our own moving forward in 
spite of skepticism.  
 
For Savonarola, obligation and rebellion take religious and political form.51 
Savonarola is a religious reformer with grand and controversial plans for Florence. He 
                                                
50 See Patchen Markell’s useful gloss: “What matters in our relation to another, Cavell 
suggests, is not knowing something special about him, or knowing him (his pain, 
pleasure, humanity, character, or very being) in a way that could evade doubt once and 
for all. What matters, instead, is what we do in the presence of the other, how we respond 
to or act in the light of what we do know. That is acknowledgement, or its failure....” 
(Bound by Recognition, italics in the original).  
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reports prophecies, rebels against the Pope, preaches against the humanistic leadership of 
the Medici family and the vulgar, materialistic excesses that their leadership promotes, 
and becomes ever more deeply embroiled in the political maneuvering and intrigue of the 
period. His charisma and persuasive rhetoric touches Romola and many Florentines 
deeply, but as the novel progresses, two questions emerge, both the result of an inability 
to know the other: First, to what extent is Savonarola’s religious and political zeal 
honestly felt and reported, or to what extent is it trumped up for ends that, good as they 
might be, are corrupting? And second, to what extent is his downfall the result of his 
presuming to know the other—whether it be God, the Pope, the people of Florence, or the 
political actors of Florence, including the devious Tito—but getting it wrong? Both 
Romola and Savonarola are unable to determine what the appropriate ethical action is in 
any of their given contexts, in large part because they are unable to penetrate others’ 
minds, others on whom they depend but whose reliability is unknowable. 
This is the main question that Eliot works through in the writing of this maturing 
novel, which functions as a hinge between her earlier and later works: What obligations 
do we have to others in light of the fact that our ignorance about them can be 
insurmountable? While most critics writing about Romola focus on Tito, I will focus 
                                                                                                                                            
51 Gender is, of course, a major factor in the potential scope of one’s obligations. Romola 
and Tito are both the children of un-ideal fathers (or father figures), and for both, 
rebellion is held up as an option, but unsurprisingly only the man, not the woman, resists 
paternal authority. Romola and Savonarola both consider rebellion from obligation, but 
Romola’s obligations are largely interpersonal whereas Savonarola’s larger sphere of 
influence and therefore obligations could only be possible for a man. See Homans (189‒
222) for more on gender expectations and restraints in the Renaissance and Victorian 
periods. See David (177‒96) on Romola as a female intellectual, Paxton (143‒49) on 
Romola as a feminist heroine, Beer (123) on Eliot’s female heroines as saints, and Gilbert 
and Gubar on Eliot’s female characters, including Romola, trapped between “angelic 
passivity or Satanic revenge” (495).  
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largely on Romola’s attempts to understand Savonarola in an effort to decipher Eliot’s 
reckoning with this question and its complex set of possible answers. This is a 
particularly fruitful dynamic for several interrelated reasons. Savonarola is a real, 
historical person and yet (or and so) it is impossible to know for sure what he was 
thinking, what he was up to, and what to think of him, because unlike a fictional 
character, there are answers that go beyond the text. Understanding Savonarola, for us 
readers, is akin to Eliot’s process of reading about Savonarola in her research, which is 
again akin to Romola’s process of coming to know Savonarola. All of us have the same 
problem: we can’t know, and yet we are asked to think ethically about him and determine 
the degree to which he is morally culpable.  
The problem that both Savonarola and Romola face—of knowing “where the 
sacredness of obedience ended, and where the sacredness of rebellion began” (474)—is 
connected to the epistemological problems the novel confronts. All but Eliot’s last novel 
are historical novels, but Romola is set in a much more distant (and foreign) past, and one 
effect of this historical distancing is that the epistemological problems are connected to 
historical ones. This novel compellingly presents the problem of the archive as an 
epistemological problem. Savonarola, a historical figure shrouded in mystery, and about 
whom scholars and historians have taken radically different positions, is examined by 
Eliot, her narrator, and her eponymous heroine, but the mystery remains: Is he the real 
thing, a religious and social reformer whose aims are pure and whose prophetic capacity 
is authentic, or is he a fraud, as hungry for power in post-Medici Florence as Romola’s 
husband, Tito (or the articulator of his creed and minor character in the novel, 
Machiavelli)? Eliot’s research for this book went beyond her process for any other. Lewes 
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wrote in a letter to John Blackwood, her publisher (though not, ultimately, for this novel), 
that Eliot was “buried in old quartos and vellum bound literature which I would rather not 
read; but she extracts nutriment, no doubt” (Letters 3: 430; quoted in Haight, 350). 
Haight’s biography is full of references in this period to Eliot’s growing despair at her 
ability to understand Savonarola. In another letter to Blackwood, Lewes writes, “Polly is 
still deep in her researches. Your presence will I hope act like a stimulus to her to make 
her begin. At present she remains immovable in the conviction that she can’t write the 
romance because she has not knowledge enough” (Letters 3: 473‒74; quoted in Haight, 
353). Of course, Eliot does write the novel, but not with any conclusive knowledge about 
Savonarola’s inner state. Cultivating this willingness to experience uncertainty, which 
Eliot passes on to both Romola and her readers, is central to the novel’s aims. 
This cultivation of uncertainty is related to what Amanda Anderson has argued is 
a dominant Victorian habit of mind. In The Powers of Distance, Anderson claims that 
Eliot’s valuing of Riehl’s “inductive method” is representative of a larger Victorian 
interest: “Eliot’s essay serves as an illuminating example of what I argue is a prevalent 
Victorian preoccupation with distinctly modern practices of detachment, a preoccupation 
characterized by ambivalence and uncertainty about what the significance and 
consequences of such practices might be” (3). She argues that writers of the period—she 
considers Eliot, Brontë, Dickens, Wilde, Mill, and Arnold—“explore in a sustained way 
what it means to cultivate a distanced relation toward one’s self, one’s community, or 
those objects one chooses to study or represent” (4). Anderson does not only study the 
habit or interest in detachment of the Victorian period, though that is certainly largely her 
aim, but also argues that it is an ideal, “the aspiration to a distanced view” (6). In so 
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doing, she addresses the provocative nature of this claim in a critical age deeply 
suspicious of any “claims to objectivity or reflective reason” (7), but responds, with Mill, 
that any responsible perspective has to be first made distant and tested.  
Anderson claims that Eliot is deeply ambivalent about the importance of distance 
and detachment, which is in conflict with her “valuing of rootedness” (14) but which is so 
essential for observing and knowing others as they really are. This ambivalence directly 
relates to Eliot’s complicated thinking on sympathy. Anderson writes that Eliot’s 
“endorsement of Riehl’s procedure of pedestrian observation, coupled with her calls for 
disinterestedness and sympathy, is an example of what Christopher Herbert has identified 
as the conflicted postures of ethnographic subjectivity, which begin to appear in the 
nineteenth century and continue to inform the development of anthropology in the 
twentieth century. Such conflicted postures attempt to mediate between sympathetic 
immersion and detached analysis and judgment” (15). In this article, and by looking at 
Eliot’s working through of these questions in Romola, I argue that sympathy itself 
becomes an exercise in detachment: Eliot shifts from depicting sympathy as an 
“immersion” in an other’s experience to depicting sympathy as an activity that requires 
and thrives on distance.  
Anderson and George Levine both train their attention on Daniel Deronda, 
arguing that it is a novel that brings into focus their various ideas about detachment and 
sympathy. While Anderson says that Eliot, in Daniel Deronda, showcases modern critical 
detachment, Levine argues, on the contrary, that in Daniel Deronda, Eliot challenges the 
ideal of rational detached objectivity and puts faith, instead, in feelings. In my reading of 
sympathy, detachment and feeling are jointly deployed in responding ethically to the 
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subject of sympathy. It is not a choice between detachment and immersion, but rather, the 
combination of detachment and “disciplined intensity of feeling,” which allows the 
retention of one’s difference from the other. In Romola, Eliot investigates this relation 
between critical detachment and “disciplined intensity of feeling” and finds a space for a 
more refined and ethical sympathy.  
There have been many sensitive critics of Victorian sympathy in recent years that 
have examined assumptions about sympathy, such as that it is based on immersive 
identification, or what I’ll call knowledge-based sympathy. These critics have focused on 
the dangers of identification: namely that it negates the other’s reality and otherness. 
Rebecca N. Mitchell makes the case, in Victorian Lessons in Empathy and Difference, 
that identification is solipsistic and possessive. She argues powerfully that sympathy is 
possible only when isolation and difference are recognized; sympathy can grow through 
the maintenance, not the reduction, of alterity. Rae Greiner has argued, along similar 
lines, that a lack of knowledge, not omniscience, aids sympathy. She writes: “It was 
crucial for [Adam] Smith, and later for the realists, that sympathy not secure the sort of 
intimacy we now associate with empathy. . . . Sympathy as the realist novelist understood 
it involves a belief that our sympathy depends on an awareness that the other is other: not 
me, not my photographic image” (419). Cara Weber, in “‘The Continuity of Married 
Companionship’: Marriage, Sympathy, and the Self in Middlemarch,” shows that by 
Middlemarch, Eliot is interested in critiquing identificatory sympathy on two counts: it 
negates otherness and assumes static identity. I endorse this reading, but argue that this 
critique begins earlier.  
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 I argue that by the time Eliot comes to write Romola, she has the same objections 
to knowledge-based sympathy that these critics have, and is thinking again about the role 
of distance and detachment in art and its ability to enlarge sympathy. If sympathy is not 
enlarged through hard-earned knowledge of the other, then how? As David Kurnick 
points out in “Abstraction and the Subject of Novel Reading,” Romola is a novel about 
reading. It is a book full of scholars and about scholarship, its protagonist is regularly 
pictured reading or aiding the study of others, and it is the product of Eliot’s own deep 
reading. By looking at how Eliot depicts Romola’s reading, and thinking about Eliot’s 
reading, we can get a better understanding of what Eliot thinks is left if we take 
knowledge of the other out of the sympathetic experience and replace it with detachment 
and disciplined feeling, or acknowledgment.  
Caroline Levine, writing about Romola in The Serious Pleasures of Suspense, 
writes that the novel represents two alternative models of reading and being in the world: 
first, the rationalist model by which suspicions are tested against reality, and second, the 
prophetic model by which dreams and desires are believed to be meaningful or real. 
“Perhaps rather than choosing between the two—as critics in the past have done—we 
might imagine that George Eliot mobilizes both the rationality of the test and the 
nonrationality of the dream as alternative modes of representing the world. Indeed, I 
propose to read the novel as an interrogation of two conflicting ways of reading the 
real—one the realist experiment, the other the antirealist model of prophecy. Romola is a 
narrative that asks how and whether we might establish one as more valid than the other” 
(139, italics in the original). My reading runs parallel to Levine’s. I argue that Eliot is 
asking us to hold multiple possibilities in mind without necessarily choosing between 
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them: regarding the truth of prophecy, we are asked to believe both that Savonarola’s 
prophecy has some element of meaningful but not religious truth, and that his and Fra 
Lucca’s prophecies and dreams actually did have prophetic truth; regarding Savonarola’s 
motives and truthfulness, that Savonarola truly believed he was receiving prophecy 
directly from God, and that he only hoped that his thoughts were corroborated by God; 
regarding his political ambitions, that Savonarola believed his religious duties were in 
line with his political goals and that there was an element of realpolitik knowingly 
involved. On the one hand, Savonarola represents a mythological, symbolic character 
with access to a higher truth in a way that draws on Feuerbach’s idea, an extremely 
influential one for Eliot, that even without God, religious ideas are mythically and 
symbolically meaningful. On the other hand, Savonarola represents a gritty, disheartening 
realism, and his downfall is the product of a psychologically realistic egoism. This 
uncertainty frustrates the reader’s desire for closure, and suggests instead that closure or 
resolution is essentially illusory. All possibilities regarding Savonarola—the reality or 
unreality of his prophecy, the righteousness of his intentions, and the extent of his 
honesty—are kept open, and we readers must allow for several, conflicting versions of 
Savonarola’s interior states, without ever settling on a single narrative. Like Levine and 
Kurnick, I argue that this is as much a challenge for Romola as it is for the reader, and 
that this novel is as much about the interrelation of the characters as it is about the 
relation between the reader and the text.52 
                                                
52 Rebecca Mitchell argues, in Victorian Lessons in Empathy and Difference, that the 
lessons of alterity are posed for characters, but not for readers. Readers, she argues, have 
access to knowledge about the characters, and so aren’t tested in the same way the 
characters are, or the same way that we all are in our lives. I agree, but maintain that in 
Romola, Eliot makes it impossible for even the reader to know Savonarola.  
 182 
The novel’s penultimate chapter (not including the “Epilogue”) provides the best 
example of this challenge to keep multiple possibilities in suspension indefinitely. The 
chapter addresses Savonarola’s written confession, extracted under torture, by discussing 
the various responses to the confession experienced or exhibited by various kinds of 
readers, including Romola. Her reading experience is held up against the reading 
experience of other reader-types, including “the more devout followers of Savonarola” 
(575), “Other friends of Savonarola, who were less ardent partisans” (576), and “Men of 
ordinary morality” (577), also described as “shrewd men” (577). All of these types are 
described as having distinct reading experiences and responses, all with regard to their 
way of relating the text to their own experience outside the text. The “shrewd men,” for 
example, weigh their understanding of how “the seductions of a public career” (577) 
might have altered Savonarola over time, while the “more devout followers” attribute 
anything damning, anything that doesn’t read like the Savonarola they hold in their 
minds, to “the falsifying pen of Ser Ceccone, that notary of evil repute” (575). Each 
succeeding reader-type responds differently and with a combination of reasoned attention 
to the text and preconceived opinion regarding the text and its subject. As readers of these 
various readers’ responses, we get to experience all of them, and we see the reason (as 
well as the failures in reason) behind each one. 
The materiality of the reading experience is central, and is insisted upon several 
times over the course of the chapter. The confession is described repeatedly as a printed, 
circulating object: “the document,” “there were copies accidentally mislaid,” “a second 
edition,” “the printed document,” “the printed confessions” (575‒78). Romola is 
described as a close reader: partaking in “long meditations over that printed document,” 
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“read[ing] this evidence again and again” (575), and reading so carefully as to discover 
that “many sentences bore the stamp of bungling fabrication” but that on the other hand, 
“the fact that these sentences were in striking opposition, not only to the character of 
Savonarola, but also to the general tone of the confessions, strengthened the impression 
that the rest of the text represented in the main what had really fallen from his lips” (578). 
“One memorable passage” (578) is quoted at length and then analyzed by both Romola 
and the narrator. Our text document—the novel—couldn’t be more insistent: this is a 
written document of personal experience that, like a novel, can be read and reread, 
analyzed down to the level of the sentence or word, and examined for all possible 
meanings. 
It is through Romola’s reading experience that we, as readers of the novel, experience 
the various readers’ experiences of the confession and the confession itself. She is described 
as reading the confession over and over again, comparing her memory and experience of 
Savonarola to his supposed words of confession. “Romola, who began to despair of ever 
speaking with Fra Girolamo, read this evidence again and again, desiring to judge it by some 
clearer light than the contradictory impressions that were taking the form of assertions in the 
mouths of both partisans and enemies” (575). This is near the start of the chapter, and the 
“contradictory impressions” are what make up the next part of the chapter, until the narrator 
reports, “Romola’s ears were filled in this way with the suggestions of a faith still ardent 
under its wounds, and the suggestions of worldly discernment, judging these things according 
to a very moderate standard of what is possible to human nature. She could be satisfied with 
neither” (577). Romola takes in all the narratives and contradictory impressions, and by 
holding them in her mind simultaneously, she reaches the conclusion that they are 
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unsatisfactory. She sees neither from the perspective of an ardent adherent nor that of a 
cynical bystander; instead, she attempts to articulate for herself an alternative that is true to 
her experience of Savonarola. Romola is enacting the sort of detachment Anderson describes: 
she stands apart, reads and rereads, and remains critical of the ready-made positions before 
her, preferring to hold them in her mind simultaneously and skeptically rather than attaching 
herself to one of the narratives. But this critical distance is coupled with years of feelings that 
stem from her deep attachment. “She brought to her long meditations over that printed 
document many painful observations, registered more or less consciously through the years of 
her discipleship, which whispered a presentiment that Savonarola’s retraction of his prophetic 
claims was not merely a spasmodic effort to escape from torture. But, on the other hand, her 
soul cried out for some explanation of his lapses which would make it still possible for her to 
believe that the main striving of his life had been pure and grand” (577). She brings to this 
moment knowledge of his past, his character, and their relationship, an understanding that this 
knowledge is not enough, and, crucially, her feelings. “Her soul cries out” for more 
information, “for some explanation,” because in spite of her “years of discipleship,” she can’t 
know what he was thinking, what was coerced and what was honest confession, and yet she 
does feel pain and a soul-crying need. So she speculates, trying out different hypotheses:  
And perhaps this confession, even when it described a doubleness that 
was conscious and deliberate, really implied no more than that wavering 
of belief concerning his own impressions and motives which most human 
beings who have not a stupid inflexibility of self-confidence must be liable 
to under a marked change of external conditions. In a life where the 
experience was so tumultuously mixed as it must have been in the Prate’s, 
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what a possibility was opened for a change of self-judgment, when, 
instead of eyes that venerated and knees that knelt, instead of a great work 
on its way to accomplishment, and in its prosperity stamping the agent as a 
chosen instrument, there came the hooting and the spitting and the curses 
of the crowd; and then the hard faces of enemies made judges; and then 
the horrible torture, and with the torture the irrepressible cry, ‘It is true, 
what you would have me say: let me go: do not torture me again: yes, yes, 
I am guilty. O God! Thy stroke has reached me!’” (579‒80; emphasis 
added)  
I emphasize the language of hypothesis in this passage because what Romola does 
here and in the previous passages is extraordinary: she works through a set of possibilities 
that is at once based on critical distance and based on her heightened feelings, and 
remains, all the while, undecided. The arc of her long exploration of hypotheses ends 
with one that proposes that Savonarola is guilty of weakness, rather than craven 
falsehood. This hypothesis is easier, emotionally, to accept than if he had been as 
Machiavellian as Tito, and harder to accept than if he was simply tortured into 
submission. It is also more likely, given what she has the ability and access to know, and 
it is so vivid to Romola that she even imagines the scene and his cry. What comes next is 
a shift from consideration and testing to something that resembles knowledge-based 
sympathy. Romola seems to imagine her way into Savonarola’s experience, contradicting 
her earlier sense that she couldn’t know what he is thinking or feeling. “As Romola 
thought of the anguish that must have followed the confession . . . that anguish seemed to 
be pressing on her own heart and urging the slow bitter tears” (580). His anguish 
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becomes her anguish. Through a strangely doubled moment of free indirect discourse, we 
hear through her feelings what he himself is feeling: “Every vulgar self-ignorant person 
in Florence was glibly pronouncing on this man's demerits, while he was knowing a 
depth of sorrow which can only be known to the soul that has loved and sought the most 
perfect thing, and beholds itself fallen” (580, italics in the original). Her mind is shown 
thinking what his mind is thinking. Through some process of critical detachment and 
emotional perception, Romola has enacted at least hypothetical identification. This 
identification is heightened in the next chapter, when Romola hears that Savonarola 
retracted his confession and hopes that he will speak the truth at his execution, when he 
has nothing left to fear. She hopes for more evidence and for truth untarnished by his or 
her hopes.  
The execution scene, for which she is seated beside Jacopo Nardi, the actual 
historian whose account of Savonarola influenced Eliot so greatly in her writing of the 
very novel we are reading,53 points in multiple ways to the inability, even to the scene of 
death, to know the other or hear a true confession. The narration repeatedly focuses on 
the clothing of the condemned and the way in which outward signs influence 
interpretation. Savonarola comes out in his Dominican robe but is stripped to his 
undergarments, and thus appears more guilty and ruined to the onlookers who are open to 
seeing him as a disgraced heretic. This is the basis of Romola’s problem—that the 
outward and inward do not correspond—and the reason that she has come to the 
                                                
53 Daniel Malachuck, in “Romola and Victorian Liberalism,” claims that Pasqual Villari 
is one of three main sources that informed Eliot in her writing of Romola (the others 
being Lewes and Thomas Trollope) and that Villari was greatly influenced by Nardi 
himself. Importantly, each of these influences had radically different impressions of 
Savonarola’s honesty and intentions.  
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execution hoping to hear from Savonarola’s own mouth his inward truth. But he doesn’t 
speak, and counterintuitively, this prompts, for Romola, more identification: “But in the 
same moment expectation died, and she only saw what he was seeing—torches waving to 
kindle the fuel beneath his dead body, faces glaring with a yet worse light; she only heard 
what he was hearing—gross jests, taunts, curses” (584, italics in the original). At the 
moment she realizes that she can’t know what he thinks or what his motives were, she 
identifies with him so strongly that she sees and hears along with him, and even imagines 
him, bizarrely, as already dead and yet still aware of the flames kindling for his 
consumption. This scene, which directly draws on Adam Smith’s depiction of the brother 
on the rack, and on Smith’s thought experiment about identification with the dead, is, 
crucially, identification, but it is identification without knowledge. Identification, in 
Romola, has shifted from something based on actual knowledge of the other, to 
something that happens in spite of a lack of knowledge. Indeed, it is the very fact that 
Romola remains “filled . . . with dismayed uncertainty” (582) that makes her 
identification so poignant.  
So what does it mean that Eliot is exploring an identification that can happen 
outside of knowledge of the other, and is in fact enhanced by that lack of knowledge, and 
what does it mean that identification is still relied upon and held up as an appropriate 
ethical response in spite of this lack of knowledge? Is Romola’s move toward 
identification in spite of knowledge condoned by the narrative? It will help to look at the 
relationship the novel sets up repeatedly between knowledge and feeling, and the weight 
it gives to feeling as a mode of or aid to knowledge. Romola’s evolution over the course 
of the novel has prepared her for letting both feeling and knowledge comingle to inform 
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her view of the world and of others. Early in the novel, when she is still under her father’s 
roof, she is regularly told that she is too feminine and emotional to be a rational scholar 
like himself. Bardo tells Tito, a complete stranger at that point in the novel, “I constantly 
marvel at the capriciousness of my daughter’s memory, which grasps certain objects with 
tenacity, and lets fall all those minutiae whereon depends accuracy . . .” (64). The novel 
proves Bardo doubly wrong: Romola is eminently reasonable, and Bardo’s inability to 
interrogate his feelings about what duties others owe him is likely the cause of his work’s 
ultimate failure (an especially ironic failure given its humanistic nature). The sharp 
distinction Bardo makes between reason and feeling is belied by Romola’s more 
persuasive form of thinking and feeling in the novel.  
Tito and Savonarola also blame Romola for letting her feelings get in the way of 
her reason. When Savonarola first stops Romola from running away, he tells her she is 
consulting her feelings rather than the actual fact of her duty. He is right, of course, that 
she is being guided by feeling, but he is too patriarchal and dominating in this moment to 
be fully persuasive, and furthermore, there is a great deal of reason behind her desire to 
run away. Tito has failed her and revealed himself to be a false person. And she does have 
intellectually driven plans for her future that can’t be seen as entirely emotionally 
motivated, and that in fact stem from her humanistic, rational upbringing. “She did not 
know that any Florentine woman had ever done exactly what she was going to do: 
unhappy wives often took refuge with their friends, or in the cloister, she knew, but both 
those courses were impossible to her; she had invented a lot for herself—to go to the 
most learned woman in the world, Cassandra Fedele, at Venice, and ask her how an 
instructed woman could support herself in a lonely life there” (327). But Savonarola 
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condescends, commanding her to return home and not to run away (“Ask your 
conscience, my daughter. You have no vocation such as your brother had [to run away 
from familial duties]. You are a wife” [365]) and when Romola’s “mind rose in stronger 
rebellion with every sentence” (360) the reader not only understands but rises in rebellion 
along with her. The discerning reader will see that Savonarola errs, like Bardo, in his 
inability to appropriately bring together feeling and reason, and to note the strength of its 
combination when he encounters it. Tito, not to be left out of the male chorus of scolds, 
rarely speaks openly enough to Romola to actually articulate his condescension, but on 
those rare occasions when he does, he chides Romola for being too swayed by feeling to 
understand the reasons behind his actions. “My Romola,” he says, oozing contempt, “You 
are so constituted as to have certain strong impressions inaccessible to reason” (418).  
While these male authority figures repeatedly make claims of this kind, casting 
aside the value and use of feelings, they are full of feelings themselves. Bardo and Tito 
share a propensity for self-love and a quickness to feel wronged and blame others. In 
other words, they have feelings, just not ones that tend outward to others. Savonarola, by 
contrast, has an excess of feelings, but is unwilling to consider them as meriting attention 
in others. When he intercepts Romola’s attempt to run away from Florence and Tito, he 
claims to know enough about her situation to be able to judge it, not only disregarding 
her feelings but “car[ing] for her apart from any personal feelings” (361). “‘I know 
enough, my daughter: my mind has been so far illuminated concerning you, that I know 
enough.’” Whereas Romola’s mind was still torn by conflict,” (366) Savonarola is 
assured and decisive—the difference between them is that Romola attends to both her 
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feelings and her understanding, while Savonarola is too assured of what he claims to 
know.  
In another scene, after returning to Florence and struggling to understand how to 
feel about her uncle and Tito’s involvement in Florentine politics, the narrator describes 
Romola as engaged in “thought” as regularly as she is described as “feeling” (449), and 
then says, “After all has been said that can be said about the widening influence of ideas, 
it remains true that they would hardly be such strong agents unless they were taken in a 
solvent of feeling” (449‒50).54 Knowledge and feeling are linked in this novel—
knowledge works best when mingled with feeling, or even when discovered through 
feeling.55  
John Cross wrote that George Eliot, speaking of Romola, “told me she could put 
her finger on it as marking a well-defined transition in her life.” She told him: “I began 
[Romola] a young woman—I finished it an old woman” (Cross 2: 255). In the writing of 
Romola, the questions Eliot asks about sympathy shift from what they were in her 
previous novels. Rather than asking, “What should we do to better understand and 
identify with the other?” she asks a harder, more cynical question: “Given that we can’t 
know the other, how should we proceed?” In Romola, sympathy is no longer explored as 
a process of identification derived from knowledge of the other. Instead, it requires a 
                                                
54 Bonaparte’s argument that the novel is best read as a symbolic poem is based, in part, 
on her use of Eliot’s claim, in “Notes on Form in Art,” that poetry “begins when passion 
weds thought by finding expression in an image” (4).  
55 Isobel Armstrong credits Eliot’s depiction of the primacy and complexity of emotions 
to her deep engagement with Spinoza, while Hina Nazar credits Eliot’s depiction of 
sympathy as a combination of feeling and insight, emotion and reason with her deep 
engagement with Feuerbach.  
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“disciplined intensity of feeling,” a willingness to acknowledge what one doesn’t or can’t 
ever know, and a commitment to respond ethically in spite of that skeptical impasse.  
 
III. “I was living myriad lives in one:” Daniel Deronda and the Dangers of Sympathy  
 
In Mill sympathy is shown to be possible for readers who have the capacity for 
complete knowledge, but is shown to be unlikely between characters, especially 
characters who theoretically should be more able to identify. Likeness does not lead to 
sympathy, we found, but the full knowledge of readership does. In Romola, not even the 
reader was treated to anything approaching full knowledge, and so the challenge of 
sympathy became figured within the context of acknowledgment: in spite of or perhaps 
even because of the inability to know anything for certain, we respond. In Daniel 
Deronda, these ideas become even more complex, as Eliot returns to a knowledge-based, 
identificatory sympathy that has damaging impacts on the performer and subject of 
sympathy.  
 Sympathy, Eliot posits, is a problem of endless alternatives. The novel opens with 
an epigraph of Eliot's own writing on the essentially imaginary, creative nature of the 
concept of a beginning. The number one is a useful concept, she writes, but is also 
essentially meaningless. “Science” doesn’t have a beginning. At least “[Science's] less 
accurate grandmother Poetry has always been understood to start in the middle.” Before 
the start of any story, number, or claim, there are an infinitesimal number of things that 
could, and do, contribute to that whole. This radical inclusiveness, however, is staggering 
and suspending: if there’s no beginning, how can anyone ever begin anything?  This is 
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the problem that Daniel Deronda faces. There are too many factors for Daniel, too many 
potential directions and possibilities. His diffuse sympathy is too diffuse. He is too open, 
too willing to be swayed, too interested in everything, and too unable to settle on 
anything. There is, problematically for Eliot, no authentic Daniel.  
 Andrew Miller has written about the Victorian obsession with and fear of 
weakness of will, a condition often associated with too much sympathy, too strong a 
capacity to consider and take on other perspectives. Although Victorians idealized 
sympathy and its moral function, they were also terrified that understanding an 
alternative perspective, though ethically useful, might be destructive of one's sense of self 
and of one's vigor.56 Miller quotes Henry Sidgwick57, writing in 1869: “We are growing 
year by year more introspective and self-conscious: the current philosophy leads us to a 
close, patient, and impartial observation and analysis of our mental processes…We see 
that there are many sides to many questions: the opinions we hold we hold if not more 
loosely, at least more at arm’s length: we can imagine how they appear to others, and can 
conceive ourselves not holding them. We are losing faith and confidence: if we are not 
failing in hope, our hopes at least are becoming more indefinite; and we are gaining in 
impartiality and comprehensiveness of sympathy” (Sidgwick, “Poems and Prose,” 363-
364, qtd in Miller, 57). Miller continues that while “the Victorian discourse about 
sympathy was famously idealizing, seeing it indeed as the spring of moral behavior—as 
in Eliot’s early and now famous remarks about that greatest benefit we owe to the artist, 
                                                
56 See also Neil Hertz’s George Eliot’s Pulse. In “Recognizing Casaubon,” Hertz argues 
that Eliot’s writing is consumed with anxiety about the egotism inherent in writing: 
“Writing, like the self-doubling of narcissism, is disturbing not simply because it may 
seem ‘self-centered,’ but because it is both that and self-dispersing at once” (25).  
57 Andrew Miller notes, amusingly and importantly, that Sidgwick was Eliot’s “friend 
and tennis partner” (69).  
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whether painter, poet, or novelist…. But writers soon came to realize that, in enlarging 
moral reflection, this wide-ranging, cosmopolitan form of sympathy could hamstring the 
very impulses it was to motivate” (60). Miller shows that alongside the idealization of 
sympathy existed an equivalent fear about its potential for diminishing “vigor.” 
“Sidgwick perceives that the very mechanism designed to launch moral reflection can 
disable its motivations. And, in the next decade, John Morley would speak of an ‘elegant 
Pyrrhonism,’ a ‘light-hearted neutrality’ according to which people ‘look on collections 
of mutually hostile opinions with the same kind of curiosity which they bestow on a 
collection of mutually hostile beasts in a menagerie’ dead to the ‘duty of conclusiveness’ 
(Morley, On Compromise, 130, qtd in Miller, 60).    
 It is not news to argue that Daniel is too interested in everyone and everything, 
that his sympathy is too diffuse, and that he is weak-willed in just the way Victorians 
were afraid of. He refuses to settle on an imaginary beginning and work forward from 
there. A classic moment that showcases Daniel's too diffuse sympathy is the scene in 
which he floats on the river “using his oars little, satisfied to go with the tide and be taken 
back by it” (188). Eliot's novels are full of river scenes, and of people either drowning in 
them or failing to drown in them, of people floating aimlessly down them or moving 
purposefully along their currents. Here is another version of that theme, and this time it is 
to show how Daniel just lets the world carry him, never taking an active role, never 
exerting his will. Daniel is aware of his aimlessness, and is aware of Sir Hugo's 
frustration with it, and the chapter opens with a description of Daniel’s continued state of 
aimlessness. 
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On a fine evening near the end of July, Deronda was rowing himself on 
the Thames. It was already a year or more since he had come back to 
England, with the understanding that his education was finished, and that 
he was somehow to take his place in English society; but though in 
deference to Sir Hugo's wish, and to fence off idleness, he had begun to 
read law, this apparent decision had been without other result than to 
deepen the roots of indecision....He had a boat of his own at Putney and 
whenever Sir Hugo did not want him, it was his chief holiday to row past 
sunset an come in again with the stars. Not that he was in a sentimental 
stage; but he was in another sort of contemplative mood perhaps more 
common in the young men of our day—that of questioning whether it 
were worth while to take part in the battle of the world: I mean, of course, 
the young men in whom the unproductive labour of questioning is 
sustained by three or five percent on capital which somebody else has 
battled for (185).  
It's been more than a year that Daniel has been floating along in this aimless way through 
life. He can't settle on anything except to settle that he definitely can't settle on anything. 
He is one of those modern young men, and it is important to note that this is the only 
novel Eliot wrote set in the present rather than in the recent or distant past, who is unable 
to “take part in the battle of the world.” He is too understanding of all people and ideas, a 
position idealized in the discourse of the ethics of perspectival sympathy but dangerous 
even on ethical grounds in that it precludes one from making decisions about right and 
wrong. If your sympathy is too diffuse, as Daniel's is, might one come to sympathize with 
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people like Tom Tulliver, as we did in Mill, or with a murderer, as we do with Hetty 
Sorrel in Adam Bede. Sympathy can take one out of one's culture in that it can preclude 
action and participation. Sympathy can take one out of one’s culture, too, in that it can 
lead to sympathy with any and all people and positions. But in order to be of the world 
and act in it, “men need the make-believe of a beginning.” Daniel is good at a fully 
sympathetic, perspective-less existence, but he cannot settle on a place to begin. Floating 
along aimlessly on the river, he is in his element. 
He chose a spot in the bend of the river just opposite Kew Gardens, where 
he had a great breadth of water before him reflecting the glory of the sky, 
while he himself was in shadow. He lay with his hands behind his head 
propped on a level with the boat's edge, so that he could see all around 
him, but could not be seen by any one at a few yards' distance; and for a 
long while he never turned his eyes from the view right in front of him. He 
was forgetting everything else in a half-speculative, half-involuntary 
identification of himself with the objects he was looking at, thinking how 
far it might be possible habitually to shift his centre till his own 
personality would be no less outside him than the landscape (189).  
Daniel is concerned here with effacing himself—putting himself in the shadow, hiding 
himself in the boat so that he can see out but others can’t see in to him, and most 
importantly, and complicatedly, experimenting with shifting his center of self as far as 
possible outside himself. Echoing the language of Middlemarch, in which Dorothea 
discovers, on her honeymoon in Rome, that her husband has “an equivalent centre of self, 
whence the lights and shadows must always fall with a certain difference” (211). Daniel 
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doesn't need to be taught that there are equivalent centers of self. He knows it, and is 
interested in seeing how far he can enter into those centers. 
 This is problematic, though, for several reasons. The first I've already touched 
on—it precludes one from actively engaging with the world, and potentially stunts one's 
ethical capacity to know right from wrong, and to make lines in the sand, effectively 
choosing a beginning and going from there, rather than always starting in the middle and 
going back, creating reasons, and imagining justifications. Another danger is that, in 
placing oneself in the unseen shadows while communing with other centers of self, one 
assumes a position of power, an imperious distance that can be destructive and shattering 
of those other selves one is so willing to imagine. Take, for instance, the opening scene of 
the novel, in which Daniel's gaze interrupts Gwendolen's gambling and seems to have 
some magical negative effect on her winning streak. He watches from a distance, judging 
her beauty and her gambling. From Gwendolen's perspective, this feels like an appraisal 
of her whole worth. “But in the course of that survey her eyes met Deronda's, and instead 
of averting them as she would have desired to do, she was unpleasantly conscious that 
they were arrested—how long? The darting sense that he was measuring her and looking 
down on her as an inferior, that he was of different quality from the human dross around 
her, that he felt himself in a region outside and above her, and was examining her as a 
specimen of a lower order, roused a tingling resentment which stretched the moment with 
conflict” (10). Gwendolen is not wrong. He is looking down on her, he is judging her, he 
does see himself as infinitely superior to the scene before him, a scene which, in his 
mind, might serve to justify Rousseau “in maintaining that art and science had done a 
poor service to mankind” (9). His limitless gaze and his ability to see into people has the 
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capacity slide into judgmental attitudes, imperiousness, and a power-dynamic that places 
him in unsound relations to others.  
 The uneven power dynamic between Daniel and Gwendolen is central to their 
relationship, and after a phase of rebellion, it is actually invited by Gwendolen, who 
desires his imperious gaze because it makes her feel known by someone, and because she 
seems to masochistically want to be punished for her deeds by someone who knows all. 
The form of sympathy that entails full knowledge of and insight into the other is, it 
seems, a sympathy that dovetails with domination and power. To know fully and to feel 
fully for the other is also to have power over that other. This feeling of power and 
domination is uncomfortable when it comes to Gwendolen, the most fully realized and 
sympathetic character in the novel. It is also uncomfortable when it arises with Mirah, the 
least realized character in the novel and the one readers often struggle to fully care for. 
Daniel is aware of his power over Mirah and makes an effort to refrain from ever exerting 
his influence over her during the period before he knows his own heritage. He knows 
how much she idealizes him, and how indebted to him she feels, and tries to steer clear as 
much as possible. He is afraid to ask her to sing, for example, because he knows she will 
do anything he asks, but doesn’t want to make her unhappy by being coerced to perform 
for him.58   Given this extremely self-aware knowledge of his power over Mirah, the 
scene of his marriage proposal seems especially disturbing. Upon discovering that he is 
Jewish, and then upon being told by Hans that Mirah loves him, Daniel wastes no time. 
What this means, though, is that he proposes to her at exactly the moment when she is 
                                                
58 Mordecai’s Biblical sister-daughter-cousin-figure, Esther, was the Queen who was 
chosen based on her willingness to perform for her husband, King Ahasueros, unlike his 
previous wife, Vashti, who refused. Mordecai’s sister in Daniel Deronda, Mirah, has a 
vexed relationship with performing for others.   
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most abjectly positioned before him. Her father, Lapidoth, who had stolen her from her 
mother and brother, forced her to sing for profit, and even attempted to marry her off for 
profit, has returned to the scene and has been grudgingly allowed to stay with Mirah and 
Ezra. The scene that culminates in the proposal begins with her father stealing Daniel’s 
ring that was given to him by Sir Hugo but which had actually belonged to his real father. 
Daniel had placed it on the small side table while sitting with Ezra and Lapidoth had seen 
the opportunity for easy money and taken it. Mirah, already deeply ashamed of her father, 
realizes immediately upon hearing that Daniel can’t find his ring that it must have been 
her father, and this instance of shame relating to her father is even greater than all the 
others because this time her father has done something disgraceful directly to the person 
she loves and feels indebted to.  
She watched him and said, ‘It is not there?—you put it on the table,’ with 
a penetrating voice that would not let him feign to have found it in his 
pocket; and immediately she rushed out of the room. Deronda followed 
her—she was gone into the sitting-room below to look for her father—she 
opened the door of the bedroom to see if he was there—she looked where 
his hat usually hung—she turned with her hands clasped tight and her lips 
pale, gazing despairingly out of the window. Then she looked up at 
Deronda who had not dared to speak to her in her white agitation. She 
looked up at him, unable to utter a word—the look seemed a tacit 
acceptance of the humiliation she felt in his presence. But he, taking her 
clasped hands between both his, said, in a tone of reverent adoration— 
‘Mirah, let me think that he is my father as well as yours…’ (791-2).  
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She looks at him with a look of abject shame, representative of the humiliation she, in 
some sense, always feels in his presence. Seeing that, understanding it, knowing her to be 
in white agitation, he takes her hands and asks her to consider her shame to be his shame, 
too, and her father his father, too. It is at once a deeply equalizing gesture that allows 
them to share the pain and shame equally, and a deeply disturbing scene in which she is 
asked for her hand in marriage at precisely the moment in which she has been brought 
lowest in her own estimation of herself in regard to her beloved.  
 So sympathy has the capacity to create some strange, disturbing power dynamics. 
It also has the tendency to efface the self, causing a potential weakness of will and an 
inability to participate in the world. It also has the capacity to efface the other. This is 
most fully realized in Daniel’s complete sympathy with Ezra, which Ezra means to quite 
literally efface Ezra’s memory. Daniel takes on his legacy, takes on his sister to be his 
own (the relationship between Daniel and Mirah is never erotic—it is a familial marriage, 
one that allows both to be comfortable with a sibling-like bond in memory of, in Mirah’s 
case, a real sibling bond, and in Daniel’s case, a homo-social bond)—he essentially takes 
his whole identity, transmuting from the apathetic Christian English gentleman to the 
Jewish, idealistic, scholarly, and fanatical figure that Ezra once was. Immediately upon 
discovering that he was right, and that Daniel is a Jew, Ezra exclaims:  
It has begun already—the marriage of our souls. It waits but the passing 
away of this body, and then they who are betrothed shall unite in a stricter 
bond, and what is mine shall be thine. Call nothing mine that I have 
written, Daniel, for though our Masters delivered rightly that everything 
should be quoted in the name of him that said it—and their rule is good—
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yet it does not exclude the willing marriage which melts soul into soul… 
(751).  
Daniel smilingly declines this proposal of Ezra’s, that the two lose their identities so 
entirely in the other that their names and identities become meaningless. The English 
gentleman in him insists on credit where credit is due. But, this is a true melding of 
identities, a marriage of souls (again, it is Ezra and Daniel who are really marrying here, 
not Mirah and Daniel). But though Daniel feels a blush of discomfort with all of Ezra’s 
enthusiastic speeches about the two of them being one, Ezra gets the last words in the 
novel. He takes a hand each of Daniel’s and Mirah’s and says, “Death is coming to me as 
the divine kiss which is both parting and reunion—which takes me from your bodily eyes 
and gives me full presence in your soul. Where thou goest, Daniel, I shall go. Is it not 
begun? Have I not breathed my soul into you? We shall live together” (811). Ezra is not 
just with him as a memory after death. Their marriage of souls, from two into one, is 
work that has already begun. He has already breathed his soul into Daniel’s, and Daniel, 
with his ideal receptiveness which we saw at work especially as he floated along the 
Thames and practiced moving his own center of self to the centers of self he found 
around him, has received Ezra, has been given his identity. It is a literal, complete 
sympathy. And it is disturbing. Eliot makes this transfer both beautiful and dark, ideal and 
disturbing, realistic and mythical.  
 Daniel’s hyper-active sympathy is what keeps him from doing anything for much 
of the novel. A consummate reader-figure, he is committed to narrative and can’t do 
anything until he knows his own story, until he meets with his mother and attains the self-
knowledge that eluded him throughout his parent-less, past-less life. His commitment to 
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narrative, the narratives of others as well as his own, takes us back to where we started 
with Mill. In Mill, the reader has all the knowledge whereas the characters don’t have 
enough. The readers can sympathize but the characters can’t, even in instances where 
they do have enough knowledge, but don’t have the will to consider the other. In Daniel 
Deronda, Daniel is now in the position of the reader. He sits back and reads his own life 
story, as well as the life stories of the others. At the start of Eliot’s career, reading was a 
vehicle for sympathy which was in turn an ethical tool one could import back into life. 
Here, Eliot shows how reading, or reading others, can inhibit the ethical work of life.  
  
In closing, I’d like to turn to the person who does act but who doesn’t care: the 
Princess Leonora Halm Eberstein. Like Henry Crawford, Deronda’s mother is an actor 
who takes on many roles, but does not extend that sympathetic rigor to her life or its real 
characters. Deronda, on first seeing her, is chiefly aware that “her face [was] so mobile 
that the next moment she might look like a different person” (624). Explaining her lack of 
interest in assuming the role of “mother,” she says, “I was living myriad lives in one” 
(626). She has no interest in living for another, or extending sympathy to her father, 
husband, or son. But before we write her off as an unwilling sympathizer in a George 
Eliot novel, and therefore unqualified to receive high ethical marks, we should consider 
what it means in this particular Eliot novel to act—both generally and in terms of 
performance.  
In Eliot’s novels, we’ve seen families whose closeness and kinship is not 
conducive to sympathy. We’ve seen sisters and mothers whose sympathy fails. We’ve 
seen husbands whose sympathy, so active and imperious, becomes abusive. Finding 
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herself in a web of interconnection, and demanded to marry and procreate, the Princess 
responds by refusing. As in so many of Eliot’s characters, duty and passion are at odds for 
her. Unlike her son, Deronda, whose life conspires to join his passion and duty, hers 
doesn’t, and can’t. Unlike Lucy Snowe, who has no other options other than to provide 
care professionally, the Princess is able to find a way out, and takes it. She does not have 
to find outlets for her negative feelings as Lucy does—instead, she refuses care 
altogether, and performs her feelings not to others imposed on her, but on the stage. Her 
domineering, demanding father wishes she had been a son, and instead, turns her into an 
object made to produce a Jewish son. She refuses this model of relational transmission, 
choosing instead of the performance of dutiful daughter, wife, and mother, that of 
professional performance on the stage—a life in which she can perform multiple roles, 
not just the small, circumscribed one she is assigned.  
That readers have so thoroughly rejected the Princess and, further, read her as 
rejected by her author is a failure of sympathy—one that Eliot expects and, rather than 
settle, leaves charged. This is pressure point of sympathy which, like the ethics of care, 
demands particular relations with particular others, or what Andrew Miller calls second 
person relations. Leonora’s unwillingness to provide maternal care, or any kind of care, is 
a response to the relational institutions in which she is born and expected to behave. Our 
willingness to sympathize with Leonora, or our unwillingness, is a radical test of our 
sympathy, and of our openness to negative affects in the nineteenth century. Along with 
Henry Crawford earlier in the century, however, I see the authors of these badly behaving 
actors as being deeply invested in their responses to and against affective expectations, 
including expectations for sympathy. 
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